WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume XXVI, Number 3 April 1974

Price $9.00 per year

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ISSN 0043-8871

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

KLAUS KNORR, *Chairman*

CYRIL E. BLACK — HARRY H. ECKSTEIN
BERNARD BRODIE — WILLIAM T. R. FOX
BERNARD C. COHEN — CHALMERS JOHNSON
ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN — SIDNEY VERBA
ORAN R. YOUNG

Editors: KLAUS KNORR, CYRIL E. BLACK, HENRY S. BIENEN, GERALD GARVEY, LEON GORDENKER (*Review Articles*)

Associate Editors: KATHRYN BOALS, WILLIAM H. BRANSON, STEPHEN F. COHEN, JAMES T. C. LIU, EDWARD L. MORSE, WALLACE E. OATES, RONALD ROGOWSKI, DAVID SEIDMAN, ROBERT L. TIGNOR

Executive Editor: ELSBETH G. LEWIN

The editors invite the submission of articles bearing upon problems in international relations. Editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to WORLD POLITICS, Corwin Hall, Princeton, N.J. 08540. Manuscripts should be double-spaced throughout and submitted in duplicate.

Statements of fact and opinion appearing in WORLD POLITICS are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publishers. WORLD POLITICS does not usually accept manuscripts for which subsequent publication, even in somewhat different form, is planned.

Reprint permission: Permission to reproduce or translate material from WORLD POLITICS should be sought from the Permission Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540. Rates: $9.00 per year; $15.00 for two years; $20.50 for three years. Foreign postage, 50 cents additional per year. Single issue, $3.00.

Back issues: WORLD POLITICS is available in microfilm or xerographic copies from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Complete Volumes I-VII are available from Johnson Reprint Corporation, 111 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003. Certain issues of Volumes XXI and XXII and all issues starting with Volume XXIII are available from Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Advertising: Advertising Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by *ABC POL SCI, Book Review Index, Public Affairs Information Service*, and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*. Abstracts of articles appear in *Book Review Digest, Historical Abstracts*, and *International Political Science Abstracts*.

Copyright © 1974 by Princeton University Press

WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. April 1974. Vol. XXVI, No. 3. Second Class postage paid at Princeton, N.J. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

VOL. XXVI · APRIL 1974 · No. 3

CONTENTS

The People's Republic of China in the United Nations: A Preliminary Analysis — *Samuel S. Kim* — 299

Building Authority: A Return to Fundamentals — *Norman H. Keehn* — 331

Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making System in Japan — *Chihiro Hosoya* — 353

RESEARCH NOTE

Fascism and Modernization: Some Addenda — *A. James Gregor* — 370

REVIEW ARTICLES

The Political Analysis of Negotiation: How Who Gets What and When — *I. William Zartman* — 385

Tradition and Politics in Studies of Contemporary Japan — *James W. White* — 400

Statesmanship and Scholarship — *Tang Tsou* — 428

The Contributors — ii

Abstracts — iii

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTRIBUTORS

SAMUEL S. KIM is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Peace Studies at Monmouth College (New Jersey). He is currently working on a book entitled *The Causes of War: An Interdisciplinary Approach.*

NORMAN H. KEEHN is an unaffiliated scholar living in Madison, Wisconsin. He is the author of a forthcoming book, *La Lucha: The Politics of Stabilization.* At present, he is investigating the political impact of science and technology on post-industrial society.

CHIHIRO HOSOYA, Professor of International Relations at Hitotsubachi University (Tokyo), is the co-editor and co-author of a four-volume study of relations between Japan and the United States during the decade before Pearl Harbor. He is also the author of two books dealing with relations between Japan and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution.

A. JAMES GREGOR is Professor of Political Science and Assistant Dean of the College of Letters and Science at the University of California (Berkeley). His most recent books include *An Introduction to Metapolitics* (1971), *Interpretations of Fascism* (1974), and *The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics* (1974). At present he is working on a biography of Mussolini. He has been awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship for 1973-74.

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, Professor of Politics at New York University, is the author of *The Politics of Trade Negotiations between Africa and the European Economic Community* (1971), and the editor and co-author of a forthcoming work on *The Analysis of Negotiation.*

JAMES W. WHITE is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His recent publications include *The Sokagakkai and Mass Society* (1970), "The Meiji Restoration" (in Gabriel Almond and others, eds., *Crisis, Choice, and Change,* 1973), and *Political Implications of Cityward Migration* (1973). At present he is engaged in a research project on the political significance of migration to Tokyo.

TANG TSOU is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is the author of *America's Failure in China* (1963) and *The Embroilment over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang, and Dulles* (1959), and co-author and co-editor of *China in Crisis* (two vols., 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ABSTRACTS

The People's Republic of China in the United Nations: A Preliminary Analysis

By S. S. KIM

As tested by the data provided during the first sixteen months of participation in the United Nations system, the PRC has proved to be neither a wrecker nor a reformer. On most issues, ideological predilection has not been a decisive determinant of the PRC's diplomacy in the United Nations. China has adopted the posture of a cautious and diligent apprentice, learning her new trade and bending her crude ideological conceptions to the dictates of *Realpolitik*. However, the pragmatic pursuit of national interests is often concealed under the mantle of either legitimizing ideological dialectics or the principles and slogans appealing to the Third-World nations. The PRC's UN diplomacy reveals not only the basic goals and objectives, but also the means and methods of her new, vigorous, and imaginative foreign policy.

Building Authority: A Return to Fundamentals

By N. H. KEEHN

In newly established regimes, building and maintaining authority is the fundamental task. It is on the basis of their authority that leaders secure compliance and support to achieve public purposes. The conferring of benefits constitutes the incentive designed to attract support and to motivate compliance. In post-revolutionary Bolivia, inflationary fiscal and monetary policies underpinned the government's support-building policies. Inflationary outputs helped to create the consent that facilitated governing. By 1956 inflation had become so acute that the Bolivian Government was impelled to administer a stabilization program. Stabilization reduced the government's capacity to confer benefits; this led to a shift in support and loyalties. Failure to consider the political aspects of inflation threatened the viability of the government.

Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making System in Japan

By CHIHIRO HOSOYA

This is an attempt to account for some traits of the foreign policy decision-making system in Japan on the basis of case studies of her war decisions. The system is characterized by: (a) the "truncated structure"—the lack of leadership at the top—; (b) the important role played by the middle echelon of the military and civil bureaucracy; and (c) the great emphasis on building consensus before making final, crucial decisions. An effort is made to compare the foreign policy decision-making system of Japan with that of the United States. It is also suggested that the bureaucratic politics model is workable as a conceptual scheme in the case of Japan's decision for war.

Fascism and Modernization: Some Addenda

By A. J. GREGOR

The effort to identify fascism as "anti-modernist" requires (1) a definition of "modernization"; (2) an accurate rendering of fascist intentions; and (3) some evidence that fascist practice was calculated to achieve "anti-modern" ends. While we do not have any universally accepted standard definition of "modernization," the term generally implies industrialization, urbanization, secularization, and rationalization. We do have some evidence that indicates that the groups that came together to constitute fascism had modernizing intentions. Furthermore, the statistics that have become available indicate that fascist practice clearly did not impair industrialization. Italy, under fascist rule, enjoyed a fairly rapid rate of industrialization. Finally, there is some evidence that urbanization, secularization, and rationalization proceeded apace. Fascism seems to qualify as a mass-mobilizing, developmental dictatorship that had totalitarian characteristics.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The United Nations publishes compendia of statistics comprising a unique storehouse of world information furnished by countries, and including estimates by experts. For governments, businesses, universities, libraries and others these are ready and useful references for studying markets and social, demographic and economic developments throughout the world.

Demographic Yearbook 1971
International demographic statistics for over 250 countries and territories on population trends, marriages, divorces, births, deaths, expectation of life, infant mortality, age distributions, population of cities, literacy, abortions.

Order No. E/F.72.XIII.1
Clothbound $28.00

Statistical Yearbook 1972
Covers a wide range of subjects, including: population, agriculture, manufacturing, construction, transport, trade, balance of payments, education and culture. Improved statistical coverage has enabled the *Yearbook* to provide more comprehensive country, world and continental aggregates.

Order No. E.73.XVII.1
Clothbound $30.00

Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics 1971
Detailed estimates of national income and related economic measures for some 120 countries. Among the many subjects covered are: gross domestic product and expenditure, distribution of the gross domestic product, composition of private consumption expenditure, government and revenue expenditure and external transactions.
3 volume set (not sold separately)

Order No. E.73.XVII.3 $36.00

World Energy Supplies 1961-1970
Contains annual data on the production, imports, exports and consumption of solid fuels, petroleum and its principal refined products, gases and electricity (thermal, hydro, geothermal and nuclear) for approximately 185 countries with regional and global totals. The origin and destination of world trade in solid fuels, crude petroleum and natural gas is also shown.

Order No. E.73.XVII.2
Paperbound $8.00

These publications, as well as many others, are also available on Standing Order. This means that by ordering once you can receive them as they are published. For further information on the United Nations publishing programme, send for our catalogues, available free of charge:

- **Sales Catalogue 1973**
- **Check List of Books in Print 1945-1972**
- **Standing Order Brochure**
- **Official Records 1962-1970 Supplement 1970-1972**

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS
Room LX-2300, New York, N.Y. 10017 or *Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Political Analysis of Negotiation: How Who Gets What and When

By I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN

The formal theoretical analyses of bilateral monopoly bargaining by Cross and Coddington involve assumptions of a two-party, positive-sum game with imperfect information, mixed motives, and alterable values. Through the concepts of interdependent concession rates and self-correcting decision systems, these works develop negotiations theory, but they are incapable of handling the causative notion of power. The social psychological symposium of Swingle typologizes power but only rarely relates it to different kinds of outcomes. The two can be combined by reconceptualizing power as added value, thus allowing power base to be discussed separately, but related to power outcomes. A determinate theory of negotiation needs to focus on that relation. An empirical study such as Young's could well profit by the theorems of the three works reviewed.

Tradition and Politics in Studies of Contemporary Japan

By JAMES W. WHITE

A review of five recent books on Japanese politics suggests that there are numerous problems involved in the usage of "tradition" and "modernization" as analytical concepts, and that the significance attributed to such concepts by scholars varies with their cultural background and with the level and unit of analysis they use. In the case of Japan, tradition is less a factor in contemporary politics than has been suggested by many; it is less non-modern (in an analytical sense) than has been thought; and sometimes it is not even intrinsically Japanese. Although traditionalist elements make some contribution to the persistence and stability of Japanese society, economy, and polity, they are in other ways detrimental thereto; where they do contribute positively, they do so only because the overall economic environment is so buoyant that inherently contradictory factors can coexist without serious problems. In the event of an economic breakdown, however, traditionalistic factors could become major contributors to general systemic crisis.

Statesmanship and Scholarship

By TANG TSOU

Several recent scholarly works on American and Chinese policies clarify the alternatives confronting the United States in 1971, and give us a glimpse of the Nixon Administration's objectives, strategies, tactics, considerations, and calculations in the opening to China. Together with these works, the processes and results of the negotiations with China constitute the fullest public record to date of Kissinger's and Nixon's general approach to international politics. But their policy toward China has a unique feature: the frank acknowledgment of the uncertainty of both the immediate and final outcome. This posture has bolstered their courage to take audacious initiatives, given their policy the necessary flexibility, and strengthened their bargaining position. The scholarly works also built a consensus behind the new policy. Their findings point to the theoretical proposition that an accommodation may be achieved if the revolutionary state is given a fair stake in the system and if it cannot improve its position by revolutionary methods.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Compelling new insights into the Mideast situation from the Arab point of view

THE ANGRY ARABS

By W. F. ABBOUSHI

"An excellent analysis of some crucial aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The author presents an enlightened, positive, broadly-based Arab position."—NORTON MESVINSKY, *Professor of History, Central Connecticut State College*

This timely book, by a professor of political science at the University of Cincinnati who was born in Palestine, will help Western readers to a clearer understanding of the culture, value system, customs, mores, and folkways that have shaped the Arabs' posture in the Mideast, and how they interpret the controversies involving them.

$8.95, now at your bookstore

THE WESTMINSTER PRESS

Witherspoon Bldg., Phila., Pa. 19107

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE UNITED NATIONS:
A Preliminary Analysis

By SAMUEL S. KIM*

AFTER having suffered from the self-inflicted wounds of internal convulsions and diplomatic isolation during the Cultural Revolution, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has returned to the world diplomatic scene with a new, vigorous, and imaginative foreign policy. To appreciate its dimensions fully, one must recall that China's foreign policy was left largely unprotected from the disruptive spillovers of the domestic quarrels during the Cultural Revolution. The Red Guards not only sacked the British chancery in Peking, but also seized their own Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 1967. By November 1967, forty-four out of forty-five ambassadors were called home for "rectification," leaving the durable Huang Hua in Cairo as the PRC's sole representative abroad. China's trade also suffered; by the end of September 1967, Peking had been involved in disputes of varying intensity with some thirty-two nations. However, the transition from revolutionary turmoil to pragmatic reconstruction came through a series of decisions made by Mao Tse-tung and his close advisors beginning in late July 1968 and culminating at the First Plenum of the Ninth Party Congress held in April 1969, ushering in a new era in Chinese foreign policy.

I

Nowhere has this transition been more clearly pronounced than in Peking's posture toward the United Nations.[1] Although her attitude

* The author gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to Monmouth College for a faculty research grant which supported the preparation of this paper.

[1] The literature on Peking's posture toward the United Nations is extremely uneven. Most studies on the subject are not only outmoded now, but they also approach the subject from the vantage point of the United States or of the United Nations. For a representative sample of writings on the subject, see the following: Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "China, the United States, and the United Nations," *International Organization*, XX (Autumn 1966), 653-76; Winberg Chai, "China and the United Nations: Problems of Representation and Alternatives," *Asian Survey*, X (May 1970), 397-409; Hungdah Ch'iu, "The United Nations," in Shao-chuan Leng and Hungdah Ch'iu, eds., *Law in Chinese Foreign Policy: Communist China and Selected Problems of International Law* (New York 1972), 195-242; Hungdah Ch'iu and R. R. Edwards, "Communist China's Attitude Toward the United Nations: A Legal Analysis," *The American Journal of International Law*, LXII (January 1968), 20-50; Poelin Dai, "Canada and the Two-China Formula at the United Nations," *Canadian Yearbook of International Law*, V

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

toward the United Nations may be characterized as one of "love me or leave me, but don't leave me alone," evolving through the stages of naive optimism, frustration, disenchantment, anger, and lingering envy and hope, the PRC's support of the principles of the United Nations Charter had remained largely unaffected from 1945 to 1964.[2] However, the Indonesian withdrawal on January 7, 1965, triggered off a process of negative polemics against the United Nations. Indeed, Peking's bill of complaints against the United Nations was broad and sweeping: that blind faith in the United Nations had to be stopped because the organization was by no means sacred and inviolable; that by committing sins of commission and omission, the United Nations had become an adjunct of the U.S. State Department; that the United Nations had become a channel for United States economic and cultural penetration into Asian, African, and Latin American countries; and that the United Nations in the final analysis was a paper tiger.[3] "As a matter of fact," an editorial of *Jen-min Jih-pao* fulminated, "the United Nations has

---

(1967), 217-28; R. R. Edwards, "The Attitude of the People's Republic of China Toward International Law and the United Nations," *Papers on China*, XVII (December 1963), 235-71; A. M. Halpern, "China, the United Nations, and Beyond," *China Quarterly*, No. 10 (April-June 1962), 72-77; Myres S. McDougal and Richard M. Goodman, "Chinese Participation in the United Nations," *The American Journal of International Law*, LX (October 1966), 671-727; Mastafa Rejai, "Communist China and the United Nations," *Orbis*, IX (Fall 1966), 823-38; F. B. Schick, "The Question of China in the United Nations," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, XII (October 1963), 1232-50; Byron S. Weng, "Communist China's Changing Attitudes Toward the United Nations," *International Organization*, XX (Autumn 1966), 677-704, and *Peking's UN Policy: Continuity and Change* (New York 1972).

[2] However, the attitude of the Chinese Communists toward the League of Nations was very negative, as evidenced by a telegram of the Chinese Soviet Government (dated October 6, 1932) signed by Mao Tse-tung, Hsiang Ying, and Chang Kuo-t'ao: "The Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic long ago told the popular masses of the whole country that the League of Nations is a League of Robbers by which the various imperialisms are dismembering China. The principal task of the Lytton Commission of Enquiry sent to China by the League was to prepare the dismemberment of China and the repression of all the revolutionary movements that have raised the flag of the Chinese Soviets." Cited in Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung* (New York 1963), 266-67. In contrast, note the following statement made by Mao Tse-tung on April 24, 1945: "The Chinese Communist Party fully agrees with the proposals of the Dumbarton Oaks conference and the decisions of the Crimea conference on the establishment of an organization to safeguard international peace and security after the war. It welcomes the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco. It has appointed its own representative on China's delegation to this conference in order to express the will of the Chinese people." *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking 1965), III, 306-07. For numerous references to the principles of the UN Charter in the PRC's bilateral treaties in the 1950's and early 1960's, see James C. Hsiung, *Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations* (New York 1972), 89-90.

[3] See the Chinese Government's statement issued on January 10, 1965 in *Peking Review* [hereafter cited as *PR*], No. 3 (January 15, 1965), 5-6, and the January 10, 1965 editorial of *Jen-min Jih-pao, ibid.*, 7-9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

degenerated into a dirty international political stock exchange in the grip of a few big powers; the sovereignty of other nations, particularly that of small ones, is often bought and sold there by them like shares."[4]

The PRC's negative polemics against the United Nations also brought about new demands and preconditions for joining the organization. Whereas the expulsion of Chiang Kai-shek's representatives had been the only precondition before 1965,[5] Peking's demands now included, *inter alia*, the expulsion of "all imperialist countries," the admission of "all independent countries," the cancellation of the United Nations resolutions against the PRC and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the adoption of a resolution condemning the United States as an aggressor, and a review and revision of the Charter.[6] The PRC then presented two sharply worded alternatives: "Either the organization rids itself of United States domination, corrects its mistakes and gets thoroughly reorganized, or a revolutionary United Nations will be set up to replace it."[7]

Having received little attention, let alone support for its call for a reorganization and/or a replacement of the United Nations, the PRC's interest in the world organization declined rapidly during the next few years. In a comment on the disappointing results of voting on the question of Chinese representation at the 22nd session of the General Assembly (see Table I), the PRC declared on December 8, 1967: "Speaking frankly, the Chinese people are not at all interested in sitting in the United Nations, a body manipulated by the United States, a place for playing power politics, a stock exchange for the United States and the Soviet Union to strike political bargains, and an organ to serve the

[4] *Ibid.*, 8-9.

[5] The PRC's last statement on the United Nations before Indonesia's withdrawal was contained in Premier Chou En-lai's reports on the work of the government, delivered at the first session of the Third National People's Congress on December 21-22, 1964, which stated that "unless the United Nations expels the representative of the Chiang Kai-shek clique and restores China's legitimate rights in their entirety, we will have absolutely nothing to do with the United Nations." See *PR*, No. 1 (January 1, 1965), 19. In contrast, Lin Piao's celebrated programmatic statement, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" published on September 3, 1965, failed to mention the United Nations. This shows the decisive impact of Indonesia's withdrawal on the evolution of the PRC's attitude toward the United Nations.

[6] These new demands were spelled out by Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi in his press conference of September 29, 1965, in Peking. See *PR*, No. 41 (October 8, 1965), 11-12. That these new demands were presented to rationalize the PRC's non-interest in the United Nations is indicated by Ch'en Yi's statement made at the same press conference: "During the U.S. war of aggression against Korea, the United Nations adopted a resolution naming China as an aggressor. How can China be expected to take part in an international organization which calls her an aggressor? Calling China an aggressor and then asking the aggressor to join would not the United Nations be slapping its own face?"

[7] *PR*, No. 42 (October 15, 1965), 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U.S. policies of aggression and war."[8] Shortly thereafter, PRC commentaries on the United Nations practically disappeared from the official media. (See Table III.)

TABLE I

VOTING RECORD ON THE QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1950–1971

Year (Session)	*Member-ship*	*Pro-PRC*	*Anti-PRC*	*Absten-tions*	*Sponsors*
1950 (5th sess.)	59	16 (27%)	33 (56%)	10	India
1951 (6th sess.)	60	11 (18%)	37 (62%)	4	Moratorium[a]
1952 (7th sess.)	60	7 (12%)	42 (70%)	11	"
1953 (8th sess.)	60	10 (17%)	44 (73%)	2	"
1954 (9th sess.)	60	11 (18%)	43 (72%)	6	"
1955 (10th sess.)	60	12 (20%)	42 (70%)	6	"
1956 (11th sess.)	79	24 (30%)	47 (59%)	8	"
1957 (12th sess.)	82	27 (33%)	48 (59%)	6	"
1958 (13th sess.)	81	28 (35%)	44 (54%)	9	"
1959 (14th sess.)	82	29 (35%)	44 (54%)	9	"
1960 (15th sess.)	98	34 (35%)	42 (43%)	22	"
1961 (16th sess.)	104	37 (36%)	48 (46%)	19	USSR[b]
1962 (17th sess.)	110	42 (38%)	56 (51%)	12	USSR[b]
1963 (18th sess.)	111	41 (37%)	57 (51%)	12	Albania and Cambodia
1964 (19th sess.)	114[c]				
1965 (20th sess.)	117	47 (40%)	47 (40%)	20	Albania plus 11 nations[b]
1966 (21st sess.)	121	46 (38%)	57 (47%)	17	Albania plus 10 nations[b]
1967 (22nd sess.)	122	45 (37%)	58 (48%)	17	Albania plus 11 nations
1968 (23rd sess.)	126	44 (35%)	58 (46%)	23	Albania plus 14 nations
1969 (24th sess.)	126	48 (38%)	56 (44%)	21	Albania plus 16 nations
1970 (25th sess.)	127	51 (40%)	49 (39%)	25	Albania plus 17 nations
1971 (26th sess.)	131	76 (58%)	35 (27%)	17	Albania plus 22 nations

[a] Votes from 1951 to 1960 inclusive were on a United States motion to keep the question off the agenda. For uniformity, the numbers in the Pro-PRC column reflect the votes in favor of the PRC.

[b] Two-thirds majority required for adoption.

[c] No vote was taken due to financial crisis.

SOURCES: *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1950 through 1969; *UN Monthly Chronicle*, 1970–71.

It is no mere happenstance that the termination of the Cultural Revolution should coincide with the beginning of the "new and revolutionary" foreign policy. Historically, a moderate and pragmatic foreign policy has generally followed political stability and lull on the domestic scene. However, the new foreign policy adopted by the PRC leadership

[8] *PR*, No. 50 (December 8, 1967), 21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

represented much more than a pre-Cultural Revolution status quo or simply a return of ambassadors to their diplomatic posts.[9] It demonstrated an extraordinary—almost unprecedented—degree of flexibility and moderation by extending the permissible limits of normalization toward former enemies such as the United States, Japan, and Yugoslavia. Under the impetus of this new policy, the PRC's attitude toward the United Nations also assumed a direct, conciliatory, and flexible posture. All the polemical indictments against the United Nations and the extraneous preconditions for participation disappeared. Instead, the PRC began to launch a new and sophisticated campaign to join the family of nations.

Greatly buoyed by the returns of the vote in the 1970 General Assembly session on the eighteen-nation draft resolution, the PRC leadership now incorporated the objective of winning the UN seat into the grand strategy of the new foreign policy. In orchestrating this strategy, Peking used several diplomatic techniques. First, the PRC quietly pursued a "banquet diplomacy," an ingenious technique of inviting prominent Western and Third-World statesmen or former statesmen to visit China—Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, former Premier Maurice Couve de Murville of France, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and Premier Alfred Raoul of the Congo (Brazzaville), to cite a few notable examples. At lavish banquets in Peking their hosts praised their statesmanship and expressed China's deep gratitude and indebtedness for their support of the restoration of China's legitimate rights in the United Nations.

Second, Peking resumed the people-to-people diplomacy of the Bandung period. This was an exercise in popular showmanship intended to beautify the PRC's tarnished image in the international community. In 1971 alone, some 290 delegations from 80 nations were invited to China while the PRC itself sent out some 70 delegations to 40 nations in carrying out people-to-people or "ping pong" diplomacy.[10] Third, Peking launched a major drive to expand the scope of state-to-state relations. Between October 1970 and October 1971, the PRC established diplomatic relations with fourteen nations, resumed diplomatic relations with Burundi and Tunisia, and elevated diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands to the ambassadorial level. (See Table II.) It seems that Peking's campaign

[9] The return of the PRC's ambassadors began in mid-May 1969, shortly after the end of the Ninth Party Congress.

[10] *Peking Review*, which had been suffering for many years from a paucity of statistical and empirical data, compiled and proudly presented these figures for 1971 in an annual review of events of 1971. See *PR*, No. 1 (January 7, 1972), 21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table II

Nations Maintaining Diplomatic Relations with the PRC as of March 16, 1973

Effective Date	*State*	*Effective Date*	*State*
10/3/49	USSR	7/19/65	Mauritania
10/3/49	Byelorussia SSR	1/31/68	South Yemen
10/3/49	Ukraine SSR	10/13/70	Canada
10/4/49	Bulgaria	10/15/70	Equatorial Guinea
10/5/49	Rumania	11/6/70	Italy
10/6/49	Hungary	11/24/70	Ethiopia
10/6/49	Czechoslovakia	1/5/71	Chile
10/6/49	Korea (DPRK)	2/10/71	Nigeria
10/7/49	Poland	3/22/71	Kuwait
10/16/49	Mongolia	3/26/71	Cameroon
10/27/49	Germany (Dem. Rep.)	5/6/71	San Marino[a]
11/23/49	Albania	5/28/71	Austria
1/18/50	Vietnam (Dem. Rep.)	7/29/71	Sierra Leone
4/1/50	India	8/4/71	Turkey
5/9/50	Sweden	8/16/71	Iran
5/11/50	Denmark	10/13/71	Burundi[b]
6/8/50	Burma	10/15/71	Tunisia[b]
9/14/50	Switzerland	10/25/71	Belgium
10/28/50	Finland	11/2/71	Peru
5/21/51	Pakistan	11/9/71	Lebanon
6/17/54	United Kingdom	11/12/71	Rwanda
10/5/54	Norway	12/7/71	Senegal
11/19/54	Netherlands	12/8/71	Iceland
1/10/55	Yugoslavia	12/14/71	Cyprus
1/20/55	Afghanistan	1/31/72	Malta
8/1/55	Nepal	2/14/72	Mexico
5/30/56	United Arab Rep.	2/19/72	Argentina
8/10/55	Syria	2/29/72	Ghana[b]
9/24/56	Yemen	3/13/72	United Kingdom[c]
1/7/57	Ceylon	4/15/72	Mauritius
8/25/58	Iraq	5/18/72	Netherlands[c]
11/1/58	Morocco	6/5/72	Greece
12/1/58	Sudan	6/27/72	Guyana
10/4/59	Guinea	9/19/72	Togo
9/28/60	Cuba	9/29/72	Japan
10/27/60	Mali	10/11/72	Germany (Fed. Rep.)
12/16/60	Somalia	10/14/72	Maldive
12/9/61	Tanzania	11/6/72	Malagasy
6/28/62	Laos	11/16/72	Luxembourg
7/3/62	Algeria	11/21/72	Jamaica
10/18/62	Uganda	11/24/72	Zaire[b]
12/14/63	Kenya	11/28/72	Chad
1/27/64	France	12/21/72	Australia
2/22/64	Congo (Brazzaville)	12/22/72	New Zealand
10/29/64	Zambia	3/9/73	Spain

[a] Diplomatic relations were established at the consular level.
[b] Suspended diplomatic relations were resumed.
[c] Diplomatic relations were elevated to the ambassadorial level.

Sources: Data for the period October 1, 1949 to March 1, 1965, are adapted from A. M. Halpern, ed., *Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents* (New York 1965), 496-97; changes and additions since March 1, 1965, are drawn from *PR*, March 12, 1965 to March 16, 1973.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to expand its state-to-state relationship was carefully orchestrated so as to reach its climax at the beginning of the 26th session of the General Assembly.[11] This technique served the purpose of generating a sense of bandwagon movement on the forthcoming vote on the China issue among the wavering member states of the UN.

Fourth, in its official media the PRC gave unusual coverage to the question of Chinese representation on the eve of the 26th session of the General Assembly. In the past, PRC commentaries on the United Nations had usually *followed* the returns of the Assembly vote on the China issue. This time, during the months immediately preceding the Assembly's discussion of the subject, fifteen articles dealing with the United Nations appeared in the authoritative *Peking Review*—compared to one in 1968, one in 1969, and five in 1970. (See Table III.)

TABLE III

NUMBER OF ARTICLES ON THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM APPEARING IN *Peking Review* BETWEEN 1962 AND 1972

Year	*No. of Articles*	*Year*	*No. of Articles*
1962	0	1968	1
1963	7	1969	1
1964	8	1970	5
1965	29	1971 (before Oct. 25)	15
1966	7	1971 (after Oct. 25)	37
1967	5	1972	88

SOURCE: *PR*, January 5, 1962 to December 29, 1972.

Thus the PRC leadership expressed the serious importance it attached to the United Nations seat.

Finally, the PRC's aid diplomacy was accelerated at an unprecedented rate in 1970 and 1971. The complete figures now show that the PRC extended no less than $709 million in aid to underdeveloped nations in 1970, compared to $391 million jointly extended by the Soviet Union and East European nations. The 1970 aid commitment by the PRC

[11] Some American specialists argued that Peking's objective to gain its UN seat had top priority, ranking above the improvement of relations with the United States; Secretary-General U Thant observed the complementary process between Peking's strategies toward the United States and the United Nations in a statement issued on July 16, 1971, which stated: "It seems that the chances for a solution of the question of the representation of China at the next session of the General Assembly are brighter in the light of the announcements in the United States and Peking last night." *New York Times*, January 24, 1972; *UN Monthly Chronicle*, VIII (August-September 1971), 68.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

represents 64.5 per cent of the total Communist aid for the year; more significantly, it represents 42.8 per cent of all PRC aid pledges since 1956.[12] Incomplete figures for 1971 indicate that by mid-1971 Peking's offers of aid exceeded $750 million in soft loan, as compared to $500 million in hard loan by the Soviet Union and East European nations combined.[13]

II

There has been no lack of Cassandras predicting disastrous consequences of the PRC's admission to the United Nations system.[14] The PRC's participation in the 26th and 27th sessions of the General Assembly and in other UN organs in the first sixteen months or so provides an empirical basis for re-examining what many had predicted or anticipated Peking would do, and for making some preliminary assessments about Peking's diplomatic style and strategy in the United Nations. It appears that the "Trojan Horse" argument, frequently advanced by Peking's detractors, was largely based on the assumption that China would use her diplomatic privileges and immunities as a shield in carrying out espionage activities, as the Soviet Union had sometimes tended to do in the past.[15] There is no evidence so far to warrant such apprehension.

In fact, the delegation to the 26th General Assembly session led by Ch'iao Kuan-hua (chairman of the delegation) and Huang Hua (vice chairman of the delegation) makes up an impressive list of "Who's Who" in Chinese foreign policy. Judged by the two criteria often used by diplomats in measuring the significance and performance of a diplomatic mission—expertise and access to the men who really count in the policy-making council at home—the PRC's UN delegation is indeed a first-rate team.[16] Both Ch'iao Kuan-hua and Huang Hua belong

[12] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1970," Unclassified Research Study, RECS-15 (September 22, 1971), 1-2.

[13] *New York Times*, November 7, 1971.

[14] Such predictions have not been confined to the members of The Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China. Even prominent scholars foretold numerous disruptive consequences of "Communist China's" participation in the United Nations system. See Bloomfield (fn. 1), *passim*; McDougal and Goodman (fn. 1), *passim*.

[15] Note, for example, Bloomfield's assertion in 1966: "It should be assumed that Chinese Communists, although doubtless confined to the Headquarters district, will, like the Soviets, use any opportunity for espionage." Bloomfield (fn. 1), 664.

[16] The data on the backgrounds of the Chinese delegates are drawn from Donald W. Klein, "The Men and Institutions Behind China's Foreign Policy," in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed., *Sino-American Relations, 1949–71* (New York 1972), 43-56; Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism*, 2 vols.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the coterie of Chou En-lai's closest advisors whose diplomatic experience pre-dates the founding of the PRC in 1949. Ch'iao Kuan-hua, who is a Vice Foreign Minister, often appears to be more active and influential than Chi P'eng-fei, the Foreign Minister, and is believed to be a leading architect of China's policy toward the West. Ch'iao is the only senior PRC diplomat who has participated in all three of the major international conferences in the PRC's short diplomatic history: the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina; the 1955 Bandung Conference; and the 1961–62 Geneva Conference on Laos. Ch'iao made his first trip to the United Nations in 1950, as an aide to Ambassador Wu Hsiu-ch'üan, for an *ad hoc* participation in the UN debate on the Korean War. He also accompanied Chou En-lai on his ten-nation tour of Africa in 1964. He may easily be regarded as the PRC's counterpart of Henry Kissinger; he is also multilingual and the possessor of a Ph.D. from Tübingen University.

Huang Hua, the PRC's permanent representative to the Security Council, has only slightly less impressive credentials than Ch'iao Kuan-hua. Clearly, he is one of the most experienced senior negotiators in China today. Like Ch'iao, he participated in the Bandung and Geneva Conferences as an advisor to Chou En-lai. In addition, he participated in the 1953 Panmunjom Conference as the PRC's chief negotiator. Moreover, his diplomatic experience in Africa as the PRC's Ambassador to Ghana and to Egypt in the 1960's should uniquely qualify him to deal with the African and Middle East questions in the United Nations. The other delegates—Fu Hao, Ch'en Ch'u, and Hsiung Hsiang-hui—all came from the ranks of professional career diplomats with wide and extensive experience abroad or in the Foreign Ministry.[17] Evidently, the primacy Peking attaches to the conduct of its UN diplomacy is reflected in the composition of its delegation. As one leading authority on the PRC leadership put it, "It's about the best possible delegation they could send in terms of professionalism."[18] Although there were numerous incidents involving Peking's diplomatic personnel caught in the overzealous act of revolutionary demonstrations abroad during

(Cambridge, Mass. 1971); and *Who's Who in Communist China,* 2 vols. (Hong Kong 1966).

[17] The composition of the members of Peking's delegation to the 26th General Assembly was as follows: 1 chairman, 1 vice chairman, 3 representatives, 5 alternative representatives, 18 secretaries, 11 attachés, 2 diplomatic couriers, 9 staff members, and 2 correspondents. There was a slight change in the composition of the PRC delegation to the 27th General Assembly because of the appointment of Hsiung Hsiang-hui as Ambassador to Mexico. The delegation was composed of Ch'iao Kuan-hua (chairman), Huang Hua (vice chairman), Ch'en Ch'u, Wang Jun-sheng, and Pi Chi-lung.

[18] Donald W. Klein, cited in the *New York Times*, November 3, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Cultural Revolution, actual espionage cases implicating Chinese diplomats are unknown.[19]

Many observers anticipated that Peking's entry into the United Nations would pose a thorny and perhaps insoluble legal problem of reapportioning or reshuffling the Chinese quota in the Secretariat.[20] Under an unofficial quota system based on the populations and budgetary contributions of member states, China is entitled to seventy-eight professionals on the staff. At the time of the PRC's entry into the United Nations, forty-six places of the Chinese quota had been preempted by those who carried Nationalist Chinese passports. The PRC has so far made no demand to replace them—only scolding them for an imperfect job of translation—nor has any attempt been made to fill the unused places immediately.[21] The appointment of Tang Ming-chao as Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs and Decolonization, on April 5, 1972, seems to have satisfied the PRC leadership in Peking for the moment.[22] Moreover, in spite of the PRC's interest in the specialized agencies of the United Nations (which had been made known through various diplomatic channels), Peking has avoided any immediate showdown with those specialized agencies which still retain the representatives of Nationalist China.[23]

That the possible disruptive impact of the PRC on the United Nations system had been exaggerated can be seen in Peking's unwillingness to exploit a number of tempting contentious issues. Peking could easily have used the United Nations as a forum to attack the United States on the Vietnam question, but has rarely done so.[24] Peking could

[19] After having studied China's practice of treaty compliance, one writer concluded: "Although she charged invasions of her sovereignty by Indian reconnaissance planes which flew well into Chinese airspace, the CPR is not known to have sent reconnaissance planes over the territory of any other country, not even during her disputes with India." See Hsiung (fn. 2), 317-18.

[20] On this point, see Bloomfield (fn. 1), 664: "Having survived the early years of Soviet obstructionism, the Secretariat, it may be argued, is perhaps not in real danger from the Chinese. But there will be disruption whatever happens, whether from the need to create new positions or the displacement of the 50-odd present Chinese officials that is sure to be demanded by Peking. Above all, the Chinese Communists sent to work in the UN will be charged with a mission reflecting the fanatical world view of their masters. The absorption of large numbers of indoctrinated Chinese Communists can only have a disruptive and stultifying effect on the Secretariat."

[21] Shortly after the General Assembly voted the PRC in, one European ambassador in Peking was told that the Chinese would not force the issue of "Chinese" citizens on the UN Secretariat staff. See the *New York Times*, October 29, 1971. For the bull session conducted by Ch'en Ch'u with 17 "Chinese" interpreters in January 1972, see *ibid.*, January 24, 1972.

[22] See *PR*, No. 15 (April 14, 1972), 4; *UN Monthly Chronicle*, IX (May 1972), 51.

[23] *New York Times*, November 3, 1971.

[24] One exception occurred on May 11, 1972, when Huang Hua sent a letter to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, in which he attacked

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have used the United Nations as a lever to force a withdrawal of American troops from Taiwan, which she claims to be an inseparable part of Chinese territory. On the other hand, the PRC delegation purposefully included in the legal term "domestic jurisdiction" not only Taiwan but also Hong Kong and Macao, when the latter were brought up in March 1972 in the Special Committee on Decolonization under the list of "colonial territories" covered by the Declaration on Decolonization.[25] (See Table IV.)

TABLE IV

COVERAGE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM IN *Peking Review* BY SUBJECT CATEGORY FROM OCTOBER 25, 1971 TO DECEMBER 31, 1972

Subject	*No. of Articles*	*Subject*	*No. of Articles*
Disarmament	16	UN and the Middle East	6
The Indo-Pakistani Dispute (including the Question of Bangladesh Membership)	16	Environment (UNCHE)	5
		UN and Korea	3
		The Secretariat	2
UN in General	14	Terrorism	2
PRC's UN Delegation	13	UNESCO	2
African Questions	13	Economic Development	1
Sea-Bed Question	13	Outer Space	1
UNCTAD	8	UN and Vietnam	1
The Question of Chinese Representation	7	Refugee Question	1
		UN and Taiwan	1
		TOTAL: 125	

SOURCE: *PR*, October 29, 1971 to December 29, 1972.

Furthermore, Peking's anticipated "wrecking operations" in the UN organs and specialized agencies dealing with multilateral aid have also failed to come about.[26] The PRC leadership has quietly and conveniently shelved the old charge against multilateral aid as an "imperialist

President Nixon's blockade and mining measures in Vietnam. However, Huang Hua's action was a response to the request by United States Ambassador Bush to the President of the Security Council that President Nixon's announcement of May 8th, which attempted to justify the new American measures, be circulated as a Security Council document. See *PR*, No. 20 (May 19, 1972), 7.

[25] UN Doc. A/AC. 109/396. See also *UN Monthly Chronicle*, IX (July 1972), 36.

[26] However, the PRC has asked the UN to stop the economic aid under the UNDP that goes to the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan as well as assistance extended by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to "Tibetan refugees" and "Chinese refugees" in Hong Kong and Macao. See *PR*, No. 31 (August 4, 1972), 18; *New York Times*, January 15, 1972.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tool of penetration." Chou Huan-min, the PRC's chief delegate to the third session of UNCTAD in Santiago, Chile in April 1972, stated in a major policy address to the conference that China was in favor of aid to developing nations from *all sources* as long as it came with easy interest and repayment terms, and no political or economic advantage was sought.[27]

Above all, functional paralysis in the Security Council resulting from Chinese overkill with the veto has failed to follow the ominous scenario projected by many of Peking's antagonists. The selection of Secretary-General U Thant's successor, in which a veto by any of the Big Five could have presented an insurmountable barrier, proceeded without any attempt by the PRC to emulate the Soviet "troika" proposal of 1960 or variations of it.[28] True, the PRC killed the question of Bangladesh membership by casting the decisive and well-publicized veto. It was the only one during the first sixteen months of her participation in the Council proceedings. Numerically, that record does not compare unfavorably with those of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, who exercised three, two, and two vetoes respectively during the same period. Of the twenty-six resolutions passed by the Council between November 14, 1971, when Huang Hua presented his credentials to the Secretary General, and the end of February 1973, the PRC recorded twenty positive votes, with three abstentions and three non-participations, as compared to seventeen positive votes with nine abstentions by the United States, twenty-two positive votes with four abstentions by the Soviet Union, nineteen positive votes with seven abstentions by the United Kingdom, and twenty-two positive votes with four abstentions by France. That the PRC's presence in the Security Council had little negative impact is indicated by the fact that the Council passed seventeen resolutions in 1972, with PRC membership, compared to sixteen resolutions in 1971, when Peking was a member for less than two months. (See Table V.)

Fully conscious of his own attack on the abuses of the veto by the big powers, especially the Soviet Union, Huang Hua defensively stated on August 25, 1972: "Since it took part in the work of the United Nations, the Chinese delegation has always been very serious and cautious

[27] *New York Times*, April 21, 1972. See also Chien Cho-po's statement before the Economic Committee of ECOSOC in May 1972 to the same effect: *PR*, No. 23 (June 9, 1972), 18.

[28] Bloomfield had argued: "One has only to recall the bitter Soviet attacks on both Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjold toward the end of the tenure of both to appreciate the excruciating difficulties involved in getting agreement on their successors without China—and on Mr. Thant's replacement *with* China, if that is the prospect for 1971." Bloomfield (fn. 1), 663; emphasis in original.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE V

VOTING RECORDS OF THE BIG FIVE ON RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL BETWEEN NOVEMBER 14, 1971 AND FEBRUARY 28, 1973

S/Res. No.	Date of Adoption	Vote (Y:N:A)	PRC	USA	USSR	UK	France
302	11/24/71	14:0:1	Y	A	Y	Y	Y
303	12/6/71	11:0:4	Y	Y	A	A	A
304	12/8/71	15:0:0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
305	12/13/71	14:0:0	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
306	12/21/71	15:0:0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
307	12/21/71	13:0:2	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
308	1/19/72	15:0:0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
309	2/4/72	14:0:0	NP	Y	Y	Y	Y
310	2/4/72	13:0:2	Y	Y	Y	A	A
311	2/4/72	14:0:1	Y	Y	Y	Y	A
312	2/4/72	9:0:6	Y	A	Y	A	A
313	2/28/72	15:0:0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
314	2/28/72	13:0:2	Y	A	Y	A	Y
315	6/15/72	14:0:1	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
316	6/26/72	13:0:2	Y	A	Y	Y	Y
317	7/21/72	14:0:1	Y	A	Y	Y	Y
318	7/28/72	14:0:1	Y	A	Y	Y	Y
319	8/1/72	14:0:1	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
320	9/26/72	13:0:2	Y	A	Y	A	Y
321	10/23/72	12:0:3	Y	A	Y	A	Y
322	11/22/72	15:0:0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
323	12/6/72	13:0:1	NP	Y	A	Y	Y
324	12/12/72	14:0:1	A	Y	Y	Y	Y
325	1/26/73	15:0:0	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
326	2/2/73	13:0:2	Y	A	Y	A	Y
327	2/2/73	14:0:1	Y	Y	A	Y	Y

Y: In Favor N: Against A: Abstention NP: Non-Participation

SOURCES: UN Security Council, Official Records, *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1971; UN Monthly Chronicle*, Vol. IX (February 1972) to Vol. X (March 1973).

on the use of veto."[29] To justify his own use of the veto, however, Huang Hua went on to make a lengthy and somewhat labored legal argument with tedious and rambling references to the 1949 Geneva Convention, Security Council Resolution 307 (1971), General Assembly Resolution 2793 (XXVI) and Article 4 of the Charter.[30] The PRC's

[29] *PR*, No. 35 (September 1, 1972), 9.

[30] Specifically, Huang Hua cited Article 118 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, which stipulated: "Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

position on the question of Bangladesh membership does not seem to be dogmatic or uncompromising, however. Huang Hua, perhaps sensing the mounting pressure of the majority opinion in the United Nations in favor of the admission of Bangladesh, has considerably softened the position of his government by indicating that the repatriation of 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war held in India could pave the path for Bangladesh's entry into the United Nations. Judging from the hypersensitivity it has shown, the PRC can be expected to continue to exercise restraint, resorting to the veto only as a last resort in situations perceived to be threatening to her vital national interests.

III

To understand and analyze China's intentions and strategies in the world organization, we may safely begin with the assumption that the PRC's diplomacy in the United Nations represents an application of the new foreign policy in a unique institutional milieu. As such, the PRC's UN diplomacy may reveal not only the basic goals and objectives, but also the means and methods of the current Chinese foreign policy. Approached from this premise, one of its salient features is the PRC's self-styled role as the champion of the Third World. This role is a corollary of the "international united front policy" which is one of the cardinal tenets of Peking's foreign policy. The PRC's Third-World diplomacy works on two contrasting themes. On the positive side, the PRC is actively promoting—or at least attempting to promote —the causes of the Third World; on the negative side, it is exposing and attacking the real or imaginary condominium of the superpowers in several key areas of international politics. The PRC has even presented this role as a form of pledge through an editorial in *Jen-min Jih-pao*:

---

cessation of active hostilities." The Security Council resolution referred to was adopted on December 21, 1971, by a vote of 13 in favor, none against, and 2 abstentions (Poland and the USSR), and demanded, *inter alia*, that a durable cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities in all areas of conflict be observed between India and Pakistan. The General Assembly resolution was adopted by a vote of 104 in favor, 11 against, with 10 abstentions, and called, *inter alia*, upon India and Pakistan to take all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces to their respective territories. UN Security Council, Official Records, *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1971*, 11; UN Office of Public Information, *Resolutions of the General Assembly at Its Twenty-Sixth Regular Session, 21 September–22 December 1971* (Press Release GA/4548, 28 December 1971), 1, 17-19. For numerous speeches Huang Hua made in the United Nations and elaborate legal arguments advanced by the PRC government, see *PR*, No. 33 (August 18, 1972), 12-13, No. 35 (September 1, 1972), 5-9, No. 40 (October 6, 1972), 29, and No. 49 (December 8, 1972), 9-12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> US imperialism is now calling China a "potential superpower," implying that China may also squeeze into the ranks of the superpowers some day. Thank you, American lords, but China will never accept this kind of compliment! China will never seek the so-called big-power position. We will forever stand side by side with all nations subjected to aggression, control, intervention or subversion by superpowers; we will forever stand side by side with all oppressed people and oppressed nations. The Chinese people will fight together with the people of the whole world to resolutely smash the doctrine of big-nation hegemony![31]

The PRC began to pursue its Third-World diplomacy in the United Nations by supporting the economic, colonial, racial, nationalist, and anti-imperialist issues which make up the core of the main concern for most developing nations. "Like the overwhelming majority of the Asian, African, and Latin American countries," Ch'iao Kuan-hua, in his major policy speech before the Plenary Meeting of the 26th General Assembly session on November 15, 1971, proclaimed, "China belongs to the third world."[32] To confirm this assertion, China has supported the enlargement of the membership of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), in striking contrast to the negative votes of the United Kingdom and France and the abstention by the Soviet Union on General Assembly Resolution 2847 (XXVI) of December 20, 1971; if ratified, the resolution would amend Article 61 of the Charter by doubling the membership of ECOSOC.[33] Furthermore, the PRC has also asserted its own, separate identity by voting for the two resolutions on the "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace," while the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France all abstained.[34]

Despite her ideological pronouncements about the inexorable revolutionary trend toward wars of national liberation in the Third World, the PRC's Third-World diplomacy toward Latin America—in and

[31] *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial of May 9, 1971, reprinted in *PR*, No. 20 (May 14, 1971), 7. The 1971 New Year editorial in *Jen-min Jih-pao* flatly declared: "At no time will China ever behave like a superpower, neither today nor in the future." *PR*, No. 1 (January 1, 1971), 9.

[32] *PR*, No. 47 (November 19, 1971), 8.

[33] China was absent when the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2847 (XXXVI), but Chinese representative Wang Jun-sheng declared in his speech before the plenary meeting of the 53rd session of ECOSOC, on July 6, 1972, that "China supports the enlargement of the membership of this council, so that more countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America can participate in its work." See *PR*, No. 28 (July 14, 1972), 17. As of December 31, 1972, 46 member states had ratified the Amendment to Article 61 of the Charter. This Amendment will become effective after it has been ratified by two-thirds of the UN member states, including the Big Five. See *UN Monthly Chronicle*, x (January 1973), 103.

[34] General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI) of December 16, 1971, and General Assembly Resolution 2992 (XXVII) of December 15, 1972.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

out of the United Nations—shows the desire to broaden state-to-state relationships, coupled with pragmatic, if somewhat contradictory, attempts to sketch out areas of common interest.[35] Sensing strong support for and apprehension about China's stand on the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) among the Latin American countries, Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei issued an official statement on November 14, 1972:

> China will never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Latin American countries and the Latin American nuclear weapon-free zone, nor will China test, manufacture, produce, stockpile, install or deploy nuclear weapons in these countries or in this zone, or send her means of transportation and delivery carrying nuclear weapons to traverse the territory, territorial sea or territorial air space of Latin American countries. I believe that this undertaking of the Chinese Government is in conformity with the proposition and basic demand of the Latin American countries.[36]

To strengthen its support of Latin American countries further, the PRC, in an apparent contradiction of its own stand of 1958,[37] supported the struggle of many Latin American countries to stretch their territorial seas to 200 nautical miles. Moreover, the PRC vigorously—and successfully—endorsed the demand of most Latin American states to hold the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Seas in Santiago, Chile, in 1974.* Thus the PRC, through its Third-World diplomacy, has projected itself as a new and different kind of superpower which protects and promotes, rather than exploits and plunders, the economic resources of the have-not member states of the United Nations.

The PRC's Third-World diplomacy also seems to be effective among the African states. While the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have often found themselves vacillating between opposing and abstaining on many "radical" draft resolutions introduced by African states, the PRC has not hesitated to support African complaints or charges against colonialism, neo-colonialism, and apartheid.[38] Peking

[35] For Peking's policy toward Latin America, see Ernst Halperin, "Peking and the Latin American Communists," *China Quarterly*, No. 29 (January-March 1967), 111-54; Cecil Johnson, *Communist China and Latin America, 1959–67* (New York 1970), and "China and Latin America: New Ties and Tactics," *Problems of Communism*, XXI (July-August 1972), 53-66.

[36] *PR*, No. 47 (November 24, 1972), 7. [37] See below, p. 325.

* The site of the Conference has since been changed to Caracas, Venezuela.

[38] In a general policy statement delivered at a special meeting of the Security Council held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on January 31, 1972, Huang Hua reiterated the five principles of China's policy toward Africa: "(1) support the African peoples in their struggle to oppose imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism and to win and safe-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has also wholeheartedly endorsed the request of the Organization of African Unity to hold Security Council meetings in an African capital. Under the pressure of African member states, the Security Council passed a resolution to hold its meetings in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, beginning on January 28 and ending not later than February 4, 1972.[39] Thus, for the first time in twenty years, the Security Council held its meetings away from United Nations Headquarters in New York.

In attempting to enhance her own image and identity as the champion of the Third World, however, Peking has not only avoided the delegates of the big powers in her "corridor diplomacy," but has also proclaimed open war on the politics of big-power consensus in the United Nations. Peking has often exposed and attacked superpower hegemony in such areas of world politics as (1) the Middle East, where she asserts there is Soviet-American collusion in maintaining a "no-war and no-peace" situation; (2) issues of arms control and disarmament, where the two nuclear superpowers are actually promoting a nuclear duopoly; (3) sea-bed and territorial waters, where the superpowers also pursue "maritime hegemony," plundering the resources of the have-not states and infringing upon the sovereign rights of coastal states; and (4) the South Asian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean, where the Soviet-American struggle for naval hegemony has been intensified. Obviously, Peking seeks to capitalize on the mood of growing exasperation and radicalization in the Third World stemming from the miscarriage of the "revolution of rising expectations." But it would be a mistake to assume that Peking has yet made a major impact in these areas, or that the Third-World nations have embraced the PRC as their leader. Most Third-World nations seem to act as sophisticated spectators rather than to cheer or join Peking's somewhat amateurish forensic exhibitionism.

However, a unique and quiet personal diplomacy pursued by the PRC's UN delegates in the corridors of the United Nations seems to have made a considerable impression on the delegates of the smaller

---

guard national independence; (2) support the pursuance of a policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment by the governments of the African countries; (3) support the desire of the African peoples to achieve unity and solidarity in the manner of their own choice; (4) support the African countries in their efforts to settle their disputes through peaceful consultation; and (5) hold that the sovereignty of African countries should be respected by all other countries and that encroachment and interference from any quarters should be opposed." *PR*, No. 6 (February 11, 1972), 16-17. See also Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei's letter entitled, "China's Position on Racial Discrimination in Some Areas of Africa," addressed to the Secretary-General on January 27, 1972, *ibid.*, No. 5 (February 4, 1972), 14-15.

[39] Security Council Resolution 308 (1972) of January 19, 1972.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

states. Having learned that the representatives of the big powers would never stroll into the delegates' lounge—the preserve of the delegates from the smaller states of Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia—for coffee or a chat, Huang Hua and his colleagues made it a point to mingle with the other delegates in the lounge. "This is where the 'third world' meets at the United Nations," one astonished African diplomat observed, adding: "and the Chinese evidently got this point quickly. I don't remember seeing Mr. Bush or Mr. Malik just drifting in for a cup of tea or coffee. Of course, they are the representatives of the 'superpowers' and they must be too busy to mix with us little fellows."[40]

As if determined to undo the prophecy about the reckless Chinese, the PRC has adopted a low-profile and apprentice-like posture in its diplomatic behavior and style in the United Nations. Actually, this was a logical and rational strategy, making a virtue out of necessity. On the one hand, the PRC was faced with the enormous problem of staffing. Immediate and complete participation in all the organs, committees, and sub-organs of the United Nations, even if this had been legally feasible, would have been beyond the resources of the PRC. Besides, this kind of unprepared plunge runs counter to the Maoist conceptual model of "protracted struggle." On the other hand, the PRC may have been equally concerned with the possibility of an early blunder by overplaying its role in the United Nations. Premier Chou En-lai, interviewed by Moto Goto, Managing Editor of *Asahi Shimbun* (Japan) on October 28, 1971, was as candid as he was illuminating on this point when he said: "We have not yet made adequate preparations. In connection with our attitude toward the United Nations, there is an old Chinese saying which goes, 'Be careful when facing a problem.' We do not have too much knowledge about the United Nations and are not too conversant with the new situation which has arisen in the United Nations. We must be very cautious. This does not mean, however, that we do not have self-confidence; it means that caution is required and that we must not be indiscreet and haphazard."[41]

The PRC's reluctance to have an immediate showdown with those who had pre-empted forty-six positions of the Chinese quota, or to demand to fill up the unused Chinese quota on the staff of the Secre-

[40] *New York Times*, November 21, 1971.

[41] Excerpts from the official record of Moto Goto's interview with Chou En-lai appear in the *New York Times*, November 9, 1971. John Stewart Service, who interviewed Chou En-lai on October 27, 1971, said to a reporter: "I have the impression that they [the Chinese] don't plan to cut any wide swathe. They probably will approach it all very moderately for the time being." *Ibid.*, October 29, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tariat, can easily be explained in terms of this "apprentice diplomacy." In fact, Ch'iao Kuan-hua pointed out to Adam Malik, the President of the 26th session of the General Assembly, that his delegation would not be able to participate immediately in all the Assembly's activities because his delegation was rather small and UN affairs were new to its members. During the 26th session the PRC delegation stayed away from four of the six Main Committees of the General Assembly.[42] Furthermore, the PRC politely declined the invitation of the Trusteeship Council to attend its session in May 1972, citing staffing problems as the reason, but expressing the desire to be kept informed about the proceedings.[43] There is no evidence that the PRC presented any nominees for the election of the twenty-five member International Law Commission in November 1971 or for the election of five new judges for the International Court of Justice in October 1972, even though her nominees would easily have won as the representatives of a permanent member of the Security Council.[44] The clearest evidence of apprentice diplomacy lies in the voting data of the 26th and 27th General Assembly sessions. As shown in Table VI below, excessive absenteeism during the 26th session, followed by the visible decline of that absenteeism in the 27th session, indicates the slowly maturing process of China's UN diplomacy.

The PRC's strategy of making a virtue out of necessity is further attested to by its constant thematic stress on the principles of national independence and self-reliance. While the PRC has quietly modified its old charge against multilateral aid as a neo-imperialistic Trojan Horse, it has nonetheless continuously emphasized the crucial role of self-reliance in economic development. Peking also asserts the inseparability of economic self-reliance and political independence. On every occasion in and out of the United Nations, Peking's commentaries on the functional activities of the United Nations have been prefaced by the assertion that "the [political] independence of any country is in-

[42] *New York Times*, November 17, 1971.

[43] *UN Monthly Chronicle*, IX (June 1972), 58.

[44] *UN Monthly Chronicle*, VIII (December 1971), 148, and IX (November 1972), 12. On numerous occasions, the PRC delegates stated that they were newcomers and had to acquaint themselves with the background of the issue under discussion before they could take a firm stand. To cite one example, PRC representative Ch'en Ch'u stated at the October 20, 1972, meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly: "The PRC did not participate in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [in the past], and it still has to acquaint itself with and study the information and issues relevant to the peaceful uses of outer space. The Chinese Government reserves its right to make comments and take action on related matters in the future." *PR*, No. 43 (October 27, 1972), 4, 21.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE VI

VOTING RECORDS OF THE BIG FIVE ON THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE 26TH AND 27TH SESSIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY[a]

26th Sess.[b]	*In favor*	*Against*	*Abstaining*	*Absent*	*Total*
PRC	21 (28.4%)	3 (4.1%)	1 (1.4%)	49 (66.2%)	74 (100%)
USA	36 (48.6%)	14 (18.9%)	23 (31.1%)	0	74 (100%)[c]
USSR	48 (64.9%)	9 (12.2%)	17 (23.0%)	0	74 (100%)
UK	33 (44.6%)	14 (18.9%)	25 (33.8%)	2 (2.7%)	74 (100%)
France	32 (43.2%)	10 (13.5%)	31 (41.9%)	1 (1.4%)	74 (100%)
27th Sess.					
PRC	52 (63.4%)	5 (6.1%)	5 (6.1%)	19 (23.2%)	82 (100%)[c]
USA	38 (46.3%)	13 (15.9%)	31 (37.8%)	0	82 (100%)
USSR	57 (69.5%)	5 (6.1%)	20 (24.4%)	0	82 (100%)
UK	40 (48.8%)	13 (15.9%)	28 (34.1%)	1 (1.2%)	82 (100%)
France	42 (51.2%)	11 (13.4%)	28 (34.1%)	1 (1.2%)	82 (100%)

[a] To draw a sharp picture of consensus and cleavage in the Assembly among the Big Five, the author has eliminated from the tabulation all the resolutions adopted by acclamation or unanimously. It should further be noted that the tabulation lists only those resolutions adopted by roll call or recorded votes. Resolutions which have been adopted by a show of hands, simply recording total numbers for, against, and abstaining could not be computed for present purposes.

[b] The tabulation for the 26th session only lists resolutions adopted after November 15, 1971, when the PRC delegation made its first appearance.

[c] The total includes 1 "not participating."

SOURCES: *Resolutions of the General Assembly at Its Twenty-Sixth Regular Session, 21 September–22 December 1971* (United Nations, Office of Public Information, Press Release GA/4548, 28 December 1971); *Resolutions of the General Assembly at Its Twenty-Seventh Regular Session, 19 September–19 December 1972* (Press Release GA/4719, 19 December 1972).

complete without economic independence."[45] It should be understood here that the PRC is by no means advocating autarky. Nor is this a declaration of abstention from bilateral or multilateral aid. As one of the PRC's UN delegates put it before an ECOSOC meeting, "Self-reliance excludes neither the development of international economic and trade relations on the principles of equality and mutual benefit nor the mutual support and assistance given on the same basis."[46] Rather, the principle of self-reliance serves the dual purpose of warning the developing nations not to expect too much from China on the one

[45] Chou Hua-min's policy speech, "China's Principled Stand on Relations of International Economy and Trade," delivered on April 20, 1972, at the third session of UNCTAD. *PR*, No. 17 (April 28, 1972), 12.

[46] Wang Jun-sheng, July 6, 1972, Plenary Meeting of the 53rd session of ECOSOC. *PR*, No. 28 (July 14, 1972), 17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hand, and of rationalizing or justifying its modest role as a donor of foreign aid on the other.[47]

By stressing self-reliance without self-sufficiency, the PRC is in effect attempting to lay the groundwork for what it calls "the advancement of this new type of international economic relations." In a major speech before the Plenary Meeting of the 53rd session of ECOSOC, on July 6, 1972, Wang Jun-sheng spelled out China's conceptualization of the new international economic relations based on the tripod of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual support.[48] (Oddly enough, the operational principles of the new international economic relations expounded by Wang Jun-sheng are hardly more than an updated version of China's own principles of foreign aid, having little to say about trade and monetary questions.)[49] These operational principles need to be mentioned here since they are intertwined with the PRC's UN diplomacy. Briefly summarized, they are: (1) that the donor nations must scrupulously respect the sovereignty of the recipient nations, treating them as equals; (2) that aid must come with no strings attached or privileges sought; (3) that the purpose of aid should always be to help the recipient nations achieve independent national economies through self-reliance; (4) that the donor nations should not attempt to develop the economies of the recipient nations in such a way as to make them dependent or subordinate to their own economies; (5) that the loans should be at a low rate or free of interest; (6) that the creditor nations should provide the most liberal terms for debt-payment service; (7) that the projects for which aid is extended should be determined by the requirements and needs of the recipient nations, not by the donor nations; (8) that equipment and materials should be of high quality and provided at fair and reasonable prices; (9) that experts and technical personnel should conscientiously impart their know-how to the indigenous personnel of the recipient nations and that they should not enjoy any special amenities; and (10) that other trade relations should be carried on among all nations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.[50]

The PRC's model of new international economic relations does not appear to be a product of haphazard or irrational forces. It looks more

[47] Wang Jun-sheng went on to say: "In per capita terms, the level attained by China's productive forces is still very low. China is a comparatively poor developing country. We must learn modestly from the merits of other peoples, overcome our shortcomings and strive unremittingly for our goal." *Ibid.*

[48] *Ibid.*, 15-17.

[49] For comparison, see "Eight Principles for China's Aid to Foreign Countries," *PR*, No. 17 (April 28, 1972), 15.

[50] *PR*, No. 28 (July 14, 1972), 17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

like a mosaic of numerous factors balancing China's external goals and objectives with her resources and power capable of sustaining them. The PRC clearly recognizes her point of greatest leverage in the existence of asymmetries and disparities in today's international economic relations. Yet she recognizes equally well the perils of making commitments or raising expectations among the Third-World nations which she could not meet or fulfill.[51] The dilemmas and frustrations posed by this situation are partially resolved by an appeal to the principle of self-reliance. In a circumlocutory way, the Chinese are trying to teach the nations of the Third World a lesson, one which they themselves were forced to learn in a traumatic way.[52] The PRC's overdependency on the Soviet Union in the 1950's, it may be recalled, came to a sudden halt in mid-1960 when the latter withdrew technical experts, managers, and industrial blueprints from China, thus inflicting maximum damage to the Chinese economy at the most vulnerable moment. The moral of Peking's appeal for self-reliance and national independence, whether this is perceived as such or not, is that eternal vigilance is indeed the price of national independence.

To give legal support to its argument for self-reliance and national independence, the PRC has also come to make extensive, and often irresponsible, use of the principle of sovereignty in its UN diplomacy. According to two well-known PRC writers on international law, "The principle of sovereignty is one of the most important principles in international relations and in the whole system of international law. It is the core of all fundamental principles of international law."[53] Translated into the context of UN politics, the PRC's use of the principle of sovereignty manifests itself in several ways. First, the PRC argues that the days of superpower hegemony in and out of the United Nations are over and a new era of international egalitarianism has

[51] Wang Jun-sheng also stated in his ECOSOC speech: "China's economy is still comparatively backward at present, and the support we give to the people of the world is mainly political and moral, while the material aid we can provide is yet scanty. We are determined to change this situation in which our ability falls short of our wish, and with the advance of China's socialist construction, strive to make greater contributions to mankind." *Ibid.*

[52] Note the following statement in Ch'iao Kuan-hua's first major speech in the 26th session of the General Assembly: "Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, we, the Chinese people, defying the tight imperialist blockades and withstanding the terrific pressure from without, have built our country into a socialist state with initial prosperity by maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands and through self-reliance." *PR*, No. 47 (November 19, 1971), 6.

[53] Yang Hsin and Ch'en Chien, "Chieh-lu ho p'i-p'an ti-kuo-chu-yi-cheh kuan-yü kuo-chia chu-ch'uan wen-t'i te miu-lum" [Expose and Censure the Imperialists' Fallacy Concerning the Question of State Sovereignty], *Cheng-fa yen-chiu*, No. 4 (November 1964), 6; cited in Ch'iu (fn. 1), 197.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dawned. To dispel the suspicion that she too is engaged in the politics of superpower hegemony behind the scenes, the PRC has exacted the inclusion of "the no-hegemony clause" in the Nixon-Chou (Shanghai) Communiqué of February 27, 1972, as well as in the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué of September 29, 1972, which established diplomatic relations between the two nations.[54]

Second, the PRC often links the principle of state sovereignty (Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter) with the principle of domestic jurisdiction (Article 2, paragraph 7) in selectively attacking the UN interventions, or any other activities smacking of "interventionism," in such areas as Hungary, the Congo (ONUC), Korea (UNKRA), Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macao (refugee questions), which she has unilaterally judged to be beyond the purview of UN jurisdiction. Even in the UN's functional activities, which certainly require transnational cooperation, Peking presents national independence and sovereignty as a cure-all. Accordingly, the effective solution to the narcotics problem is seen to lie in the achievement of complete national independence; the cause of poverty and backwardness among the developing nations is not overpopulation but "the prolonged exploitation and plunder by imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism." Moreover, each nation has the sovereign right to determine its own environmental standards and policies in the light of its own conditions. Once the Third World has shaken off the shackles of imperialist interventionism, the road to freedom and prosperous economic development is said to be open.[55]

Third, the PRC uses the principle of sovereignty in championing the causes of many Third-World nations. As noted earlier, the PRC has supported the claims of some Latin American countries for 200-mile territorial seas. The Chinese representative Shen Wei-liang, in a speech before the United Nations Sea-Bed Committee, went a step further by

[54] The "no-hegemony clause" in the Nixon-Chou Joint Communiqué reads: "Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony"; the clause in the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement reads: "Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each country is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony." For the complete texts of both communiqués, see *PR*, No. 9 (March 3, 1972), 4-5, and No. 40 (October 6, 1972), 12-13. It is also interesting to note that the PRC supports the enlargement of the Common Market in Europe because it "will constitute a serious obstacle to the United States and the Soviet Union in pushing their policies for hegemony in Europe." *PR*, No. 27 (July 2, 1971), 36.

[55] For numerous statements on the UN's functional activities or organs, see *PR*, No. 17 (April 28, 1972), 12-14, No. 23 (June 9, 1972), 17-18, No. 24 (June 16, 1972), 5-6, 8, 13, No. 25 (June 23, 1972) 9-10, and No. 42 (October 20, 1972), 11-12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

presenting the legally untenable and anarchical notion that "every state in the world has the right to define the extent of its territorial seas, and that is its sovereign right."[56] Another Chinese representative at the 12th session of the Trade and Development Board of UNCTAD argued that "China is a developing country and belongs to the third world" and "will, as always, firmly stand on the side of the third world and resolutely support the just stand and reasonable propositions of the developing countries to safeguard state sovereignty and develop national economies."[57] Obviously, the PRC's strategy here is to lead as many Third-World nations as possible in the struggle to ward off the actual or imaginary exploitation of their natural resources by the superpowers—and, of course, China is not, and cannot be, such a superpower!

Finally, the PRC leadership has found the principle of sovereignty to be a useful and effective weapon to attack her main adversary, the Soviet Union. Peking's commentators have repeatedly argued that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent proclamation of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine constituted, in effect, "the New Tsars' theories of limited sovereignty," and as such "flagrantly trample underfoot the universally acknowledged principle of state sovereignty."[58] Ironically, the PRC's endorsement of absolute and illimitable sovereignty reflects the early influence of the Soviet Union as well as China's own traumatic experience in modern history.[59] Just as the Soviet Union was using the doctrine of absolute sovereignty to circumvent "capitalistic encirclement" during the early days of her national life, so does the PRC attempt to use the doctrine of absolute sovereignty both as a legal shield to protect herself from "imperialism" and "social imperialism," and as a legal sword to fight her enemies.

IV

It does not take an ideological purist or logical perfectionist to decipher numerous inconsistencies and contradictions in the PRC's UN diplomacy. But if one accepts the Machiavellian notion of politics, the very inconsistencies and contradictions could become evidence of realism and flexibility in a new institutional milieu. There are several key areas of inconsistency. First of all, the PRC's application of the principle of domestic jurisdiction is highly selective at best and

[56] *PR*, No. 33 (August 18, 1972), 13. [57] *PR*, No. 42 (October 20, 1972), 11.

[58] *PR*, No. 13 (March 28, 1969), 23. For additional statements on this point, see also No. 21 (May 23, 1969), 20-22, No. 22 (May 30, 1969), 14, and Special Issue (April 28, 1969), 27.

[59] See Hsiung (fn. 2), 72-88.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

downright hypocritical at worst. Clearly, on this question the PRC wants to have her cake and eat it too. The PRC commentators have time and again insisted that the United Nations, in exercising its role in the maintenance of international peace and security, should not intervene in the internal affairs of states in violation of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter. Specifically, the PRC has condemned the UN "interventions" in Korea, Hungary, the Congo, Cyprus (UNFICYP), Vietnam, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macao as contraventions of the Charter principles.

However, the PRC has also argued forcefully *in support* of the UN interventions and sanctions in the Suez Crisis of 1956 and in colonial and apartheid questions involving Portugal, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa. Peking's rationale for the apparent double standard is simplistic enough: that the acts of suppressing national liberation movements do not constitute "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." "Such acts violate," one leading PRC theoretician argued, "the fundamental United Nations Charter principles of national self-determination and respect for human rights and also threaten the peace and security of the world. Therefore, both the General Assembly and the Security Council have the duty and the authority to handle this matter."[60] In accordance with this line of reasoning, Huang Hua forcefully advocated in the Security Council meeting of January 31, 1972, that the Council should further strengthen and expand the sanctions against Rhodesia, South Africa, and the Portuguese "colonialists."[61]

The PRC does not seem to have a firm or consistent stand on the jurisdictional division of labor between the General Assembly and the Security Council. Like the United States and the Soviet Union, whose positions on this question have shifted according to their changing political calculus, the PRC has taken a political or pragmatic, rather than a purely legalistic, approach to this matter. While she has on numerous occasions attacked the Uniting for Peace Resolution[62] (which transferred the United Nations' responsibilities on security matters from the Security Council to the General Assembly when the former was paralyzed by the veto) as a clear-cut violation of the Charter, the PRC displayed a willingness to sacrifice consistency by editorially supporting the action of the General Assembly in the Suez Crisis: *Jen-min*

[60] Kuo Ch'un, *Lien-ho kuo* [The United Nations] (Peking 1956), 15; cited in Ch'iu (fn. 1), 238.
[61] *UN Monthly Chronicle*, IX (February 1972), 21.
[62] General Assembly Resolution 377 A (V) of November 3, 1950.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Jih-pao stated that "this is the first time that the United Nations has adopted resolutions against aggression in conformity with the Charter."[63] It ought to be added that the Assembly's action in this case was based on the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

Since her entry into the United Nations the PRC has continued to take this political approach. For example, when the Security Council was immobilized by the Soviet vetoes in December 1971 in dealing with the Indo-Pakistani War, the PRC not only voted for, but also raised no reservations or qualifications on a Security Council resolution which referred the deadlocked issue to the General Assembly for consideration based specifically on the Uniting for Peace Resolution.[64] Furthermore, the PRC voted for the Assembly's Cease-Fire and Troops Withdrawal Resolution on the Indo-Pakistani War without raising any objections or reservations about the citation of the Uniting for Peace Resolution as a legal basis for this Assembly action.[65] However, when the Security Council was deadlocked by the PRC's veto over the question of Bangladesh membership, and the issue was subsequently raised in the General Assembly meeting of September 23, 1972, Huang Hua, in a monumental contradiction, inquired: "Why is there such insistence on by-passing the Security Council and raising this matter for discussion at the General Assembly with the good knowledge that the General Assembly cannot possibly settle this question?"[66]

Perhaps the most salient example of the PRC's inconsistent—or pragmatic—posture in the United Nations is found in her stand on the veto. In spite of her ferocious attack against superpower hegemony and her unremitting support of absolute sovereignty, the PRC has never challenged the principle of the veto of the Big Five, which is clearly an institutionalized expression of superpower hegemony in the United Nations system. Of course, the veto can easily be justified on practical or functional grounds, but it surely cannot be defended in terms of the principles of national sovereignty and equality, which have now become the clichés of Peking's foreign policy rhetoric.

The PRC has seldom attempted to clarify or rationalize her support for the veto, but one of her leading scholars on international law has attempted to rationalize Peking's stand by asserting that the veto or the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council would prevent "certain imperialist big powers from manipu-

[63] *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 1412, November 16, 1956, 22.
[64] Security Council Resolution 303 (1971) of December 6, 1971.
[65] General Assembly Resolution 2793 (XXVI) of December 7, 1971.
[66] *PR*, No. 40 (October 6, 1972), 29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lating a superficial voting majority to reach decisions unfavorable to small states or dragging them into participation in aggressive activities."[67] In short, the veto is presented as a legal shield to protect not only the interests of the big powers but also the sovereignty and interests of the small nations.

In order to minimize the inherent ambiguities and contradictions in her incongruous support of the veto, the PRC seems to have adopted two tactics. First, she has frequently attacked the abuse of the veto power by "certain superpowers." Such an attack, if carried to the extreme, could easily mislead the uninitiated into believing that the PRC is actually against the veto *per se*. Second, the PRC has already begun exercising great caution in her own use of the veto except, of course, in a situation or on an issue perceived to be affecting her vital security interests such as the Indo-Pakistani War or questions of arms control and disarmament. In the past, PRC commentators had asserted that the abstention of a permanent member does not constitute a veto on the Security Council's resolutions on substantive matters. This position is compatible with the actual practice of the Security Council, which has followed the precedent established by the League of Nations. The PRC is therefore more likely to abstain or not to participate than to veto resolutions disagreeable to her, as evidenced by her stand on the Security Council resolutions extending the tenure of UNFICYP.[68] In short, the preliminary empirical data on Peking's behavior in the Security Council indicate that her veto is likely to remain an ace in the hole.

China's Third-World diplomacy in the United Nations is also fraught with some incongruities and inconsistencies. The Chinese support for 200-mile territorial seas may be flattering to the national ego of many small states, but it is quite anachronistic in today's interdependent world when transnational cooperation on such matters as the peaceful use of sea-bed resources and the joint control of marine pollution is becoming increasingly urgent. Besides, the PRC's support for the Latin American claims contradicts its own "Declaration Regarding Territorial Waters," issued on September 4, 1958, to proclaim the adoption of the twelve-mile rule and the straight base-line method for measuring the territorial sea.[69]

This is another example of China's willingness to sacrifice ideological

[67] Kuo Ch'un (fn. 60), 101.

[68] Security Council Resolution 305 (1971) of December 13, 1971, and Security Council Resolution 315 (1972) of June 15, 1972. See also Table V.

[69] See Hsiung (fn. 2), 103.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consistency in order to follow the newly defined interests and dictates of her national interest.[70] It was easy for the PRC to get substantial diplomatic mileage out of this support without giving up much of her tangible interests. China is a non-maritime power, and her interest in free transit or in the principle of the freedom of the seas is academic. One may conjecture that the discovery of enormous oil potentials around the Tiao-yü-t'ai (or, in Japanese, Senkaku) islets—which happen to fall within the 200-mile radius of the Chinese coastline—and the desire to ward off a Japanese and/or Western scramble to exploit the oil potentials, could be a potent motive behind the PRC's support for the Latin American claim, but she is not likely to admit that.[71]

The flexible and opportunistic character of China's UN diplomacy is further illustrated by the use and application she makes of international law. Like many states in today's international politics, China seeks maximum protection under international law, without necessarily assuming the corresponding degree of obligation, or supporting the same maximum protection for all other states in all circumstances. Furthermore, the Chinese use of international law is marked by ambiguities and subjective interpretations. To cite one example within the context of UN politics: before her entry, the PRC repeatedly made a cogent legal argument for the restoration of her legitimate rights in the United Nations, based largely on the doctrine of state continuity in international law. She maintained that the China issue in the United Nations was a procedural question of credentials rather than a substantive matter of admission, since "China" has always been and would continue to be a founding member of the United Nations; hence, the "important-question resolution," introduced by the United States in the 1960's to block her entry, was interpreted by the PRC as a legal absurdity.

Yet, after her entry into the United Nations, the PRC refused to assume all the obligations incurred by "China." To take one illustration, the Nationalists left a debt of $30.2 million ($16.6 million for the United Nations and $13.6 million for the specialized agencies) in

[70] To cite a further example in support of this thesis, in 1970 (just prior to Canadian recognition of the PRC), China conducted more than three-fourths of her foreign trade with nations not having diplomatic relations with Peking.

[71] The PRC presented, as an *amicus curiae* argument, excerpts from an article by John Gittings, "Scramble for Oil in East China Sea," published in the British newspaper *Guardian* on December 18, 1970, in which Gittings argued for the sovereign rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf "to a depth of 200 metres or beyond that limit to where the depth of the waters admits of the exploitation of natural resources." *PR*, No. 2 (January 8, 1971), 15-16; see also No. 1 (January 1, 1971), 22.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unpaid dues at the time of their expulsion.[72] The PRC's UN delegation declared that it would not be responsible for the unpaid balance of China's assessment incurred before October 25, 1971, and eventually succeeded in having the pre-entry dues deleted from its assessment account: the General Assembly adopted a resolution by a vote of 92 in favor, 9 against, and 24 abstentions.[73]

However, the PRC has promptly paid China's assessments for 1971 (prorated from October 25, 1971) and 1972.[74] While the United States launched a major campaign to have its own assessment reduced from 31.52 per cent to 25 per cent (and succeeded with the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 2961 B [XXVII] of December 13, 1972), and the Soviet Union threatened unilateral action on its own assessment, the PRC's representative Hsing Sung-yi stated before the General Assembly's Budget Committee on October 9, 1972, that his government was willing to have its budget assessment gradually raised from the present 4 per cent to 7 per cent in the next five years.[75] Despite the ambiguous and subjective interpretation of her obligations in the United Nations system, the PRC is likely to be a greater contributor to United Nations finances than Nationalist China, who, contrary to her propaganda image, proved to be one of the worst defaulters in UN history.[76]

Although, contrary to some predictions, she has not staged an open confrontation to undo the UN's past resolutions or made a blanket rejection of them all, the PRC has taken the position that she would unilaterally judge past resolutions on their intrinsic merits, challenging some and accepting others.[77] The PRC's commentators have often invoked the principle of *pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt* (which is generally accepted in international law as meaning that a treaty applies only to the parties involved and has no effect upon third states), thereby justifying rejection of some past UN resolutions and decisions with the contention that these could not bind states with no representation.[78] This is a legally defensible position, to be sure, but the PRC cannot

[72] *New York Times*, October 28, 1971, and October 10, 1972; *UN Monthly Chronicle*, IX (October 1972), 64.

[73] General Assembly Resolution 3049 C (XXVII) of December 19, 1972.

[74] See a declaration to this effect in *PR*, No. 52 (December 29, 1972), 18.

[75] *New York Times*, October 10, 1972.

[76] According to one study, "[Nationalist] China has been the largest single debtor and has usually been responsible for over three-quarters of the total arrears." John G. Stoessinger, "Financing the United Nations," *International Conciliation*, No. 535 (November 1961), 12.

[77] *New York Times*, November 17, 1971.

[78] See Hsiung (fn. 2), 24-25, 241, 243.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

refuse to assume the obligations incurred by "China" based on *pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt*, and at the same time lay claim to all the rights emanating from the doctrine of state continuity.

V

The foregoing analysis of China's UN diplomacy, even though based on preliminary empirical data of the trial- and apprenticeship-period, provides a basis for sketching out a few broad assessments and conclusions. First of all, ideological predilection does not seem to be a decisive determinant of Chinese diplomacy in the United Nations. The PRC has proved to be capable of being a party to compromise diplomacy on numerous occasions. That she has been somewhat inconsistent on several issues further illustrates her tendency, at least for the moment, to zigzag carefully in following the dictates of realpolitik. Judging from her trenchant attacks on the Soviet Union and her muted posture toward the United States on many occasions, the most potent operational guide of China's UN diplomacy seems to be the Palmerstonian dictum that she has no perennial friends or foes but only perennial interests.

However, the pragmatic pursuit of national interest is often concealed under the mantle of either legitimizing ideological dialectics or the universally popular principles of the Charter and international law. Actually, the PRC often finds herself in a predicament inherent in her contradictory diplomacy. Caught between revolutionary élan which demands evangelical zeal and an institutional milieu compelling accommodation, the PRC often follows a diplomatic double track, with militant revolutionary verbalization on one side and cautious and pragmatic behavior on the other. Often there seems to be an inverse relation between the rhetorical militancy and the pursuit of realpolitik —that is, the more the PRC de-ideologizes her diplomacy in the United Nations in pursuing her practical goals, the greater the need and compulsion to wave ideological banners.

Once settled in the world organization, the PRC has proved to be neither an operational wrecker as many of her detractors had long feared, nor a structural and procedural reformer as some romantic revolutionaries once hoped. For most of the time on most issues, China has been acting as a cautious and diligent apprentice, mastering her new trade and adjusting her crude ideological preconceptions to the reality of the institutional milieu. In a word, the PRC is playing the diplomatic game in the institutions of world peace by the established

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rules, rather than attempting to replace or repudiate them. The camel's nose of an *embourgeoisement* process has already entered the tent of China's UN diplomacy.

The PRC's Third-World diplomacy in the United Nations also bears testimony to the strategy of translating weakness into strength. Indeed, this is a rational strategy of attempting to narrow the gaps between the ambitious objectives of the new foreign policy and the limited means and resources available to support or sustain them. China has been championing the causes of the Third World without assuming too much cost or obligation. The expansive claims of Latin American nations on the territorial seas have received Chinese support, but one suspects an ulterior motive. The Arab cause has been blessed with Peking's verbal endorsement, but both Ch'iao Kuan-hua and Huang Hua have forcefully denounced assassinations and hijacking as a means of waging political struggles. By denouncing the collusion of the superpowers and their meddling in the Middle East, the PRC has excused and rationalized its own meager material support to the Arab countries. In addition, the PRC's model of the new international economic relations has an escape clause under the guise of self-reliance.

Despite her periodic protestations and disclaimers, the PRC is likely to continue to exploit and expand her economic, military, political, and diplomatic power potentials in order to achieve the status of a superpower. As a novice in the world organization, Peking's "status crisis" is very acute. Her ferocious attack against superpower hegemony and collusion could well be a manifestation of the Freudian defensive mechanism of denial and projection. Peking's tenacious support of the veto tends to make this hypothesis plausible. Historians familiar with traditional Chinese diplomacy can detect in current Chinese foreign policy or in its UN diplomacy a replay of *I i chih i*, the strategy of using barbarians to control barbarians (the "divide-and-rule strategy" of Western diplomatic practice), as well as of *chi-mi*, the strategy of getting barbarians under control through concessions.

Finally, one may ask: What is the PRC's conceptualization of the United Nations? Her long exclusion and isolation from the family of nations have made her hypersensitive to any suggestion smacking of "world government." Consequently, she takes a critical view of the expansion of the role and functions of the United Nations system except in a few selective cases. Yet the PRC finds the United Nations extremely useful in advancing her foreign policy interests in a number of ways. The United Nations serves as a marketplace for seeking and expanding her diplomatic relations, as evidenced by the negotiations

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that led to the normalization of relations with Mexico and Cyprus. The United Nations is a training ground for foreign service personnel. China's first Ambassadors to Mexico and Japan (Hsiung Hsiang-hui and Ch'en Ch'u) emerged from her delegation to the 26th General Assembly. The United Nations provides a stage to cultivate her mystique, and a propaganda podium to sermonize the virtues of the New China and the vices of imperialism, social imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, and apartheid. The United Nations is seen as a barometer for checking the moods and trends of the international system, which could provide a corrective filter in the feedback process of Peking's foreign policy. The United Nations is also a shield and a sword in the struggle against the Soviet Union. Above all, China today senses "an irresistible historical trend" in the international system marked by fluid configurations and realignments among the major players, because "the imperialist camp is split while the revisionist bloc is falling apart."[79] Although the United Nations offers no guarantee that all of her interests can be accommodated, it does provide an institutional framework in which China can participate as one of the major actors in the newly emerging international system.

[79] The 1972 New Year's Day editorial of *Jen-min Jih-pao*, in *PR*, No. 1 (January 7, 1972), 8-9. This editorial provides a lucid exposition of the PRC's perception of the international system today. It states, *inter alia*: "Never before had there been a situation in which medium and small countries were able to play such an inspiring role in the United Nations through their joint efforts, the voice of justice was able to prevail to such an extent, and the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were so isolated. The changes in the United Nations are a vivid reflection of the excellent international situation."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BUILDING AUTHORITY:
A Return to Fundamentals

By NORMAN H. KEEHN

UNTIL recently, most of the literature on political development has centered primarily on nation building. Relatively little expenditure of time and energy has been directed toward some of the most gnawing political problems that confront leaders in industrializing societies: how to remain at the apex of power; what steps must be taken to create and then preserve public authority; and by what means leaders mobilize support and secure compliance with policy decisions when their brittle governmental structure is simultaneously confronted with crises of integration, mobilization, and distribution.[1] The imperative need is to raise questions concerning (1) how authority is built and maintained, and (2) the means by which political leaders implement policy when they are confronted with a skeptical and volatile population. Those are the ends toward which this article is directed.

For an incoming regime, the search for authority is the basic task. Building and maintaining authority requires that political leaders have some base of power; it is on the basis of this capability of power that choices are made and implemented. And it is in the attainment of desired ends that a regime's performance is respected, evaluated, and ultimately judged. Authority, choice, performance, power, and leadership are starting points for a study of the building and maintaining of authority and the implementation of policy; they will serve as the building blocks for a framework of analysis. The framework will then be applied to a real situation—Bolivia.

Post-revolutionary Bolivia was selected as a case study to illuminate the problems of inducing compliance and generating support under a new regime. The revolutionary government which came to power in 1952 was inundated with problems: the one that monopolized the attention of the ruling elite was regime maintenance. In focusing on how the new regime sought to build and maintain its authority, we are in a favorable position to understand the tangle of difficulties involved in solving a serious problem which plagued the Bolivian economy:

[1] The following works represent the most recent explorations of authority-building and regime-maintenance strategies: Warren F. Ilchman and Norman T. Uphoff, *The Political Economy of Change* (Berkeley 1969); W. Howard Wriggins, *The Ruler's Imperative: Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa* (New York 1969).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inflation. By 1956 this problem had become so acute that the Bolivian Government was impelled to effect a stabilization program. Stabilization became a controversial issue precisely because it posed a direct challenge to values and attitudes as well as to immediate and future goals. Conflict swirled around issues involving authority, power, the distribution of advantages and burdens, and performance. The present study of stabilization has no other objective than to emphasize the political consequences of choice.

I. Framework of Analysis

AUTHORITY

"Authority is the essence of all government."[2] But the scarcity of authority is precisely what confronts embryonic regimes. Leaders are unable to take for granted that their commands, orders, and requests will be obeyed; they are at the mercy of the pressures of massive social forces. Thus, the challenge that faces the leadership in any new regime is how to join formal with concrete power—"how to be on top in fact as well as name."[3] As a consequence, the leaders' interests and energies will be taxed by the demanding task of establishing and then sustaining legitimate public authority. Without a minimum degree of authority, governance is impossible; authority is a continuing desideratum.

The term authority is here employed to indicate the capacity, inherited or acquired, to exercise control over individuals or groups.[4] Closely allied with the concept of authority are the concepts of compliance and support. If a regime is to accomplish its goals, it must be able to secure compliance with and support of its policy choices. Clearly, the capacities for compliance and support are indispensable to the successful attainment of goals. To gain compliance with their policy goals, leaders must engage in the complicated task of mobilizing support; in newly founded regimes the difficulty of generating support is intensified because political groups whose active support is needed to promote public purposes are likely to retain a good deal of autonomy. So long as plural, independent clusters of power are capable of vetoing decisions made at the center, or of withholding their support, they can render public control ineffective. Such developments are inimical to authority because they challenge the assumption of superiority without

[2] Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (Washington, D. C. 1967), 72.

[3] Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York 1962), vii.

[4] The term has been subject to a variety of definitions. For a catalog of the meanings of authority, see Young C. Kim, "Authority: Some Conceptual and Empirical Notes," *Western Political Quarterly*, XIX (June 1966), 223-34.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which authority cannot maintain itself. Governmental authority can rarely be taken for granted.

Implicit in the notion of compliance is a regime's capacity to exercise control over the political community. But in those modernizing societies where the fabric of legitimacy is torn by widespread dissidence, where political institutions are too feeble to contain the centrifugal pluralisms emitted by political development, impotence rather than omnipotence is the rule. This was recognized by Madison in his admonition in *The Federalist* (No. 51): "In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself." Unhappily, in new regimes, the state's capacity for control is seriously circumscribed; the critical problem is not liberty but authority.

Under these circumstances, the theoretical concept that the state holds a monopoly of coercive power confuses potential for control with actual control.[5] It does not allow for the fact that powerful interests can immobilize their government. The clash between formal and informal authority inheres in any polity; it is particularly intense in nascent regimes. The concept of control is vitiated where public authority is diluted by pluralistic tendencies and where political institutions have little power. The uneasy relation between a regime whose claim to support and compliance is imperfectly realized on one hand, and aggressive interests on the other, serves as an antidote to exaggerated notions of state sovereignty.

Clearly, the central issue is not the form of authority; it is the *degree of authority*.[6] A low degree of governmental authority is the prime characteristic of new regimes. The logical focus of analysis lies, therefore, in assessing the degree of a regime's authority. Such an assessment provides a realistic way of ascertaining the boundaries of the possible, and it offers a reminder of the very narrow limits of power.

CHOICE

Given limited sovereign capability and the constraints posed by the shifting contours of power relationships, political leaders are confronted with weighing the costs of compliance and support against the benefits of alternative courses of action. A critical examination of the trade-offs between short-term benefits and long-term gains is therefore a matter

[5] On this point, see Robert Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *American Political Science Review*, LII (June 1958), 465.

[6] See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven 1968), 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of special urgency. How leaders perceive the costs and advantages of pursuing economic, political, and social goals has an important bearing on their decisions to follow short-term or long-term policies.

The obligation to make hard choices between competing alternatives means that leaders must be attuned to the political atmosphere in which they work and acutely sensitive to the matrix of constraints which delimit choice and inhibit action. Without a knowledge of the empirical world, their policy choices would be ludicrously discordant with the possible.

To look at choice is to view it against the stubborn inertia of constraints imposed by a refractory economic, social, and political setting. Leaders must therefore ask what choices and implementing actions are possible, given the "confining conditions" of their milieu.[7] They may not be captives of their environment; they must recognize that the social, economic, and political frame of the particular society does set conditions for and limits to implementing action. The essential point therefore is that political leaders must have an appreciation for what is technically sound in relation to what is politically feasible. For us, then, rational actions mean, as they did for the French scholar Paul Mus, "measures in harmony with the structure of facts, rather than with logical arguments."

Choice, therefore, must be made in reference to the objective situation, rather than on the basis of some universal desiderata; it must be made against the backdrop of imprecise, unknown facts; and it must be made in counterpoint, where passion, sentiment, and self-interest are played off against reason.

Choice thus contains two poles: the rational and the irrational. Leaders swing between them like a pendulum. In struggling to find a position between the extremes, they cannot seek sanctuary in a simplistic dialectic between correct and incorrect alternatives. Instead, they are compelled to make a synthesis requiring compromise, give-and-take, partial victories, and limited defeats. There is, then, no absolute measuring rod which enables a leader to certify that one choice is superior to all others.

The point is that there will be no perfect solutions, only tolerable ones. Unlike mathematics, political problems yield to no solutions. Political solutions are illusory. Jacques Ellul reminds us: "A political problem permits only an accommodation, never a solution. There can

[7] On the role of "confining conditions" in restricting the choices of new regimes, see Otto Kirchheimer, "Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs," *American Political Science Review*, LIX (December 1965), 964-74.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be compromise, evolution, conciliation, various methods of using authority, and so on. But these are not solutions. Yet modern man increasingly demands solutions. Increasingly, the technicians insist on formulating problems of society as though they were exact problems permitting exact solutions. The growing myth of 'solutions' progressively removes from our conscience the sense of the relative, i.e., limited, nature of all true political effort."[8]

In choosing, leaders must be willing to pay the price; there is no other way. In regimes suffering from low legitimacy, for instance, political leaders are likely to yield to the temptation of resorting to short-term policies aimed at maintaining their authority. Regime-building rather than nation-building strategies would appear to be the logical derivative of a short-term perspective. Survival is a central concern of any regime. Indeed, leaders of incoming regimes are likely to find that securing and maintaining national authority is their most fundamental objective. In the words of Richard Rose: "If Western politicians are expected and allowed to maximize short-term benefits, then how much greater an allowance should be made in states in which the risks of repudiation of the regime itself are much greater, and the penalties for loss far higher than in a Western election."[9]

Decisions involving the maintenance of a regime will have repercussions on the capacity to make choices concerning social and economic transformations. Faced with the necessity of choice, political leaders must tap their minimal resource base in order to aggregate sufficient power to achieve valued ends. Choice is always made under the shadow cast by the scarcity of resources. In the expenditure of limited resources to attain preferred goals, the leeway to achieve other political ends is gravely curtailed.

This problem is especially critical where scarce resources have to be devoted simultaneously to the demands of support and the demands of economic development. Where a mobilized public demands both immediate consumption benefits and economic development—without wanting to pay for them out of pocket—the leadership's dilemma is particularly sharp. This dilemma of insufficient resources to cover rising demands may be resolved in two possible ways: either allocate the existing resources to investment, or dilute the resources by dispersing them between investment and consumption. The latter option creates the

[8] Jacques Ellul, *The Political Illusion* (New York 1967), 190. Comments very much in this spirit are also made by Michael J. Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics* (New York 1962), chap. 1.

[9] Richard Rose, "Dynamic Tendencies in the Authority of Regimes," *World Politics*, XXI (July 1969), 628.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strong possibility that government will have to produce political resources.[10]

PERFORMANCE

In well-established states suffused with the aura of "spontaneous obligation," the ruled can be governed with far more economy of means. As Howard Wriggins puts it, "such acceptance requires little performance to sustain it."[11] In short, legitimacy reduces to a minimum the necessity for expending compliance resources.

On the other hand, in poorly integrated polities deficient in diffuse support, voluntary compliance is difficult to attain. This is generally so because of (a) rival interests that cling tenaciously to divergent views concerning fundamental political values and institutions; (b) opposition to the specific nature of the demands for governmental compliance; and (c) popular resistance to demands for compliance that are deemed to be outside the legitimate scope of governmental activities.[12] Accordingly, where legitimacy is weak or eroded, the cost, to government, of engineering support and securing compliance goes up considerably. Under these conditions the mobilized sectors of society are likely to attach some *quid pro quo* for increments in support, and in exchange for compliance with public policy decisions.[13]

A moment's reflection will suggest that, in the fragmented societies that are deficient in affective ties toward government, the maintenance of compliance is subject to the imperatives of reciprocal exchange. The basic factors which make reciprocity essential are the urgent need of overcoming the atomization of power, the necessity of accommodation, and the need to mobilize support and gain compliance. The conferring of benefits constitutes the incentive designed to attract support and to motivate compliance with policy choices, thus underscoring the reciprocal nature of modern power. Distributive benefits, therefore, furnish a regime whose claim to whole-hearted support and compliance is imperfectly realized with a means to establish a simple self-interested basis for eliciting support and cooperation. This gives force to Richard Merelman's argument that "the marginal utility of material rewards

[10] The concept of productivity is central to the model of political economy developed by Ilchman and Uphoff (fn. 1), 29-30.

[11] Wriggins (fn. 1), 39; Ilchman and Uphoff (fn. 1), 74.

[12] Deane E. Neubauer and Lawrence D. Kastner, "The Study of Compliance Maintenance as a Strategy for Comparative Research," *World Politics*, XXI (July 1969), 633-34.

[13] For example, see Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York 1963), 45-46; Ilchman and Uphoff (fn. 1), 73.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in a society will be directly related to the length of time necessary for a political system to gain legitimacy."[14] Inducements are the lubricant for easing the friction between centralized power and a congeries of grasping and contending interests.

This type of pragmatic legitimacy is subject to the performance test, especially in the economic realm. Since authority is based upon consent, reciprocal exchange helps create the consent that facilitates governing. The capacity to confer benefits, especially economic welfare benefits, is plainly an important source of legitimacy.[15] By now it is clear that legitimacy involves some kind of rough distributive justice. It follows that the consent elicited by weak regimes turns on what performance they are able to offer; in a pragmatic sense, performance creates the legitimate title to govern.

Regimes that earn the right to govern by virtue of their performance run the risk of repudiation as a result of non-performance. Authority that is not securely anchored in the bedrock of legitimacy tends to be highly vulnerable. In circumstances where authority is not deeply veined with custom and tradition, where it rests solely on the shifting sands of performance, the populace is suspended between the extremes of liberty and authority. They live and struggle in a protean universe where everything at any moment can become almost anything else. No specific form endures for long.

Performance thus helps to explain why authority is not absolutely fixed or unchangeable. Authority is limited and in flux. It is a matter of degree—degree that may expand or contract.

The myriad evaluations of a regime's performance produce, from time to time, a shifting of support and loyalties. Hanna Pitkin observes, "evaluating a government in order to decide whether it deserves obedience or resistance requires attention both to the way it works and to what it does."[16] Charles Hendel writes: "It is by its measure of performance that authority is actually judged, respected, or disobeyed."[17] In other words, authority is a dynamic rather than a static concept, a continuous rather than a dichotomous variable.

[14] Richard M. Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, LX (September 1966), 552.

[15] A similar point is made by Morton Grodzins: "through its multitude of programs, government purchases conformity and allegiance." *The Loyal and the Disloyal* (Chicago 1956), 25.

[16] Hanna Pitkin, "Obligation and Consent—II," *American Political Science Review*, LX (March 1966), 40.

[17] Charles W. Hendel, "An Exploration of the Nature of Authority," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Authority* (Cambridge, Mass. 1958), 19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POWER

Directional impulse is given by a regime's goals. Goals reveal the leaders' ambitions, influence choices over the allocation of resources, and affect a regime's ability to sustain its authority; also, they catalyze the expectations of citizens concerning what government will and ought to do for them. The realization of public goals is a yardstick by which a regime's performance is evaluated, respected, and ultimately judged.[18]

In the pursuit of public goals, political leaders are impelled to expend their meager resources in the act of generating support and inducing action by others. The exercise of authority requires the possession of political resources. "Resources are the means by which a regime induces or coerces compliance in order to implement its objectives for the polity."[19] To the extent that a regime has resources at its command, it has the potential for control. But so long as resources are limited, the potential for exercising control is concomitantly limited. Power is an essential element of authority.

Enough has now been said to make clear that the power capability of government rests on its ability to reward the compliant, persuade the recalcitrant, and coerce the intransigent. To a large degree, the success of political leaders in motivating compliance with their policy choices depends upon the reservoir of exchangeable resources at their disposal. Available power capability obviously affects the goals to be achieved.

We could be rightly accused of ignoring the dynamics of this chain of actions and counteractions if we neglected to consider the leverage that powerful interests exert against governmental control. The power capability of elites and collectivities is determined by the extent to which they can compel, prod, persuade, or otherwise induce government to alter its conduct or course of action. In the end, the degree of governmental authority and the goals to which it directs its power depend upon the tugs and pulls of other foci of power. In this melee, resources are always prominent.

Table I presents a simplified picture of the variables that political leaders must be concerned with in their efforts to implement policy. Details will be filled in when a specific policy area is discussed.

[18] See Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (New York 1963), 244-45. For other criteria by which to measure performance, see Karl W. Deutsch, "The Price of Integration," in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., *The Integration of Political Communities* (New York 1964), 144-47; Gabriel A. Almond, *Political Development* (Boston 1970), 181-220, 291-99.

[19] Ilchman and Uphoff (fn. 1), 32. On this point, Roberto Michels writes: "One of the principal means of exercising authority is the dispensation of rewards and punishments." "Authority," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, II (New York 1930), 319.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE I

VARIABLES IN SECURING COMPLIANCE AND SUPPORT

Leaders	*Opposition*
SUPPORT SECTORS	OPPOSITION SECTORS
COMPLIANCE-SUPPORT RESOURCES	OPPOSITION RESOURCES
Goods and services	Withholding of goods or production
Force	Violence
Status and prestige	
Resource management skills	
GOALS	GOALS
Regime maintenance	Maximization of economic and and social well-being
Support and compliance	Acquisition and preservation of status and prestige
Economic development	
Social change	

LEADERSHIP

Clearly, it is the contrapuntal tension between goals and capability, between ends and power, which makes it so difficult to achieve public ends. Where there is a wide chasm between authority and power, goals and capability, ambitions are likely to be consigned to the dustbin of frustrated aspirations. We can now appreciate that power is not simply a possession but something difficult to exercise effectively.

Resources, therefore, are by themselves not sufficient to achieve goals: it is the skillful statesman, dextrously managing his resources in the act of persuasion, who eases the way for effective policy implementation. He is the architect whose aim is to give reality to grand designs, whose purpose is to link together the cantilevers of power and authority. Promethean efforts are required to make the two into one thing and to make them work as one: power and authority merged and yet reacting upon each other produce the stress necessary to support regimes during seismic disturbances. The statesman's dream is precisely to erect an edifice that is stable and durable.

If so many dreams end in failure, it is because the statesman lacks the essential qualification: the ability to use the materials at hand.

II. REGIME BUILDING IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY

POLITICAL STALEMATE

Contrary to the old Tory metaphor that revolutionaries tear down the noble edifice of the *ancien régime* and leave poor human beings naked

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the skies, the Bolivian revolutionary leaders initially made no attempt to break with the past. Instead, they moved to anchor the new regime's legitimacy on the foundation of the past, the constitution. Their claim to legitimate authority rested on their electoral victory in 1951, which the military had unjustly denied them. But there were those within the ruling party who, fired with a Jacobin spirit, were inspired by a deep-seated aversion to the old order. They pushed for radical change, not continuity. Claims to legitimacy therefore rested on an unstable foundation, as rival interests clung stubbornly to incompatible views concerning goals and the nature of the social order.

The logical derivative of this development was that Bolivian politics —like Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean politics—came to be characterized by political stalemate: no one political or social sector was able to attain a hegemonic position or impose its direction on public policy.[20] In order to marshal support and secure compliance, the government had to maintain a delicate political balance among a broad range of disparate elements. This was accomplished through the politics of reconciliation. Reconciliatory politics, however, forced the state into the role of arbiter between the major interests of Bolivian society.

CONTOURS OF POWER

The contours of political power bore the imprint of the government's reformist posture. Unable to control the *campesino* uprising that was sweeping the land, President Paz Estenssoro decided to harness its energies by responding to the intense pressures for distributive justice. Agrarian reform was the result. By responding to the *campesinos'* expectations of right and social justice, the regime sought to acquire the support of this new center of power.[21] Labor, whose voice found institutional expression within the *Central Obrera Boliviana* (COB), emerged as the major holder of power. It formed the nucleus of strength in the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (MNR) party. Although the workers generally supported the regime, control over them eluded the governing elite.[22]

[20] For examples, see Robert L. Ayres, "Economic Stagnation and the Emergence of the Political Ideology of Chilean Underdevelopment," *World Politics*, XXV (October 1972), 50-57; Torcuato S. DiTella, "Stalemate or Coexistence in Argentina," in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds., *Latin America: Reform or Revolution?* (Greenwich, Conn. 1968), 249-63; H. Jon Rosenbaum and William G. Tyler, eds., *Contemporary Brazil: Issues in Economic and Political Development* (New York 1972), 4.

[21] Responsive performance was also a means for increasing legitimacy and support. This is brought out by Raymond F. Hopkins, who suggests that a strategy "for increasing legitimacy is responsiveness to expectations of right and justice." "Securing Authority: The View from the Top," *World Politics*, XXIV (January 1972), 288.

[22] Eldon Lanning, "Government Capabilities in a Revolutionary Situation: The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

With the army emasculated, peasants' and workers' militias as well as armed civilian groups now had a monopoly on the force of arms. The state, as a consequence, was not able to wield a coercive power. Formal power had been cleaved from concrete power; with degree taken away, central authority was enfeebled.

The divergence between power and authority had far-reaching consequences for policy implementation. Deprived of its capacity to apply force, and surrounded and threatened by the groups who had a virtual monopoly of coercive power, the government had to rely on demand satisfaction to carry out its decisions and maintain its authority. Lacking coercive power, the regime relied heavily on consensual power. This placed an extra load on its meager resources.

With the deflation of national power, powerful centrifugal tendencies were set in motion. Power became localized. Bolivia was riddled with regionalism; some areas, such as Santa Cruz and Beni, were determined to preserve their autonomy. The central government, unable to establish effective control over these areas, was compelled to negotiate and bargain its policies into execution. Emphasizing the veto power exercised by the two powerful *caciques* of these regions, James Malloy pointed out that "national decisions were translated into local policy through their will, not that of the state, the government, or the party."[23] Any existing governmental authority was eroded by increases in political and social pluralism which created centers of loyalty that challenged the legitimacy of the new regime. The most elementary predicament confronting the new polity was obviously its low level of authority; the basic problem for the revolutionary party was, as it is for any new regime, to build up its authority in order to begin ruling.

THE DYNAMICS OF RECONCILIATORY POLITICS

The social and political mobilization that came in the wake of the revolutionary struggle reinforced this fragmentation. In this atmosphere, the government was exposed to a welter of distributive and redistributive claims. Government had come to be viewed by workers and peasants alike as a paternalistic benefactor, an omniscient provider. Under mobilization politics, the state had become a great fiction by means of which everybody wants to live at the expense of everybody else. The net result was inflation. Inflationary pressures were given

---

MNR in Bolivia," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, XXIII (Autumn 1969), 10; James M. Malloy, "Revolution and Development in Bolivia," in Cole Blasier, ed., *Constructive Change in Latin America* (Pittsburgh 1968), 209-10.

[23] James M. Malloy, *Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution* (Pittsburgh 1970), 251.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

momentum by the actions and reactions of warring interests, none of whom were willing to accept the existing monetary relationships.[24] The distributive struggle took on the appearance of latent civil war.

Politicization and high levels of social mobilization led to an escalation of demands on already scarce resources; as the process of politicization advanced, so did the regime's vulnerability. In the face of the mounting demands of burgeoning pluralisms, the Bolivian Government resorted to distributive policies to extract support and secure the loyalty of sharply divided parochial interests. According to Malloy, "In Bolivia interest satisfaction became the dominant basis of loyalty, and when important sectors failed to have their perceived interests satisfied, their previous support was converted into hostility, and potentially into rebellion."[25] The regime, deficient in the diffuse support essential to soften or modify the antagonism of interests, used reconciliatory politics to cushion the effects of that antagonism. Regimes with low legitimacy aggregate support through *quid pro quo*; distributive performance helped the MNR to legitimate its rule. Payoffs in the form of wage increases, subsidies, bonuses, rent controls, sinecures, social welfare benefits, increases in public services, and other payments established a simple basis of self-interest for inducing and maintaining support. The MNR elite had obviously embraced the view that they had to assure the major interests that while none would get everything they wanted, everyone would get something; and that in getting something, they would be content to support the system. In so doing, the government became penned in the prison of its own support policies.

The politics of reconciliation aggravated the contrapuntal tension between investment and consumption. Economic rationality demanded that consumption be restrained so that investment could flourish. But the structure of political facts required that the government meet the demands of its support groups in order to preserve the mottled center-

[24] Henri Aujac has advanced the hypothesis that inflation is the result of group behavior: "It is the social groups which lend validity and effectiveness to the maladjustments, and it is the behaviour of social groups which dampens or reinforces these maladjustments. The inflationary process ceases only when, in the course of the reciprocal actions and reactions of various groups, the latter are once again, willing or by force, led to adopt a behaviour of acceptance." "Inflation as the Monetary Consequences of the Behaviour of Social Groups: A Working Hypothesis," *International Economic Papers*, IV (London 1954), 115. It follows from Aujac's hypothesis that steps to implement stabilization policy are limited in their effectiveness by the opposition of social groups. Anti-inflationary policy is, therefore, "primarily a political and to a lesser extent an administrative problem rather than an economic one." Sumner H. Slichter, "The Problem of Inflation," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, XXX (February 1948), 4.

[25] Malloy (fn. 23), 277.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

left coalition upon which its political fortunes were based. The core of Bolivia's financial dilemma was the conflict between two sets of demands: economic development and prevailing political priorities. The government tried to evade the dilemma by pursuing both consumption and investment policies. In order to stay in authority and advance Bolivia's development, the government therefore needed to expand the resources at its command.

To meet this rising volume of demands, the government was impelled to produce political resources.[26] In view of the fact that domestic savings were negligible or negative, it had no other choice. This was accomplished by manipulating exchange rates, by borrowing from the Central Bank, by United States economic assistance, and by resorting to the printing press.[27] Budget deficits and expansionist monetary policies became essential political tools for increasing the level of resources to secure collaboration. They were the fount of consensual power.

The expansionary fiscal and monetary policies which underpinned the government's support-building policies and developmental projects simply fueled the inflationary pressures. The spectacle of an embattled government yielding to the pressures of impacted interests gives emphasis to Alexander Groth's argument that "regimes that are politically weak, because of chronic division and stalemate among their policymakers, or because they cannot assure themselves effective physical control over the system they claim to rule, are least effective in holding the line against the inflationary pressures in their economies."[28]

III. Stabilization

The problem of balancing demands to sustain fragile coalitions was aggravated by the government's decision to accept the monetary strategy of the United States and the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) to curb inflation. In 1956 the government, under President Hernán Siles Zuazo, was forced to come to terms with past policy deci-

[26] As Harold and Margaret Sprout point out, "the dilemma of insufficient resources to cover rising demands and ongoing commitments is managed (when it is effectively managed at all) by changing the relative value of the respective shares or by increasing the total size of the 'pie' to be distributed—or usually by some combination thereof." "The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources," *World Politics*, xx (July 1968), 687. In many Latin American countries, particularly in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile, inflation is a way of increasing the total size of the pie.

[27] *Analisis y Proyecciones del Desarrollo Económico IV: El Desarrollo Económico de Bolivia* (United Nations: Economic Commission for Latin America, 1958), 68-70; *Economic Bulletin for Latin America*, xii, No. 2 (United Nations 1968), 83-85.

[28] Alexander J. Groth, *Comparative Politics: A Distributive Approach* (New York 1971), 112.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sions. Logical argument prevailed: growth with stability, the canon of monetary orthodoxy, was accepted. With stabilization, the governing elite abruptly revised its order of priorities, with the intent of bringing commitments, demands, and resources into a rough balance.

In the newly created anomalous situation, sacrifice and restraint were the imperatives of stabilization; but devotion to hedonism and the urge to self-indulgence animated Bolivian society. With this choice, those who had previously been indulged now had to pay the bill. But at what cost?

Steps to apportion the burden of sacrifice signaled the advent of an antagonistic, zero-sum contest. The bitter conflict over the redefinition of the sociopolitical order was now linked with the classic battle over who gets what. Goals and aspirations, logical argument and the structure of facts clashed. Expectations awakened by past governmental policies were in sharp contrast with the goal to stabilize the economy. The inertial effect of past expectations created a thicket of political obstacles for the operational success of measures to control stabilization. Since the government was being judged by its ability to confer economic welfare benefits and develop the economy, its performance was increasingly called into question as the gap between promise and fulfillment widened. The regime had earned the right to rule by performance; the pursuit of stabilization cast a shadow over its continued viability.

In order to reduce inflationary pressures propagated by fiscal deficits, monetary policy required a balanced budget. This meant a reduction in support expenditures and the postponement of development projects. Curtailment of economic development was, as Robert Alexander has admitted, inimical to the long-run development of Bolivia.[29] Economic reform was to be purchased at the expense of a larger vision. In restoring the free operation of market forces, orthodoxy demanded the removal of price controls, elimination of subsidies on consumer goods, the abolition of controls on foreign trade, and the maintenance of a free exchange rate. Wage and credit restraints were also introduced. The United States International Cooperation Administration (U.S.I.C.A) and the I.M.F. extended short-term credits in the amount of $25 million to support the stabilization program. Continued aid was conditioned on progress toward stabilization.

In a burst of despair over the "shock treatment," President Siles complained to the head of the Bolivian I.M.F. mission: "The United

[29] Robert J. Alexander, *The Bolivian National Revolution* (New Brunswick, N.J. 1958), 216.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

States has given me just enough rope to hang myself."[30] An American economist, in a masterpiece of understatement, acknowledged that "it can be admitted that perhaps the 'cure' was somewhat rough."[31] The "cure" was indeed rough because those who had conceived the program had failed to recognize that stabilization is primarily a political problem, and only secondarily an administrative one. For this reason, imposition crowded out persuasion, command replaced process, and the avoidance of deviance smothered contingency. But contingency is the essence of policy. A viable policy makes allowance for the relationship of forces, and adjusts aspirations to the material at hand; it requires bargaining, involves adjustment of risks, and makes a virtue of logrolling. Preoccupation with technique produced a hiatus between planning and the responsibility for execution—responsibility that would allow for contingency of application.

A disposition to consider private economic initiative sufficient to the task of development was evident in the new style of policy, but it collided with the structure of social fact. Broadly, the Bolivian middle sector was more preoccupied with the quest for government service than with the pursuit of commerce and industry.[32] It was simply deficient in entrepreneurial vigor; the precapitalist ethos was amazingly resilient.

To overcome this obstacle, the government, during the second term of President Paz (1960–1964), established the *Institúto Tecnológico Boliviano* (I.T.B.). But the creation of a technical university independent of the existing university system drew cries of protest from the bastion of middle-sector values: the university. By alienating this sector of support, Paz pushed it into anti-governmental activity.

The attempt at stabilization triggered a critical public response. The middle sector, forced to shoulder the social costs of hyperinflation, had withdrawn its support earlier. Rumbles of discontent emanated from manufacturers whose source of profits and external markets withered with the elimination of import subsidies and the establishment of free exchange rates. Banks suffered acutely from stringent credit restraints. The elimination of unrealistically cheap prices previously charged in the miners' commissaries catalyzed the withdrawal of support by the miners. It was evident that the social costs of stabilization were being shifted to labor, in particular the mine workers. The abrupt reordering

[30] Richard Patch, "Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting," in Richard Adams and others, *Social Change in Latin America Today* (New York 1960), 175.
[31] Cornelius Zondag, *The Bolivian Economy 1952–1965* (New York 1966), 63.
[32] C. A. M. Hennessy, "Shifting Forces in the Bolivian Revolution," *World Today*, xx (August 1964), 199.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of priorities also produced fissures within the ruling MNR between those advocating moderate and those advocating radical reform. Bolivia was fragmented into a mosaic of dissonance.

Stabilization forced a perceptible change in power relations. To counteract the loss of support by the miners, the government began to cultivate two other major sources of power: the *campesinos* and the military. The center of gravity shifted from the center-left symbiosis to a center-right coalition.

Immediate benefits to the *campesinos* took the form of rising prices for their produce. The MNR sought to preserve their support through building rural schools, developing potable-water systems, distributing "Food for Peace" commodities, and by formal grants of land titles. Benefits extended to the military were both tangible and symbolic: the national defense budget was increased while steps were taken to restore the tarnished image and prestige of the military. Table II summarizes the sectors in support of and opposed to the government's anti-inflationary measures, their resource positions, and their goals.

Coercive power had now been combined with consensual power. But in substituting the military for the left, the governing elite had, in the words of William Brill, "traded an ally that was relatively restricted in its ability to make alliances for one which had no such difficulty. The military, unlike the miners, was acceptable to a wide range of groups."[33] Compelled to choose, the regime had incurred a power risk without clearly perceiving it: a resurgent military posed a threat to regime maintenance.

Revolutionary leaders had turned conservative under the responsibilities of power. We can see now that inherent in the processes of regime building and economic development were catalysts which turned the revolutionists' larger vision opaque; reality has a way of demolishing dreams. The revolution lost its momentum because Bolivia was unable to break through the confining conditions created by economic scarcity, political priorities, mobilization politics, and foreign intervention. In sum, the revolution intensified Bolivia's problems instead of resolving them; it added new inertial material without having completely eliminated the old. Past and present were a mortgage on the future.

Success in containing inflation was momentary. The fact that stabilization enjoyed even a fleeting success was due largely to the cunning of President Siles. But with the obtrusion of the unexpected, not even skilled leadership could triumph for long. The collapse of world tin

[33] William H. Brill, *Military Intervention in Bolivia* (Washington, D.C. 1967), 34.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE II

SECURING COMPLIANCE AND SUPPORT DURING STABILIZATION

Rulers	*Opposition*
SUPPORT SECTORS	OPPOSITION SECTORS
Labor	Labor
Railway workers	Miners
Construction workers	Middle sector
Peasants	Political parties
Military	*Right*
United States	*Falange Socialista Boliviana* (FSB)
I.M.F.	Social Democratic Party (PSD)
U.S.I.C.A.	*Left*
	Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR)
	Manufacturers
	Commercial sector
COMPLIANCE-SUPPORT RESOURCES	OPPOSITION RESOURCES
Goods and services	Withholding of services or production
Patronage	Force
Increased defense budget	Strikes
Public services	Riots
Civic action programs	Demonstrations
School for high military studies	Coup attempts
Rural schools	
Potable-water systems	
Grants of land titles	
"Food for Peace"	
U.S. economic aid	
I.M.F. stabilization funds	
U.S.I.C.A. funds	
Status and prestige	
Force	
Peasant militias	
Military	
GOALS	GOALS
Regime maintenance	Maximization of economic and social well-being
Economic development	Achievement of ideological goals
Economic reform	Status-maintenance goals
National integration	

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prices delivered a serious blow to Bolivia's foreign exchange earnings. The imposition of U.S. quotas on lead and zinc and the dumping of Russian tin on the world market cut deeply into Bolivia's exports between 1957 and 1958. A crisis in balance of payments and strains on the internal economy resulted. As Cornelius Zondag has pointed out, "Had it been possible to maintain mineral income at a high level, the country might well have been able to absorb the shock caused by the stabilization program."[34] "If" is a luxury historians may be able to afford; political leaders cannot.

As an economic reform, stabilization came high: consumption declined, but so did industrial activity. Economic development projects were shelved, and with the abolition of internal price controls, Bolivia slid into the abyss of price-push inflation. Business was made to absorb additional losses when the government prohibited the firing of surplus labor. Relations between the miners and the government deteriorated further when peasant militias were used to break a strike of miners who were resisting the enforcement of the austerity plan.

Faced with a languishing economy and exposed to the pushes and pulls of factious elements, the government had little choice but to relax the restraints of the anti-inflationary program. Its actions were prompted by the fear that "it could not abide by all of the conditions stipulated in its agreement with the I.M.F. and still remain in power."[35] Survival proved to be a stronger stimulus than economic reconstruction.

THE PRICE OF COHESION

Monetary nostrums for "curing" inflation were evidently at odds with Bolivia's reconciliation system.[36] The aim of a reconciliation system is to defuse conflict; the monetary policy had intensified it. Latin American political systems have the propensity to "ameliorate social conflict rather than bring it to a head."[37] Compromise, accommodation, and bargaining are the operative norms. Unfortunately, the U.S.-I.M.F. solution for Bolivia's economic malaise provided little space for process. Since Bolivia was deficient in patterns of obligation sufficiently spontaneous to reduce the need for material inducements, authority and citizenry were bound together by mutual trade-offs. The "shock treatment," however, dried up the resources that the Bolivian Government

[34] Zondag (fn. 31), 60.
[35] Patch (fn. 30), 175.
[36] On the concept of a "reconciliation system," see David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965), 397-402.
[37] Howard J. Wiarda, "The Latin American Development Process and the New Developmental Alternatives: Military 'Nasserism' and 'Dictatorship' with Popular Support," *Western Political Quarterly*, XXV (September 1972), 468.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

needed to manage and sustain a dynamic balance among contending forces.

The underlying reality that had made economic orthodoxy workable in other times and circumstances was not the reality within which Bolivian leaders had to function now. In trying to compel reality to accommodate to their economic model, monetary theorists ignored the cumulative experience of the past—the eccentricity of economic systems. As a consequence, the actions that flowed from their simplistic notions jeopardized the prevailing political order and threatened economic growth. The United States and the International Monetary Fund simply ignored the limits and costs of introducing their universal imperatives into a fragmented society. Conflicts of interests, the material at hand, and the diversity of circumstances challenged the sovereignty of technique. The tangle of the past tends to create situations that defy solutions by "correct" measures.

The outlook for permanently changing the established patterns of expectations and the Bolivian inertia of behavior was not encouraging. Economic stability was a chimeric goal which should not have been vigorously pursued. The point is that inflationary outputs may not necessarily be symptoms of poor governmental performance; they are functionally useful as consensual mechanisms for inducing cohesion among members of fragmented societies. Producing such political capital is also vital for regime maintenance.

Since inflation is as much a political as an economic phenomenon, a degree of inflation becomes the price that must be paid for muting distributive conflict and accommodating antagonistic interests. The role of inflation in attenuating social conflict is described by Martin Bronfenbrenner: "Another social function of inflation . . . is as a method of mollifying class conflict in a capitalistic society. In its capacity as social mollifier or lubricant, inflation permits one pressure group . . . to increase its money income without decreasing the money income of anyone else, and therefore without arousing the volume and vehemence of opposition which might be expected."[38]

In this connection, the words of Edmund Burke are as relevant today as when they were first written in 1790: "[A] true politician always considers how he shall make the most of the existing materials of his country. A disposition to preserve, and an ability to improve, taken together, would be my standard of a statesman."[39] A statesman must

[38] Martin Bronfenbrenner, "Some Neglected Implications of Secular Inflation," in Kenneth K. Kurihara, ed., *Post-Keynesian Economics* (London 1962), 35-36.

[39] Edmund Burke, *Selected Writings and Speeches* (New York 1963), 501.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

work with the material at hand, good or ill. The influence that constraints exercise on the range of policy options open to him demonstrates how limited his power really is. His philosophy must therefore be a tempered determinism: his choice of action lies somewhere between necessity and freedom.

To sum up, the scarcity of resources limits the range of possibilities. A moderate approach to developmental problems would therefore probably produce results that correspond to capability. Although time and circumstances will impose constraints on what is possible, the true test of a statesman lies in his ability to extend the realm of what can be done. Politics is an art—the art of manipulating constraints.

THE PRICE OF STABILITY

This brings us to a fundamental problem that neither the United States nor the International Monetary Fund seemed willing to face: that of containing inflation in a fragmented society. A strong government was a necessary condition for stabilization; expansion of degree, not its contraction, was indispensable for stabilization. In Bolivia, the political price for checking inflation was a vast increase in scope and penetration of state authority. Laissez-faire economics were incompatible with this political requirement.

Pluralist democracy could not be a remedy for a society deficient in affective ties to government and lacking in a spirit of sacrifice. Indeed, pluralist politics stimulated inflationary pressures. The government, in its role of broker in an intramural contest for distributive benefits, became a motor that was pushing inflation. According to George Bach, "Democracy is clearly not the most 'efficient' form of government, and the democratic political process is open to self-seeking minority groups whose actions may turn the governmental process into an engine of inflation."[40]

IV. PERFORMANCE

Fundamentally, the prospects for a stable and moderate pluralist democracy in Bolivia were bleak. Bolivia required a strong central authority to check the centrifugal impulses of conflicting interests. The MNR leadership was unable to overcome the impotence caused by fragmentation. The basic problem is one that faces most new regimes:

[40] George L. Bach, *Inflation: A Study in Economics, Ethics, and Politics* (Providence, R.I. 1958), 99. Robert Lekachman remarks that "democratic governments are better organized to stimulate than to control inflation." "The Economy: To Tame the Monster," *New York Times Magazine* (February 18, 1973), 71.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deficiency in degree. "The danger," Manfred Halpern points out, "seems less that the powerful will be corrupted by power than the fear that they still do not have enough power to avoid being overwhelmed by their problems."[41] The need for greater increments in coordination and control in order to ensure the priority of national interests inheres in the process of modernization; in view of rising levels of interdependence and the increasing complexity of economic and administrative tasks in industrializing societies, ever greater centralized domination becomes an imperious need. By implication, a return to authoritarian forms may appear to be a viable and appealing alternative to the chaos of unruly pluralism. Indeed, some Latin American countries are likely to find that what they regard as an appropriate balance between claims on resources and the resources actually available can best be achieved within the framework of pragmatic, modernizing authoritarianism.

Regardless, however, of what form authority takes, the perennial problem endures: how to make *de facto* authority *de jure*.

In the course of history, few states have been able to arrest the cycle of change. For the majority, including Bolivia, the unpleasant projection is continual fluctuation in degree; they never seem to be able fully to establish institutionalized patterns of stabilized authority. The thin tie of loyalty that binds the citizenry to authority will continue to depend heavily upon the ability of the political system to produce output that satisfies the expectations and felt needs of the mobilized public. An essential factor in the transmutation of power into authority lies, therefore, in a government's capacity to co-opt and oblige, and thereby satisfy, important segments of the body politic.

When evaluating regimes, we should not be guided solely by ideological preferences or moral imperatives. Nor, for that matter, should foreign policy be conducted on the basis of parochial versions of legitimacy. Regimes should be evaluated on the basis of performance; as C. E. Black states, "when military regimes come to power . . . they should be judged by their performance."[42] It is performance that counts; performance nourishes legitimacy and promotes a sense of identification with the state. Whether performance takes place under the aegis of capitalism, communism, socialism, corporatism, or Maoism is beside the point.

[41] Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton 1963), 234.
[42] Cyril E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York 1966), 163.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

V. Return to Fundamentals

In placing the focus of attention on a case study, we have learned that in Bolivia fiscal and monetary policy was a political tool employed for the purpose of increasing the volume of resources at the disposal of government to (1) secure compliance and gain support, (2) cope with and induce social and economic change, and (3) insure regime maintenance. All of these objectives required the production of political resources, which in turn had a cumulative impact on inflationary pressures.

But have we really examined a unique case? A casual glance at the economic topography of Latin America would suggest that Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have also been afflicted by this morbific condition. They are the *loci classici* of inflation in Latin America. Their inflation, like Bolivia's, is as much a political phenomenon as it is an economic one. Although our emphasis has been on a single case, the characteristics it shares with others should not be overlooked.

Perhaps a return to fundamentals would shed some light on this troublesome and continuing problem. With respect to Latin American politics, this means a re-education in the fundamentals of realism. What is necessary is a sense of limitation, coupled with an appreciation of the imperative needs for compromise and the balancing of interests—along with the acknowledgement of the imperfection of solutions to major problems. Such a re-education would move us away from the sterile clichés of reform or revolution. It would, in the words of Raymond Aron, "teach everyone to doubt model societies and utopias, to challenge all the prophets of redemption and the heralds of catastrophes."[43] A healthy dose of skepticism would help to dissolve the utopianism that so often beguiles those who prescribe universal remedies for individual ills. Realism may have lost its appeal in international politics, but its relevance for conflict-scarred societies is undeniable.

[43] Raymond Aron, *The Industrial Society* (New York 1967), 145.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING SYSTEM IN JAPAN

By CHIHIRO HOSOYA*

I. The Rational Calculation Model

IN his pioneering essay, "The Element of Decision in the Pattern of of War," Theodore Abel argues, on the basis of twenty-five sample studies, "The rational, calculating decision for war is reached far in advance of the actual outbreak of hostilities," and "in no case is the decision precipitated by emotional tensions, sentimentality, crowd behavior, or other irrational motivation. In every case, the decision is based upon a careful weighing of chances and of anticipating consequences."[1] This thesis—that a state selects an action of war from a number of alternatives in a conscious decision to maximize its goals after a careful weighing of available means and of possible consequences—may be applied as a conceptual scheme which we could term the rational calculation model.

Prior to Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, high American officials apparently used the rational calculation model in an attempt to predict Japan's unwillingness to plunge into war with the United States. For example, when John Emmerson, then a junior embassy officer in Tokyo, warned the State Department that Japan might begin a war out of sheer desperation, the chief State Department adviser on Far Eastern affairs, Stanley Hornbeck, replied, "Tell me of one case in history when a nation went to war out of desperation."[2] Even after the Hull note of November 26, Hornbeck was still optimistic about avoiding the war, and put the odds at five to one "that the United States and Japan will not be at 'war' on or before December 15."[3] Thus the political adviser at the State Department who had been responsible for formulating American Far Eastern policy for more than a decade ap-

* This is a revised version of an essay which was originally presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, March 1972, in Dallas, Texas.

[1] Theodore Abel, "The Element of Decision in the Pattern of War," *American Sociological Review*, VI (December 1941), 855-59.

[2] James C. Thomson, Jr., "The Role of the Department of State," unpub. essay delivered at the Conference on Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941 (Kawaguchi-ko, Japan, July 14-18, 1969), 21.

[3] Quoted in Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford 1962), 264.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parently predicted that because Japan was inferior to the United States in both economic power and military strength and was bogged down in the China War, she could not rationally dare to challenge the United States in outright war.

Contrary to Hornbeck's prediction, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, marking the beginning of a tragic war. After the defeat of Japan, her political and military leaders who had been responsible for leading the nation into war were prosecuted at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial on the charge of a long-term joint conspiracy for planning the war. Regarding Japanese military activity in the 1930's, the prosecution charged that "These wars of aggression . . . were the work of many leaders acting in pursuance of a common plan for the achievement of a common object . . . that they should secure Japan's domination. None of the events which took place during this fourteen-year period occurred by accident. Every event was coldly calculated, planned for, and put into execution."[4]

Historians generally tend to resist applying a model to interpret, analyze, and reconstruct a historical process operating over a period of time; thus, there seem to be no works by postwar American historians treating Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor on the basis of an explicit application of the rational calculation model. There are, however, some political scientists who are attempting to analyze the decision-making process relying on the model.[5] Specifically, Bruce Russett's article, "Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory and Decision Theory," presents a strong argument that Japan's decision for Pearl Harbor was *not* "a choice that cannot be explained by any calculation of utilities and probabilities," and asserts that it was an act of taking "a third option with higher expected utilities" or of picking "the least unattractive course of action from a set of options."[6]

There is an oft-quoted remark by War Minister Tōjō in the fall of 1941, when Premier Konoye was hesitant about making a decision on war with the United States: "Sometimes a man has to jump from the veranda of Kiyomizu Temple, with his eyes closed, into the ravine below."[7] This remark has been cited to explain the frame of mind of Japanese leaders who took the great risk of going to war with the

[4] Quoted in Richard H. Minear, *Victor's Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial* (Princeton 1971), 128-31.

[5] For example, see Douglas E. Hunter, "Application of Deterrence Theory to the 1941 Japanese Decision for War," unpub. (UCLA 1964).

[6] Bruce M. Russett, *Journal of Peace Research*, IV, No. 2 (1967), 89, 98-99.

[7] Konoye Fumimaro, *Heiwa e no Doryoku* [Efforts to Maintain Peace] (Tokyo 1946), 94.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States regardless of the bleak prospect for winning it. The effort to explain the Pearl Harbor decision as an irrational "leap in the dark," however, is subject to Russett's criticism that it provides "no explanation at all," since it "would depend upon a notion of *collective irrationality over a period of many months.*"[8] However persuasive Russett's argument may sound, some "collective irrationality" may be observed in Japan's decision-making process in going to war with the United States.

As I have pointed out elsewhere,[9] non-rational factors influenced the thinking of Japanese leaders. For example, in their education and training, Japanese military leaders had been imbued with the characteristic values of moving forward with bravery and a high regard for honor. They had been taught to prefer death to surrender or humiliation. Even the civilian leaders of prewar Japan shared these basic values to some extent. The memory of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 also was still vivid in the minds of the Japanese decision-makers in 1941. The victory Japan had gained over such a seemingly invincible military power was a constant source of pride and confidence. For example, as late as November 1, 1941, both Premier Tōjō and Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori made references to the Russo-Japanese War at a Liaison Conference in which a heated debate on the decision for war dragged on till midnight. The memory of having won the gamble of the Russo-Japanese War definitely had a bearing on the determination of the Japanese decision-makers to take another great risk.[10]

These psychological factors, among others, prevented most of the Japanese decision-makers from carrying out a calm means-ends or costs-benefits calculation. As Sidney Verba has pointed out, "If . . . a large number of the members of a group are subject to similar pressures and share attitudes that perform a personality-oriented function, the attitude in question will be reinforced by the group situation."[11]

The danger of predicting Japan's response solely on the basis of the rational-calculation model, and the necessity of understanding the peculiarities of the Japanese mental structure, was pointed out repeat-

[8] Russett (fn. 6), 91; emphasis added.

[9] Hosoya, "Twenty-five Years After Pearl Harbor: A New Look at Japan's Decision for War," in *Imperial Japan and Asia: A Reassessment,* compiled by Grant K. Goodman, Occasional Papers of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University (New York 1967).

[10] *Ibid.*, 58-59; Nobutaka Ike, *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences* (Stanford 1967), Introduction, xxv-xxvi.

[11] "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System: Theoretical Essays* (Princeton 1961), 103.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

edly in reports sent by both the American and the British Ambassador in Tokyo. For instance, American Ambassador Joseph Grew wrote: "Japan is a nation of hard warriors, still inculcated with the samurai do-or-die spirit which has by tradition and inheritance become ingrained in the race."[12] British Ambassador Robert Craigie expressed his concern about the inflexible attitude of the American Government, saying that "little attention seems to have been paid in Washington to Japanese psychology," and even warned of making "the worst mistake . . . to under-estimate the strength and the resolution of this country . . . that it may feel itself driven to desperation."[13]

Another weakness of the rational calculation model in analyzing Japan's decision for Pearl Harbor lies in its inherent limitation for explaining an organizational decision. A government decision is ordinarily made within its organizational context. It is not an act of selecting an alternative, made by a unitary actor; rather, it is the outcome of pushing and pulling among multiple players seeking conflicting goals and advocating different courses of action. For instance, in *Essence of Decision*, Graham Allison analyzes the decision-making process of both the American and Soviet Governments during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and, elaborating on Roger Hilsman's thesis that "policy-making is politics," argues for the usefulness of the governmental (or bureaucratic) politics model.[14] This model proposes that governmental behavior is an outcome of bargaining games played "along regularized circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government."[15]

The bureaucratic politics model seems to be even more workable as a conceptual scheme in the case of Japan's decision for Pearl Harbor than it is in the case of the Cuban missile crisis: (a) the former was a non-crisis decision which was incrementally reached after a number of decisional points had been passed over a long period of time; thus the number of individual and group players participating in the decision game was much greater; (b) as I will explain in more detail later, the Japanese decision-making system was structured in such a fashion that the leaders lacked the integrative power necessary to direct the nation toward a consistent goal and to overrule conflicting views; as a consequence, government decisions tended to be more dependent upon

[12] U. S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations, 1939*, Vol. III, 606-7.

[13] Craigie to Eden, Report No. 2173, November 1, 1941 (F.O. 371/35957), Public Record Office.

[14] Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (New York 1964), 3-10; Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York 1971).

[15] *Ibid.*, 144.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the development of games among groups and factions within the military and civilian bureaucracy.

The bureaucratic politics model is a useful tool for explaining or predicting the external behavior of a government; but one must be careful not to apply it in oversimplified form. Both practitioners and analysts tend to view players in other governments in terms of dichotomies such as "hawks and doves" or "extremists and moderates."[16] In reality, many players do not fit into simple categories. Furthermore, not only bureaucrats highly positioned within the governmental apparatus and the military institutions, but also middle- and sometimes lower-echelon bureaucrats may play the game. Thus, the game is played vertically as well as horizontally within the government.

The Far Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office has provided us with a penetrating observation on the decision-making process of prewar Japan, likening it to the Japanese custom of carrying *Mikoshi*:

> "A sight very familiar to travellers through the country district is the carrying in procession of a light wooden shrine (*Mikoshi*). The shrine has long poles at either side by which it is borne on the shoulders of excited youths. The general direction is not in doubt but the speed and manner of progressing is the result of thrusts from one side and counter-thrusts and restraints from the other. The shrine sways widely from one side of the road to the other: backs and fills: sometimes it stays poised and stationary: sometimes it lands the entire party in a ditch. But the bearers all know where they are going and sooner or later that is where they take the shrine."[17]

The report, however, neglects to mention that usually a "cheering party" accompanies the *Mikoshi* to direct the whole procession and to inflame the high spirits of the bearers. One can wonder if the role of the cheering party may have been played by the middle echelon in Japan's decision-making system. In the following chapter, I will attempt to explain the important role played by the middle echelon in the decision games of prewar Japan, and will then examine the painful process of reaching consensus decisions in the Japanese government.

II. The Role of the Middle Echelon

Let me first take the cases of two war decisions, the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and the Pacific War in 1941, which have had a great effect on the fate of Japan. In both cases, it was among the middle echelon

[16] Regarding Japan's decision for Pearl Harbor, see Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," *World Politics*, XXIV (Spring Supplement 1972), 66-70.

[17] Report No. 2173 (fn. 13), April 23, 1943.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the determination for war was first crystallized within the Japanese decision-making structure. In April 1903, the Japanese Army learned that the Russians, in direct violation of agreements to withdraw forces from southern Manchuria, had instead moved to augment the forces already there. Shortly after receipt of this intelligence, certain middle-echelon staff members of the Army, Navy, and the Foreign Office joined together in an informal planning group called the *Kogetsukai*. The members of this group shared certain perceptions of a Russian threat to Japanese security and regarded war with Russia as inevitable; they agreed that they should make every effort to persuade their superiors in their own departments as well as the *Genrō* (senior statesmen) to make a decision for war before the military situation took a turn for the worse. This effort led to intense debate on the question at various levels of the general staffs and other government bureaus. In the course of these debates, members of the middle echelon took an active part in steering Japan toward war through personal pressure on their superiors, in some cases preparing reports and memoranda to bolster their pro-war arguments. It was in December of 1903 that the final consent of the *Genrō* brought about a consensus among the Japanese leadership on which a decision for war could be taken.[18]

In the case of the Pacific War the Japanese Navy's "First Committee," set up in November 1940 and constituted of middle-echelon officers occupying key positions in the Ministry and General Staff, played a role similar to that of the *Kogetsukai*. As early as May 1941, members of this committee reached agreement on a policy of moving southward forcefully, and on taking steps to maneuver their own superiors as well as the Army into moving toward a decision for war. In the beginning of August 1941, the imposition of an oil embargo by the Government of the United States forced Japanese leaders to choose among alternatives ranging from conciliation and offers of great concessions to the launching of hostilities at the earliest possible date. It was at the meetings of the section and bureau chiefs of both services that a consensus was reached on an early determination for war with America. At the Imperial Conference of September 6, 1941, the top decision-makers, under the pressure of these middle-echelon officers, finally adopted a plan entitled "Essentials for Executing the National Purpose of the

[18] The most relevant and informative accounts are Tani Hisao, *Kimitsu Nichi-Ro Sen-shi* [The Secret History of the Russo-Japanese War] (Tokyo 1966), and Shumpei Okamoto, *The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War* (New York 1970), 57-102.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Empire." It specified that, while Japan would continue negotiating with the United States, she would opt for war after approximately a month if adequate prospects for successful negotiations were not apparent. The Hull note of November 26 shattered any hopes for a *modus vivendi* with the U.S., and the Japanese decision-makers made the ultimate decision for war on December 1.[19]

The role played by the middle echelon was therefore salient in both these cases of Japan's decision for fateful, unlimited war. With some degree of oversimplification, the general pattern may be summarized as follows: the determination for war was first crystallized in the middle echelon of the military, then the top-level military decision-makers were persuaded into sharing the views of their subordinates, and finally the civilian decision-makers were persuaded to go along. This appears to have been the fashion in which consensus building worked within the Japanese governmental apparatus.

The question might be raised whether such a process also took place in the case of the more limited hostilities initiated by Japan. To attempt an answer, let us examine two cases: the Siberian Intervention in 1918 and the Manchurian Incident in 1931.

Upon the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution, it was the General Staff of the Japanese Army that took the initiative in leading Japan toward armed intervention in Siberia. As early as November 1917, the General Staff drew up a plan for sending an army to eastern Siberia, to be dispatched on the pretext of protecting Japanese lives and property. Subsequently, the General Staff was actively engaged in bolstering anti-Bolshevik groups in northern Manchuria and eastern Siberia. Under Vice-Chief of Staff Tanaka Giichi, certain officers, including General Nakajima Masatake, chief of the Intelligence Bureau, pushed forward plans for armed intervention in Siberia. A joint committee had been created in February 1918, composed of members of the middle echelons of the General Staff and the War Ministry, to coordinate views and to work toward this purpose.[20] The middle echelon of the Navy, although its activities were less well known, was not far behind that of the Army in agitating for a Siberian expedition. In January 1918, Aho Kiyotane, chief of the Operations Bureau, and other members of the Naval General Staff came up with a strong recom-

[19] Ike (fn. 10), 262-83.

[20] Hosoya, *Shiberia Shuppei no shi-teki Kenkyū* [Japan's Armed Intervention in Siberia] (Tokyo 1955); James W. Morley, *The Japanese Thrust Into Siberia, 1918* (New York 1957).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mendation for sending troops to Siberia to counter the infiltration of Bolshevik elements.[21]

The actual planning of the Manchurian Incident was undertaken by the middle-echelon officers of the Kwantung Army, particularly Itagaki Seishirō and Ishiwara Kanji, and was carried out by them on September 18, 1931. These officers played a central role in expanding the original Mukden Incident into a full-scale offensive, circumventing the efforts of the government to localize the incident, and defying the directives of the High Command in Tokyo by politically restructuring Manchuria into the new state of Manchukuo. In the words of Ogata Sadako, "foreign policy decision-making deserted merely nominal decision makers and fell into the hands of the actual holders of power. . . . The highest official policy makers—cabinet ministers, including service ministers—generally lacked control over the developments in Manchuria."[22]

Although members of the middle echelon of the Kwantung Army were the prime architects of the Manchurian plot, middle-echelon officers of the Army General Staff in Tokyo were also involved in planning and developing it. Moreover, an influential study group, the *Issekikai*, had been in existence since May of 1929; it consisted of about forty field-grade officers of the Army General Staff, the Ministry of War, and the Kwantung Army. Itagaki and Ishiwara were members when, at its first meeting, the group reached the conclusion that, since diplomatic negotiations could not settle the issues in Manchuria and Mongolia, there seemed to be no alternative for Japan but to drive Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang from Manchuria by means of armed force.[23] It might be argued, indeed, that the preparations for the Manchurian Incident began with the birth of the *Issekikai*.

The important role played by the middle echelon of the military is also evident in the Japanese expeditions into the Shantung Peninsula in 1927 and 1928, and in the process by which Japan expanded the skirmish at the Marco Polo Bridge into a full-scale war in 1937.

The role of the middle echelon in the decision-making process of prewar Japan was not limited to decisions for war, but also stood out in other major decisions, such as those concerning military alliances. The idea of concluding the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and

[21] Hosoya, *Roshia Kakumei to Nippon* [The Russian Revolution and Japan] (Tokyo 1971), 21.

[22] Sadako Ogata, *Defiance in Manchuria* (Berkeley 1964), Introduction, xvi.

[23] Bōeichō Bōei Kenshushō Senshi-shitsu, ed., *Daihonei Rikugunbu* [Section of Military History, Ministry of Defense, ed., Division of War, General Headquarters], Vol. I (Tokyo 1967), 303-5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Germany in 1936, for example, found its inception on the Japanese side in the strategic planning of the Army General Staff, designed to counter the build-up of the Soviet forces in the Far East. With the intention of developing a loose military tie with Nazi Germany, Major General Ōshima Hiroshi, the military attaché in Berlin, opened talks with Ribbentrop in 1935; he performed an important function, in the initial stages of the secret negotiations, as intermediary between the General Staff of the Japanese Army and the German Government. Between 1938 and 1940, when the question of concluding the Tripartite Alliance became a hot domestic issue, the most ardent advocates of a tightly cemented military alliance among the Axis powers were to be found at the center levels of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Foreign Office.[24]

Now let us briefly examine the middle echelon of the American bureaucracy during the prewar period. In an essay on the Far Eastern policy of the Taft Administration, Charles Neu states: "Within the State Department a group of energetic, restless young men . . . led by Francis M. Huntington Wilson and Willard Straight . . . wanted to make the Open Door policy a reality. . . . More vulnerable to initiatives from below, [the President] gave subordinates much influence in the formulation of East Asian policy."[25] When President Wilson was pondering an American response to the Bolshevik Revolution, middle-echelon advisers such as William C. Bullitt and Gordon Auchincloss exercised some influence on the Russian policy of the United States.[26] Stanley Hornbeck certainly seems to have played an important role in the process of formulating Far Eastern policy in the crucial days before Pearl Harbor.

Undoubtedly, there are other cases where the middle echelon played an important role in the process of foreign policy decision-making of the United States. However, its influence seems to have been more limited in strength and scope than that of the middle echelon of the Japanese bureaucracy, particularly in the case of the military. In the American case, no examples can be found where strong pressure was exerted on top-echelon leaders by the middle echelon *as a group*.

Some words of qualification are necessary here. Although I have stressed the role of the middle echelon, I do not mean to imply that

[24] Nihon Kokusai-seiji Gakkai, ed., *Taiheiyō Sensō e no Michi* [Japan Association for International Relations, ed., The Road to the Pacific War], Vol. V (Tokyo 1963), 70-71, 85-86.

[25] Charles E. Neu, "The United States and East Asia, 1906-1913," unpub. paper presented at the Cuernavaca Conference (January 1970), 5-7.

[26] Regarding the formulation of the United States policy toward Russia in early March 1918, see George F. Kennan, *Russia Leaves the War* (Princeton 1956), 479-83.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the highest-ranking people in prewar Japan were merely puppets manipulated by subordinate officers. Nor do I fully subscribe to the notion of Maruyama Masao that "the men who held supreme power in Japan were in fact mere robots manipulated by their subordinates, who in turn were being manipulated by officers serving overseas and by the right-wing *ronin* and ruffians associated with the military."[27]

Expanding on Maruyama's thesis, Robert Butow has argued that "Japan . . . was a country in which puppet politics had reached a high state of development. . . . The ranking members of the military services were the robots of their subordinates. . . . The civilian members of the cabinet were the robots of the military—especially of the nucleus group. . . . The Emperor himself, through no fault of his own, was the robot of the government . . . a prisoner of the circumstances into which he was born. . . . the nation was the robot of the throne."[28]

In my opinion, the robot theory cannot explain the whole mechanism of Japan's prewar foreign policy decision-making as we have come to understand it through the records, diaries, and memoirs of the Japanese leaders which have been uncovered since the end of the war. The ranking members of the military services and the civilian members of the Cabinet were neither robots nor rubber stamps; they did exert some influence on their subordinates, rejecting their proposals and revising their plans. The process was one of interaction between the higher ranks and the middle echelon; in other words, decision games were carried on between these participants. I would argue, however, that those at the middle levels were more influential (for instance, in inflaming the *Mikoshi* parade), and those at the top were more vulnerable to initiatives and pressures from below, than was true of their American counterparts.

The question remains as to *why* the middle echelon played such an important role in the foreign policy decision-making system of prewar Japan. I would hazard several answers.

The first may be found in the development of political modernization. As I have argued, "modern states tend to magnify the institution which copes with foreign affairs and to expand its specialized organizations . . . and this leads to an increased number of levels in the decision-making hierarchy. . . . In other words, decentralization is a characteristic of the decision-making structure of modern states."[29]

[27] Masao Maruyama, *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics*, ed. Ivan Morris (Oxford 1963), 107.

[28] Robert J. C. Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War* (Princeton 1961), 308.

[29] Hosoya, "Retrogression in Japan's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process," in James W. Morley, ed., *Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan* (Princeton 1971), 93-94.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This characteristic requires, in turn, a greater effort on the part of modern states to coordinate the views and interests of specialized agencies of the government and to integrate their activities. Middle-echelon officials are so well located within the governmental system of decision making, both horizontally and vertically, that they can perform an integrative function. In prewar Japan, the Emperor was in theory supposed to perform that integrative function; in practice he never made personal decisions, although he made an effort to influence decisions in a circuitous way. As long as the system of senior statesmen, the *Genrō*, was still functioning, it was instrumental in coordinating different views and integrating civil-military activities. In the 1930's, certain institutions were designed to perform the integrative function, such as the Four- or Five-Minister Conference and the Liaison Conference; but in practice they did not work well, mainly because of the difficulties arising from the peculiar system of "the right of supreme command." In circumstances under which the top decision-makers did not effectively perform the integrative function, it was natural that the center of gravity within the decision-making system tended to move down to the lower echelon.

Second, the staff system of the Japanese military, which was introduced during the Meiji period and was patterned after the Prussian army, might also have had a bearing on the important role of the middle echelon. The system placed so much emphasis upon the role of the staff that, in undertaking military operations, a military commander was supposed to take the views of the staff without expressing his own judgment.

Third, the influence held by the middle echelon can be attributed to the *ringisei*—the "piling up" system—characteristic of Japanese administrative behavior. According to Tsuji Kiyoaki, the *ringisei* refers to "a system whereby administrative plans and decisions are made through the circulation of a document called *ringisho*." "The *ringisho* is initially drafted by a low-ranking official . . . thereafter the *ringisho* is discussed and examined separately by the officials of all relevant bureaus and divisions. . . . the highest executive is expected to approve it without change or modification because of this long process of prior scrutiny by lower administrators."[80] While the *ringisei*, which makes the flow of "command" go from bottom to top, prevailed in ministries concerned with domestic matters, a modified *ringisei* influenced decision making at the Foreign Office and the Ministries of War and Navy.

[80] Kiyoaki Tsuji, "Decision-Making in the Japanese Government: A Study of *Ringisei*," in Robert E. Ward, ed., *Political Development in Modern Japan* (Princeton 1968), 458.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In these ministries, middle-echelon officers such as section chiefs and desk officers (all of them career diplomats or officers) took the initiative in making plans and drafted the relevant documents—*ringisho*—by themselves. In this fashion, the flow of influence proceeded from the middle, rather than from the bottom, to the top.

Finally, the particular nature of Japanese mentality and political culture seems to be related to the important role of the middle echelon. There is a common belief—or myth—in Japanese society that a good leader quietly trusts his subordinates to manage affairs, shows little concern for meticulous detail, and assumes the entire responsibility for the outcome. General Ōyama Iwao, commander-in-chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Manchuria during the time of the Russo-Japanese War, has often been cited as an ideal military commander—one who did nothing but doze during the ferocious battles of Mukden that settled the outcome of the war. Anticipating tolerance and permissiveness at the top, those immediately below have often tended toward bold action and adventurous policy. For instance, staff officers of the Kwantung Army, such as Hattori Takushirō and Tsuji Masanobu, who played crucial roles in the Nomonhan Incident in 1939, received no severe punishment for the debacle; eventually they were reinstated in key positions, while their commander, General Ueda Kenkichi, assuming the whole responsibility for the failure, left the active list of the Army. The *Amae* (anticipating indulgence) mentality of subordinates may, as a characteristic of the Japanese, be useful in accounting for the relations between the middle echelon and the higher echelon. At the same time, the fear of being considered "weak-kneed" in the face of demands for strong policy or resolute action by their subordinates made those at the top levels susceptible to pressure from below.

III. Consensus Decision

Another trait of the Japanese decision-making system was the great emphasis upon building consensus in the process of making decisions. For example, when Japan decided on wars with Russia and with the United States, more than six months elapsed between the determination for war by the middle echelon and the final decision of the government. This time was needed to attain consensus within the Japanese decision-making system. Consensus was sought, in both cases, within the respective organs—the Army, the Navy, and the Foreign Office—first among organizations and groups with differing views, and then among the top decision-makers. The writings of Itō Miyoji record the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

discussions at the meetings of the *Gaikō Chōsakai*, the Advisory Committee for Foreign Affairs, in July of 1918, before Japan decided on its armed intervention in Siberia.[31] They demonstrate how essential consensus building was among political leaders before the government was able to come to a crucial decision. Failure to reach consensus among civilian and military leaders often prevented the government from making vital decisions, keeping it in a state of indecision. A good example of such a continuing state of indecision because of the failure to generate a consensus may be found in the case of the military alliance with Nazi Germany in 1939. In spite of more than seventy meetings of the Five-Minister Conference between January and August 1939, the Hiranuma Cabinet could find no way of accommodating the views of the Army on one hand and of the Navy and the Foreign Office on the other; it therefore simply procrastinated in dealing with the Germans.

Even when facing crisis decisions, Japan seems to have taken more time than one would usually expect under such circumstances. One example will suffice. At the sudden outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union in June 1941, Japan's leaders took more than ten days to decide on a proper response, merely because of the problem of building consensus between the civil and military branches and between top and middle echelons.[32]

In a system which leans heavily on consensus building, both vertically and horizontally within the decision-making structure, the position occupied by the middle echelon is strategically favorable in terms of accommodating the differing views of various echelons, and in terms of communication between the bottom and the top. The middle echelon was favorably located so as to recognize the needs of the society as a whole and to cause these needs to be reflected in the governmental decision-making process. The emphasis on consensus therefore seems to be part of the reason why the middle echelon was so influential in the decision-making process of prewar Japan.

The question may be raised as to why consensus building was so necessary in the decision-making system of prewar Japan, and why it was more important here than in other countries. Part of the answer may lie in the nature of the political system of prewar Japan, as well as in the nature of Japanese society.

[31] Kobayashi Tatsuo, ed., *Suiusō Nikki* [Suiusō Diary of Itō Miyoji] (Tokyo 1966), 125-96.

[32] Hosoya, "A Case Study of the Japanese Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process: Japan's Response to the German-Soviet War, 1941," unpub. paper delivered at the University Seminar on Modern East Asia: Japan (Columbia University, May 11, 1963).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The political system of prewar Japan lacked unitary leadership. The Emperor, who theoretically was in a position to bring about the ultimate integration within the decision-making system, in actuality did not intervene in the decision-making process. The Prime Minister could not take the Emperor's place to perform an integrative function because he was not empowered to take strong leadership; for instance, he could not even legally dismiss a dissident minister of his Cabinet. This system of weak leadership, which might be termed a "truncated structure," had a direct bearing on the importance of consensus building among the players participating in the decision games of prewar Japan. To reach a decision in this decision-making system, it was necessary for the players to find common denominators even at the cost of a great deal of time. The Japanese system here was quite different from the American arrangement which gives the President tremendous decision-making power.

More generally speaking, in Japanese society it is essential for the leaders of organizations to make a maximum effort to obtain the views of their constituents (even if only for appearance' sake), to save face, and to maintain harmonious relationships. Japanese society may be characterized as one where a system of mutual reliance is dominant. The higher-echelon officials lean on their subordinates and vice versa; the civilian leaders lean on the military and vice versa. It is a system of mutual reliance, which places emphasis on the interrelationship of groups within the Japanese decision-making process, rather than a system of "the rule of the higher by the lower" (*Gekokujō*). The Japanese are likely to feel secure and stable in this state of mutual reliance, as demonstrated by their predisposition to stick together and to conform. Consensus building tends to be important in the decision-making process of this type of society.

IV. The Postwar Pattern of Japanese Decision Making

Since the war, changes have of course taken place in the system of Japanese foreign policy decision-making. Foremost among these changes has been the departure of the military, which had been so much a part of the Japanese political process of the thirties, as a major force in the determination of foreign policy. No active middle-echelon elements comparable to those of the *Kogetsukai*, the *Issekikai*, or the Renovation Group (prominent during the issue of the Tripartite Pact) remain as important power centers. Taking the place of the military, to some extent, have been the leaders of the dominant po-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

litical party, the Liberal Democrats, and the business elite, who have become much involved in the determination of foreign policy since the war.

Yet, though the powerful middle-echelon military groupings appear to have been eliminated from the Japanese decision-making arena, it is not easy to determine whether the influence of their counterparts in the civilian bureaucracy—the Foreign Office or the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, for example—has similarly disappeared. This is due in part to the difficulty of gaining access to the relevant classified material of the postwar period, and in part to the scarcity of revealing memoirs. Analysts of American decision making are in a better position to gain insight into the workings of the American system, thanks to the leakage of official documents, such as the Pentagon and Anderson Papers, and to the publication of memoirs of key American officials.[33]

Granted that there is inadequate evidence on which to base a firm judgment, I think it safe to assume that in Japan the middle levels of the Foreign Office and other agencies concerned with foreign affairs continue to play a greater role in the formulation of foreign policy than do their counterparts in the American system. Such an assumption is based on the continuing emphasis in the Japanese system on consensus building prior to the formation of policy decisions, and to the advantageous position of the middle echelon in the Japanese foreign-policy structure, not only in the creation of consensus, but also in the network of communications within the government.

With the Emperor playing only a symbolic role in postwar Japan, the Prime Minister now stands at the top of the decision-making structure. The Japanese Prime Minister, who is empowered, under the postwar constitution, to appoint and dismiss Cabinet members at will, possesses greater authority in decision making than any of his prewar predecessors under the Meiji constitution, who acted merely as *primus inter pares*. Nevertheless, the Japanese Prime Minister continues to hold less power in the formation of foreign policy than the President of the United States. This is undoubtedly due to structural differences, both parliamentary and presidential, in the political system of the two countries. At the same time, the lesser degree of authority wielded by the Japanese Prime Minister seems to be related to the Japanese emphasis on consensus building. In addition to the general explanations which I advanced earlier, I would stress the fact that the Japanese

[33] See, for instance, George F. Kennan, *Memoirs*, 2 vols. (Boston 1967 and 1972); Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York 1969); Hilsman (fn. 14).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Prime Minister must necessarily rely on political support from the leaders of the various factions of his own political party, as well as on the financial support of the business community, in order to attain and hold his position. Unlike the American President, the Japanese Prime Minister does not have a fixed term of office; he must resign once he loses the support of the leaders of his party and of the major business circles. In making foreign policy decisions, fear of the loss of such support is less of a restriction on an American President. President Nixon, for example, was able to make the announcement of his forthcoming visit to Peking, which obviously marked an abrupt change in policy, without lengthy prior consultations with political leaders and the rest of the government bureaucracy. A move of this sort simply lies beyond the competence of a Japanese Prime Minister, who, before reaching a final decision on any substantial change in Japan's foreign policy, must make an exhaustive effort to consult a wide spectrum of Japanese leadership in politics, business, and the bureaucracy in order to obtain the fullest range of support for any eventual decision.

In the early postwar period, the consultative efforts prior to negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1955–56 for the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations are perhaps a good example of this process. A more recent example is offered by the first, cautious steps toward a so-called "independent diplomacy," taken by Japan in response to the Sino-American rapprochement which became apparent in the summer of 1971. Since the initial "Nixon shocks" were felt, a number of new diplomatic moves have been initiated, including the extension of official recognition to Outer Mongolia and to the new state of Bangladesh, the dispatch of an official mission to Hanoi, and an agreement with the Soviet Union concerning the development of oil fields in Siberia. But the length of time between the crisis of the summer of 1971 and the initiation of these moves in January of 1972 would seem to indicate the concern of Prime Minister Satō for allowing sufficient time for the massing of support from critical elements in the Japanese decision-making structure prior to embarking on this new course. This is but a recent example of the importance of consensus in the formation of Japanese foreign policy.

After consensus has been reached, the range of options is narrower for a Japanese Prime Minister than that available to a President of the United States. The American President makes his own choice among several alternatives. Assisted by special advisors and the White House staff, he is able to overrule the views of various elements in the bureaucracy and to impose his own will on the decision-making process.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

By contrast, the Japanese Prime Minister seems to perceive his role as one of establishing accommodation among the differing views of the various leaders and agencies concerned in order to secure their maximum support, rather than the assertion of his own priorities. In this sense it may be argued that the Japanese system is more democratic: the views of the members of the decision-making system are more likely to be taken into account and to be reflected in the decision-making process. At the same time, the Japanese system is obviously less democratic, or less open, in that it is more deficient in terms of interaction or a feedback process between the decision-makers on the one hand, and the representative bodies, the various interest groups, and the public on the other.

A better understanding of the differences and similarities among various foreign policy decision-making systems has been a very real necessity in the effort to reduce misunderstanding and conflict between nations. Studies directed to such a task will require the joint efforts of scholars in various countries.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Research Note

FASCISM AND MODERNIZATION: Some Addenda

By A. JAMES GREGOR

HENRY Ashby Turner's recent suggestions[1] concerning the analysis of fascism in terms of its relationship to the processes we have come to understand as "modernization" are too important and interesting to pass without critical comment. So much of what Turner says is persuasive that we run the risk of uncritically accepting what might be the chaff of his discussion along with its welcome substance.

There are at least two types of reservations with respect to Turner's account. One type turns on the general thesis he entertains; the second deals with the specifics of his argument.

I

Turner suggests that, given the "erosion of theories of totalitarianism," we find ourselves without a "suitable concept" for characterizing those "interwar authoritarian movements and regimes" that are generally identified as "fascist." He indicates that the theory of modernization might afford the absent "suitable concept" or "frame of reference" requisite to a more compelling analysis of the complex phenomena with which we are concerned.

While the theory of totalitarianism has regrettably given evidence of vagueness and conceptual porosity, the theory of modernization is, unfortunately, hardly less imprecise and ambiguous. Exponents of modernization have used the concept in any number of perplexing, inclusive, vague, complex, and sometimes mutually exclusive ways. Some theoreticians speak of modernization as an organic or holistic process, involving an array of social, economic, cultural, attitudinal, and political manifestations in a complex interaction.[2] Others seem to focus, more specifically, on economic development and growth as critical or de-

[1] Henry A. Turner, Jr., "Fascism and Modernization," *World Politics*, XXIV (July 1972), 547-64.

[2] Cf. Cyril E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York 1967), particularly chap. 1; Guy Hunter, *Modernizing Peasant Societies* (New York 1969); David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terminant variables—with social, cultural, political, and psychological variables as contingent, dependent, or epiphenomenal effects.[3] The theory of modernization may (or may not) have more immediate common currency than the theory of totalitarianism, but it would be hard to make a case for its being any more precise or providing greater leverage on analysis, explanation, or prediction.

Turner himself conceives of modernization as being a complex process "involving industrialization, urbanization, secularization, and rationalization."[4] Objective indices can perhaps be provided for two of the four defining properties of modernization: industrialization and urbanization. Overall, sectoral, and subsectoral rates of growth can, in principle, be plotted for industrialization. We can, in principle, discover some measures of aggregate output, output per man, and output per man-hour for industrial production. We can, in principle, provide some reasonably accurate figures for population flow and some measures of urbanization. It is hard to say, however, what we might use to measure secularization and rationalization. Most judgments must remain impressionistic and intuitive.

In order to obtain purchase on a vague and somewhat fugitive notion —fascism—we are asked to invoke what appear to be the equally vague and mercurial notions associated with modernization. If some of the central notions entailed by the latter concept have, at best, indeterminate reference, it becomes very difficult to know when we have made defensible ascriptions of modernizing or anti-modernizing to any complex political movement.

As a case in point, Turner seems to argue that even anti-modernizing regimes might suffer some measure of industrial growth (and attendant urbanization) because of their fascination with industrial products. That fascists might have had a "positive attitude toward the products of modern industry," we are informed, "should not necessarily be equated with approval of the larger process of modernization."[5]

We can only be puzzled. Fascists can, apparently, foster or suffer industrialization—one of the four constituent components of modernization—while rejecting the "larger process of modernization." What this seems to mean is that, in fact, fascists really want to de-urbanize and

[3] Cf. Irving L. Horowitz, *Three Worlds of Development* (New York 1966); Walt W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (New York 1960); Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, *The Political Basis of Economic Development* (Princeton 1966); A. F. K. Organski, "Fascism and Modernization" in S. J. Woolf, ed., *The Nature of Fascism* (New York 1969).

[4] Turner (fn. 1), 548.

[5] *Ibid.*, 556.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

de-industrialize, but somehow entertain a need and desire for the products of industry. This generates an air of paradox.

Turner seems to be saying that fascists actually do not wish to industrialize, urbanize, secularize, or rationalize. They are *intentionally* anti-modern, and harken back to some pre-modern ideal. Fascists, it would seem, "implemented many modernizing policies . . . only as the means to anti-modernist ends."[6] Much of Turner's argument thus pertains to what fascist *intentions* might have been—which, in turn, would require a reasonably competent and objective catalogue of fascist doctrinal commitments.

What Turner's argument requires is an adequate rehearsal of fascist intentions. In neither the National Socialist nor the Italian Fascist case does Turner provide what is critical to his discussion. The weaknesses in his argument can be made more transparent by considering specifically the intentions of the Italian Fascists. As Turner insists, the "central question" around which his discussion gravitates is "what [fascist] leadership cadres wanted to do with their societies. . . ."[7] Did they really aspire to a restoration of a pre-modern social, political, and economic system?

II

The discussion of some of the general disabilities of Turner's argument has led us to a consideration of some of his specific claims. Can it be plausibly argued that Italian Fascists sought to recreate a utopian "ancient Rome"? Were their explicit intentions anachronistic and reactionary? Turner is disposed to leave these questions open—but they are clearly not as open as he seems to suggest.

The most striking feature of discussions of this sort is the apparent indisposition of discussants to catalogue Fascist commitments as the Fascists themselves articulated them. In his account, for example, Turner does allude to some National Socialist literature, but he does not make a single direct reference to primary Fascist literature. We are, rather, treated to a recital of a collection of folk sayings about Fascist ideals and intentions. We are told that the Fascists aspired to a "revived Roman Empire," and that Mussolini intended to "ruralize" Italy. Moreover, Fascists entertained a reactionary "martial . . . ideal."[8] All of which suggests to Turner that Fascism might have been a "utopian anti-modernism."

[6] *Ibid.*, 562.
[7] *Ibid.*, 550.
[8] *Ibid.*, 555f.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Almost everything we know of the original Fascist movement as it collected around Mussolini in 1919 indicates, in fact, that it could not be persuasively characterized as anti-modern—unless the notion of modernization is used in a totally idiosyncratic fashion. The principal constituents that entered into the coalition that became Fascism—Futurism, Italian Nationalism, and Revolutionary National Syndicalism—seem to have all been clearly modernizing in intention. They advocated an industrialized Italy, with flourishing urban centers, secular political control of community life (sometimes with due regard for traditional religious values), and a rationalized bureaucratic (if anti-parliamentarian) infrastructure to govern the peninsula effectively. All three political movements dated from the prewar period and all three seem clearly to have been committed to the modernization of Italy.

Futurism, for its part, was the product of the brain of F. T. Marinetti —and whatever else it was, Futurism seems to have been a modernizing movement. In the *Futurist Manifesto* of 1909, Marinetti proclaimed, for instance, that the "magnificence of the world has been enriched with a new beauty: the beauty of speed. . . ." Marinetti was giving voice to what he conceived to be a new secular "religiosity"—a devotion to mechanization.[9] Marinetti, in fact, advocated an "identification of man with machine," a new humanity metered to the measure of machinery.[10] So intense were Futurist sentiments that Futurists formed a "Society for the Protection of Machines"—machines which, they argued, have "enriched life . . . destroyed distance and bridged space and enhanced the very tenor of life." Machines, to Futurists, were "concentrated power, inexorable precision, constancy and sincerity [!]." The Futurists, furthermore, were the advocates of cities that would be "geometrized . . . [fashioned in] cement, steel, crystal"—and filled with "machines, machines, machines, machines." They admonished Italians to "love and protect machines."[11] They aspired to create an Italy controlled by a technocracy, characterized by vast industrial complexes, modern communications systems, and urban developments.[12] In James Joll's judgment, some of the main themes of the Futurist movement included an "intense excitement about the prospects of the new century that was just beginning, an awareness of the beauty of machines which

[9] Filippo T. Marinetti, "Fondazione e Manifesto del Futurismo," and "La nuova religione-morale della velocità," in *Teoria e invenzione futurista* (Verona 1968), 10, 111ff.

[10] *Ibid.*, "L'uomo moltiplicato e il regno della macchina," 255ff.

[11] "Per una Società di Protezione delle Macchine," in Luigi Scrivo, ed., *Sintesi del futurismo: storia e documenti* (Rome 1968), 186f.

[12] Marinetti (fn. 9), "Al di là del Comunismo," 419f.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

could replace the more traditional objects of aesthetic satisfaction, and a realization of the heightening of experience which new sensations of speed and mechanical power could give."[13]

The Futurists seem to have been modernizers, and as modernizers they were among the first leadership cadres of the nascent Fascist movement. Marinetti and his immediate followers were in attendance at the founding meeting of the movement in San Sepulcro in 1919. Futurism, in effect, made up one of the currents that constituted the subsequent flood tide of Fascism.

Another current which was to contribute to that tide was the Nationalism of Enrico Corradini. Whatever else Corradini's Nationalism was, it seems to have been clearly modernizing in intention. As early as 1910 Corradini identified Italy as a "proletarian" nation suffering economic retardation; by 1914 he explicitly argued that the fortunes of all Italians, whether characterized as "proletarian" or "bourgeois," were inextricably bound up in the *quantity and quality of national production*. Italy was "economically retarded," its industrialization "impeded" by constraints imposed by foreign "imperialisms" and archaic traditions. "Nationalism," Corradini insisted, "rests on the principle of production, which precedes and transcends that of distribution. . . ."[14] The only way open for Italy to attain her "rightful place" in the community of nations was to undertake a program of accelerated economic development. Italy was at the "very commencement" of her curve of economic growth. What was required was a marshalling, rationalization, and disciplining of human and natural resources to the tasks such a process would inevitably entail.[15] Sacrifice and discipline were advocated as cardinal virtues for a nation of "producers." The "maximization of production" became a critical instrumental consideration in the program of making Italy a "major world power." For the Nationalists, "production" constituted the "central dynamic of modern civilization, the central dynamic that provides for the future of modern nations." The organization of modern nations should be calculated to afford "maximum efficiency" to productive processes.[16] By 1916 Corradini made the issue of Italian industrial development central to his arguments. The war, he insisted, had forced the expansion and ac-

[13] James Joll, *Three Intellectuals in Politics* (New York 1960), 135.

[14] Enrico Corradini, "Nationalismo e socialismo," in *Discorsi Politici* (Florence 1924), 214-29.

[15] *Ibid.*, "Le nazioni proletarie e il nazionalismo," 180ff; "Nazionalismo e democrazia," 161; "Per la guerra d'Italia," 302; and "Commemorazione dei soldati morti in battaglia," 314.

[16] *Ibid.*, "Diritti e doveri nazionali dei produttori," 341, 354f.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

celeration of Italian industrial growth. He spoke of an "intelligent political policy" of maximizing capital accumulation, a rationalization of financial institutions, and a mobilization of the labor force in pursuit of an organized policy of growth. Corradini reiterated with tedious regularity that the critical elements determining the future of modern nations were those identified with "industrial production." "Producers," whether the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie or the workers, constituted for Corradini the "true aristocracy of our epoch," and productive expansion and the extension of markets constituted critical instrumental ends in the service of the nation. To achieve those ends, Corradini advocated the regular accumulation of investment capital, the substitution of an efficient bureaucracy composed of technocrats for a parliament composed of ineffectual lawyers. Such reforms would facilitate economic maturation and expansion.[17] These themes remained constant throughout the period that marked the transition between the termination of the first World War and the advent of Fascism. By 1923 Nationalism and its modernizing fervor had been absorbed by Fascism, and in 1924 Corradini could dedicate the volume that contained his collected speeches to "Benito Mussolini, the Duce of Victorious Italy."

If both Futurism and Nationalism, two of the three principal constituents of victorious Fascism, could be characterized as "modernizing" in intention, no less could be said of National Syndicalism, the radical syndicalism that survived the war under Mussolini's leadership and provided the rationale for Fascism's specific economic and social policies.

As early as August 1918 Mussolini had changed the subtitle of his newspaper from that of a "Socialist Daily" to "A Daily of Combatants and *Producers*." This signaled a shift from what he was later to characterize as "destructive" to "constructive" socialism. Mussolini began to speak of "*productive* classes" rather than classes of the oppressed and classes of the oppressors. He spoke of a "coincidence of interests" that united the Italian proletariat and the Italian productive bourgeoisie in a rationalized national program of economic development.[18] By the end of the war, Mussolini spoke of the tasks that faced the nation in terms of an "economic renovation" that included an "association of energies" to "resolve the problem of increased production."[19] By 1919 he was calling his socialism a "socialism" preoccupied with "production," a "productivistic socialism."[20]

[17] *Ibid.*, "Politica ed economia della Nazione e delle classi," 376f, 388f.
[18] Benito Mussolini, "'Tu quoque,' Jouhaux?" *Opera Omnia* (Florence 1953), XI, 357f.
[19] *Ibid.*, XII, "Il sindacalismo nazionale: per rinascere!" 11-14.
[20] *Ibid.*, "Nel mondo sindacale italiano: rettifiche di tiro," 250.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At the meeting at which Fascism was founded, Mussolini maintained that Italy was a "proletarian" nation, disadvantaged in the competition with "rich" or "plutocratic" nations. He insisted that whatever policies Fascism advanced, two considerations must remain central to its concerns: the reality of the nation and the *exigencies of production*. Mussolini stressed that the "capstone" of Fascist policies would be the "maximizing of production." Under no circumstances should production be limited or "prejudiced."[21] In July 1919 Mussolini emphasized that the programmatic formula of Fascism was "the maximization of production" to which variable pragmatic tactics would be tailored.[22]

When revolutionary socialists seized industrial plants throughout Northern Italy, Mussolini indicated that Fascism was prepared to support the enterprise only if the workers could insure the maintenance of productive levels. Mussolini insisted that the Fascists consider problems only in terms of "productivity."[23] In 1920 the Fascists published their "Postulates for a Fascist Program" in which they identified their interest in the "maximization of production and well-being."[24]

By the time of Mussolini's accession to power, Fascism had given clear evidence of its commitment to industrialization and modernization of the economy. Not only were the Futurists, Nationalists, and National Syndicalists agreed that the maximization of production was the first order of business, but all were advocates of urban development, the rationalization of financial institutions, the reorganization of the bureaucracy on the basis of technical competence, the abolition of "traditional" and nonfunctional agencies, the expansion of road, rail, waterways, and telephonic communications systems, the modernization and secular control of the educational system, and the reduction of illiteracy.

The advent of Fascism brought with it the first efforts at theoretical interpretation. When Luigi Salvatorelli suggested that Fascism might be conceived as a product of "petty bourgeois humanistic" dispositions, Giovanni Ansaldo was quick to remind him that not "humanism" but "*industrial development*" constituted the preoccupation of the cadres of Fascism. Ansaldo reminded his readers that it was "the apotheosis of industrial development" which animated the Fascists—and that such a concern was calculated to warm the hearts of the Milanese "*technical* petty bourgeoisie." Fascism, Ansaldo insisted, resonated with

[21] *Ibid.*, "Atto di nascita del fascismo," 325, 327; and "La politica nazionale: primo squillo," 223.

[22] *Ibid.*, XIII, "Per l'intesa e per l'azione: fra gli interventisi di sinistra," 254.

[23] *Ibid.*, XV, "Discorso di Cremona," 186.

[24] "Per una economia di massimo produzione," Postulati del programma fascista (May 1920), in Renzo De Felice, *Mussolini il rivoluzionario* (Turin 1965), 747.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the interests of the "Italian petty bourgeoisie *obsessed with modernity*."[25]

It seems fairly clear that by 1923 Fascism could be—and was by a considerable number of contemporaries—recognized as a modernizing and industrializing movement. In the opinion of Ludovico Garruccio, those representatives of the "traditional" or "anti-modern" sectors of Italian society that were attracted to Fascism were quickly domesticated, or else purged in the service of "developmental" and "modernizing" Fascism.[26]

Mussolini piloting his own aircraft and tooling through the Italian hills in his red sports car were public displays of this modernizing temper. The public policies of introducing the work ethic among civil servants, of insistence that the trains run on time, and plans for the development of a modern road system were the first overt indications of the character of Fascism's modernizing dispositions.

Immediately after accession to power, Fascism's domestic policy was largely governed by the efforts to rationalize and improve both the infrastructural bureaucracy and the productive plant. In 1924 Sergio Panunzio, one of the principal ideologues of Fascism, characterized Fascist policy as a "means [to] the production of national wealth," a concern for the efficient and rationalized reorganization of the productive forces of the nation.[27] Fascism continued to characterize itself in this way throughout the Fascist period. By 1930 Nazareno Mezzetti could identify the "principle of defense and development of production" as the central concern of Fascist economic policy.[28] Gioacchino Volpe, the official historian of Fascism, identified Fascist policy as a calculated effort to "break away from the plutocratic nations [and] the development of the forces of internal production. . . ."[29] Volpe regularly alluded to Fascism's role in providing a "massive impulse" to economic development.[30]

All of this, conjoined with the Fascist programs of urban redevelopment and expansion that made Rome, Milan, Turin, and Genoa heavily populated modern industrial and commercial centers, suggests that Fascism could hardly be conceived as a "utopian anti-modernism" in intention. Considering the long struggle for secular political control

[25] Giovanni Ansaldo, "Il fascismo e la piccola borghesia tecnica," in Costanzo Casucci, ed., *Il fascismo* (Bologna 1961), 208, 210; emphasis added.
[26] Ludovico Garruccio, *L'industrializzazione tra nazionalismo e rivoluzione* (Bologna 1969), 105f.
[27] Cf. Sergio Panunzio, *Che cosa è il fascismo?* (Milan 1924), 24.
[28] Nazareno Mezzetti, *Mussolini e la questione sociale* (Rome 1931), 27.
[29] Gioacchino Volpe, *History of the Fascist Movement* (Rome 1936), 48.
[30] Cf. Volpe, *Lo sviluppo storico del fascismo* (Rome 1928), *passim*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of all facets of public life (coupled with the political accommodations necessitated by the presence of organized Catholicism in Italian life), it is hard not to read in Fascist intentions and performance the efforts of a modernizing movement.

When one reviews the economic performance of Italy during the Fascist period, it becomes fairly obvious that Italy enjoyed a steady rate of industrialization and economic modernization. If Fascism was "anti-modern" in intention, then the Fascists apparently were unsuccessful in impeding the modernization of the economy they controlled. With a base index of 100 in 1922, the aggregate indices of industrial production in Italy had risen to 182.2 by 1934. The metallurgical, building, textile, and hydroelectric generating industries all showed significant advances.[31] The rates of growth remained relatively constant, and the economic and industrial performance of Fascist Italy compared favorably with the economic and industrial performances of more resource-favored advanced industrial states. By 1938, using 1913 as a base, the index of aggregate volume of output for Italy had risen to 153.8, which compared more than favorably with that of France (109.4), and Germany (149.9). Again using 1913 as a base, the aggregate index for output per man in 1938 stood at 145.2 for Italy, 136.5 for France, 122.4 for Germany, 143.6 for the United Kingdom, and 136.0 for the United States; the aggregate index for output per man-hour stood at 191.1 for Italy, at 178.5 for France, 137.1 for Germany, and 167.9 for the United Kingdom.[32] All of this seems to imply rationalization and increasing role specificity among the labor force and functional entrepreneurs.

In point of fact, analysts like A. F. K. Organski and Charles F. Delzell are wrong when they suggest that the Fascists "severely repressed" economic development, and that the rate of economic development in Italy "slowed down in the 'twenties and virtually came to a halt in the 'thirties."[33] The fact is that between 1922 and 1938 Fascist Italy had become (both in terms of industrial growth and the modernization of agriculture) an economically mature society. In the opinion of Roland Sarti, Italy's postwar "economic miracle" would have

[31] Cf. William Welk, *Fascist Economic Policy* (Cambridge 1938), 191-205; Antonio S. Benni, "Lo sviluppo industriale dell'Italia fascista," in Tomaso Sillani, ed., *Lo Stato Mussoliniano* (Rome 1930), 97-105, updated as "The Industrial Growth of Fascist Italy," in Sillani, ed., *What Is Fascism and Why?* (New York 1931), 281-89.

[32] Angus Maddison, *Economic Growth in the West* (New York 1964), Appendices A, E, H, I.

[33] Organski (fn. 3), 37ff. Cf. Charles F. Delzell, *Mediterranean Fascism, 1919–1945* (New York 1970), 138.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been impossible without the developments of the antecedent Fascist period.[34] That judgment is shared by the most unlikely commentators.

In effect, there is very little either in the explicit intentions of Fascist ideologues or in Fascist performance that would suggest that Italian Fascism belonged to the class of anti-modern utopian movements. Mussolini's appeal to ancient glories, his effort to paramilitarize Italian society, and his advocacy of martial virtues do not an "anti-modern utopian" make. Modernizing Japan, Maoist China, and the Soviet Union all have regularly appealed to the ancient glories of their peoples in order to mobilize their energies for the efforts required in industrialization and modernization. Each of them, immediately or ultimately, has perceived the benefits of paramilitarization and the organization of "work brigades," "wars" of production, and "battles" for meeting quotas. All of them, in some way or another, have invoked "martial virtues" in the effort to mobilize and control the energies necessary for their enterprise.

No matter what can be said of National Socialism in Germany, it would appear that Italian Fascism was an exemplar of the class of contemporary mass-mobilizing and modernizing dictatorships operating under single-party auspices. That such a judgment might well be correct receives support from an unlikely source: the contemporary Marxist-Leninist interpretations of Italian Fascism. This leads us to the second specific criticism of Turner's argument.

III

It is an opinion shared by professional commentators and reflected in Turner's remarks, that Soviet-bloc theorists have very little to say that might contribute to the analysis of generic fascism and its relationship to the processes of modernization. Although that is largely true of the literature that became available during the Stalinist period—and a considerable part of the literature that immediately followed—the Soviet theoretician Boris Lopukhov could argue by 1965 that the Stalinist interpretation of fascism as the "terrorist tool of finance-capitalism" was a caricature of the actual historical sequence.[35] By 1970 the standard Soviet interpretation of fascism had undergone critical changes. Around that time Alexander Galkin, head of a section of the

[34] Roland Sarti, *Fascism and the Industrial Leadership in Italy, 1919–1940* (Berkeley 1971), 122f. Cf. Garruccio (fn. 26), 140.

[35] Boris R. Lopukhov, "Il problema del fascismo Italiano negli scritti di autori sovietici," *Studi storici*, VI, No. 2 (1965), 255.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Institute of Concrete Social Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, could insist that fascism was not a typical expression of bourgeois politics, but constituted a crisis regime atypical of capitalist societies.[36] For Galkin the characteristic political form of bourgeois rule is pluralist and multiparty parliamentary governance. Galkin argues that fascism arose "spontaneously" under crisis conditions that obtained in various environments in the years that followed the first World War. Fascism was neither planned nor directed by "finance capital"; in fact, fascism was compelled to win the grudging acquiescence of the prevailing "ruling circles," some of whom maintained "a restrained attitude to the fascist regime throughout its existence." The "big capitalists" remained "suspicious" of fascism because fascism "infringed upon" the "concrete interests of . . . special representatives and entire factions" of the bourgeoisie. Galkin maintains that under fascism "the settlement of questions which for centuries were the prerogative of the big capitalists in some measure was becoming the function of the [fascist] bureaucratic agencies. . . . That is why for the monopolies the handing over of power to the fascists implied at the same time subordination to the regime for the sake of preserving and extending their positions."

The picture we get of fascist regimes is one that is significantly different from the previous orthodox Soviet interpretation. Fascist movements arise "spontaneously" by mobilizing "petty bourgeois and lumpen-proletarian" elements, and they subordinate traditional and prefascist elites to a new bureaucratic and political elite. The fascists then proceed to undertake political and social changes that "run counter to the intrinsic conservatism of the bourgeoisie. . . ." Fascism, according to this revised standard version, proceeded to act "as an independent force with regard to separate factions and groups of the ruling class and gained definite freedom of action. . . ."

What is most instructive in Galkin's revised Marxist interpretation is the conception of the purposes to which fascism put its "autonomy," and to which it "subordinated" the "ruling circles." Fascism not only "eroded" the foundations of "bourgeois democracy," but proceeded to "build up and improve" the "economic infrastructure" of society. It maintained "necessary but unprofitable industries" and "spurred" economic activity. Moreover, according to this version, fascism expanded "technocratic" controls over the economy, elevated "social philanthropy" to the "state level," and provided, at least temporarily, for an "increased degree of vertical social mobility."

[36] Alexander Galkin, "Capitalist Society and Fascism," *Social Sciences: USSR Academy of Sciences*, II (1970), 128-38.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All this sounds suspiciously like a modernizing and industrializing movement. We receive this impression even more emphatically in Mihaly Vajda's recent discussion of fascism. Vajda is a member of the Hungarian Academy of Science; it is unlikely that his widely distributed interpretation has anything less than Soviet approval.

According to Vajda, Italy "was very underdeveloped at the time of the Fascist take-over" and the Italian bourgeoisie was correspondingly "feeble." What Italy faced was the necessity of implementing a "period of extensive growth of the . . . economy." The bourgeoisie was incapable of creating the conditions for this development—and *the task fell to Mussolini's Fascism*. Italian Fascism constituted, in Vajda's judgment, the only possible "progressive solution" to Italy's retarded industrial development.

> Under Fascist rule, we are told, Italy underwent rapid capitalist development with the electrification of the whole country, the blossoming of automobile and silk industries, the creation of an up-to-date banking system, the prospering of agriculture, the reclaiming of substantial agricultural areas, . . . the construction of a considerable network of highways, etc. Italy's rapid progress after WW II and the fact that today it is already moving toward intensive capitalist development would have been unimaginable without the social processes begun during the Fascist period.[37]

In effect, according to the most contemporary Marxist-Leninist interpretation, Italian Fascism was a progressive and perhaps revolutionary industrializing and modernizing movement.

Vajda is, in fact, simply repeating elements of an analysis made available as early as 1933 in the unorthodox Marxist interpretation of Franz Borkenau.[38] Vajda specifically recommends Borkenau's work—in which Italian Fascism was identified as a "transitional form of modernizing dictatorship" which matured in an environment beset by retarded industrial development. Borkenau, in fact, argued that the "proletarian" demand for "socialist revolution" in such an environment was "reactionary." Fascism "discharged its historic task" by industrializing the Italian peninsula. The elements of this kind of analysis may be disinterred in a number of non-orthodox Marxist accounts. Arthur Rosenberg, for example, insisted that Mussolini's Fascism *forced* the growth of Italy's heavy industries and "systematically drove forward

[37] Mihaly Vajda, "The Rise of Fascism in Italy and Germany," *Telos*, XII (Summer 1972), 12f.

[38] Franz Borkenau, "Zur Soziologie des Faschismus," in Ernst Nolte, ed., *Theorien über den Faschismus* (Cologne-Berlin 1967), 156-81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the development of shipping and communications."[39] Otto Bauer similarly argued that Italian Fascism "accommodated" the retarded economic system of the peninsula to the requirements of "modern capitalist technology."[40] As early as 1923, Giulio Aquila, in the first Marxist-Leninist interpretation of Fascism, maintained that Fascism performed a "historically progressive function" by breaking the resistance to industrialization and modernization represented by the traditional banking system of the peninsula, and by rationalizing the political system.[41]

Of course all Marxists, of whatever persuasion, have regularly insisted that Fascist modernization was undertaken in the service of capitalism. For our purposes the critical concern is whether Marxists have been prepared to recognize the modernizing character of Mussolini's Fascism; it seems fairly obvious that such is the case. However one construes the program of Fascism, it did include the rapid industrialization of Italy's retarded economic system, the modernization of agriculture, the rationalization of the banking system, and the extensive bureaucratization of the productive processes. Given the standardized indices of Fascist Italy's economic development, it is difficult not to see the merit of the analysis. Italian Fascism, no matter what else it was, seems to have been an industrializing and modernizing political movement in both performance and intention. The fact that even the more orthodox Marxists are prepared to grant as much is instructive.

IV

What has been suggested here is, among other things, that whatever can be said of National Socialism cannot without argument be said of Italian Fascism. As Turner indicates, in dealing with National Socialism and Fascism we may be dealing with complex political phenomena that share some impressive similarities but are distinguished by critical differences. Organski, in fact, has suggested that, because of the differences, National Socialism was not a fascism at all.[42] It was some sort of pathological response to the welfare problems of a consumer-oriented post-industrial society. Ludovico Garruccio, in his most recent essay on the subject, identifies Italian Fascism as a fascism that was charged with industrializing and modernizing intent, while National Socialism

[39] Arthur Rosenberg, "Der Faschismus als Massenbewegung," in Wolfgang Abendroth, ed., *Faschismus und Kapitalismus* (Frankfurt 1967), 75-141.

[40] Otto Bauer, "Der Faschismus," *ibid.*, 143-67.

[41] Giulio Aquila, "Il fascismo italiano," in R. De Felice, ed., *Il fascismo e i partiti politici italiani* (Rocca San Casciano 1966), 437.

[42] A. F. K. Organski, *The Stages of Political Development* (New York 1967), 170-77.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was a fascism invoked to resolve the post-industrial problems of technological unemployment and welfare distribution.[43]

However one chooses to interpret the available evidence, it is clear that the comparative study of mass-mobilizing movements of the twentieth century is facing critical problems of typology and classification. If Italian Fascism was, in fact, a mass-mobilizing developmental dictatorship under single-party auspices, how can one rigorously distinguish it from Stalinism, or Maoism, or, for that matter, Castroism? Fascists, as early as the twenties, maintained that there were substantial similarities between themselves and the political system developing in the Soviet Union. In 1925 Sergio Panunzio argued that "Fascism and Bolshevism are phenomena that share critical similarities."[44] In the more elaborate discussions of the thirties, Fascists argued that the anarcho-syndicalist and anti-statist ideas of Lenin had eroded under the weight of Stalinist practice, and what resulted was a "political formula that galvanizes the Russian people in the service of industrial development—to nationalist purpose,"[45] a political formula that "transformed Marxist-Leninist principles into their 'contraries,' that is to say, the ideas that provide the shape and substance of the Fascism of Mussolini."[46]

Among Marxists, Leon Trotsky spoke of the symmetry between Fascism and Stalinism—a "deadly similarity" in many of their features.[47] After the second World War, Bruno Rizzi could only lament that "that which Fascism consciously sought, [the Soviet Union] involuntarily constructed."[48]

If one takes these suggestions seriously, they indicate that we are confronted with a typological and classificatory problem of staggering complexity. Is Italian Fascism a member of the class of mass-mobilizing developmental dictatorships under single-party auspices that includes Stalinism, Maoism, and Castroism, as well as an indeterminate number of related political systems? If so, does that make Stalin, Mao and/or Castro fascists? If it does, does such a notion "strain language well beyond its breaking point," as Peter Wiles suggests?[49]

[43] Ludovico Garruccio, "Le tre età del fascismo," *Il Mulino*, CCXIII (January-February 1971), 53-73.

[44] Sergio Panunzio, *Lo stato fascista* (Bologna 1925), 145ff.

[45] Agostino Nasti, "L'Italia, il bolcevismo, la Russia," *Critica Fascista*, XV (March 15, 1937), 162.

[46] Tomaso Napolitano, "Il 'fascismo' di Stalin ovvero l'U.R.S.S. e noi," *Critica Fascista*, XV (October 1, 1937), 397.

[47] Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed* (New York 1937), 278.

[48] Bruno Rizzi, *Le lezioni dello Stalinismo* (Rome 1962), 38.

[49] Peter Wiles, "Comment on Tucker's 'Movement-Regimes,'" *American Political Science Review*, LV (June 1961), 293.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If we do not wish to strain ordinary language unduly, might the concept "totalitarianism" serve some purpose? But if such a strategy suggests itself, are we not back where we started? Might not the notion of modernization be effectively incorporated into the classificational system suggested in the works devoted to totalitarianism?

Even if we grant this possibility, we have as yet no suggestion as to how one might characterize the specific subspecific differentiae that distinguish the species or subspecies of such an inclusive class. Do manifest or latent functions of the various political systems differentiate between them? Do they distinguish themselves in terms of their ideological commitments, the class provenience of their leadership or their membership, the economic conditions under which they manifest themselves, or their real and pretended treatment of capitalist institutions and capitalists?

There are very few serious treatments of these issues in the literature. We continue to use the generic term "fascist" to cover a wide diversity of significantly different social and political movements and extant and/or extinct political systems. Whether we continue to employ the term "fascist" in such fashion, or whether we subsume such movements and regimes under the more omnibus "totalitarian," or allude to the more inclusive class as "fascistic"[50] is a matter of little *cognitive* significance—as long as we understand that we have not yet begun the serious analytic and classificatory task of defining the critical concepts that we wish to employ for the purpose of identifying significant features within our universe of inquiry. Until we satisfy some of these analytic obligations, we can hardly expect to *describe* effectively some of the most important political phenomena of the twentieth century, much less *isolate recurrent regularities* that might permit us to *generalize* over them. If we cannot effectively describe or generalize, it is doubtful that we can hope to articulate compelling theories which might explain them.

[50] In my *The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics* (Princeton 1974), I have used the terms "fascist" and "fascistic" to cover the entire class of mass-mobilizing, developmental dictatorships under single-party auspices with the conviction that this use will outrage most of my colleagues. I am hopeful that such usage will also provoke my colleagues to reconsider some intuitive and commonsensical ordinary language classifications that suggest that the terms "fascist" and "Marxist" refer to mutually exclusive classes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Articles

THE POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATION: How Who Gets What and When

By I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN*

Alan Coddington, *Theories of the Bargaining Process*. Chicago, Aldine Publishing Company, 1968, 106 pp., $4.95.
John G. Cross, *The Economics of Bargaining*. New York, Basic Books, 1969, 247 pp., $8.95.
Paul Swingle, ed., *The Structure of Conflict*. New York, Academic Press, 1970, 305 pp., $12.50.

NEGOTIATION is one of the basic political or decision-making processes, but if processes in general have been sorely neglected in political analysis, negotiation has been neglected more than most. Legislation as an institutional function has a respectable literature; as a process wherein goal values are constant and decisions are made by aggregating a sufficient number of parties to constitute a numerically superior side, it has become the subject of coalition theory.[1] Adjudication has also given rise to a large quantity of institutional literature, although a theory explaining the process wherein a single party combines events and values to produce a decision is less well established.[2] Similarly, diplomacy—and more recently, collective bargaining—has

* I am grateful to Steven J. Brams, Douglas Muzzio, and Bertram Spector for their comments.

[1] See William Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven 1962); S. Groennings, W. E. Kelley, and M. Leiserson, eds., *The Study of Coalition Behavior* (New York 1970); Cornelius Cotter, J. H. Kessel, W. C. Mitchell, and R. Tanter, eds., *Conflict, Competition, and Coalitions* (Indianapolis 1973).

[2] See, however, Herbert Simon, *Administrative Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill. 1957); Alexander Bickel, *The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis* (Cambridge, Mass. 1957); Glendon Schubert, *Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill. 1959), chap. 4, and "Policy Without Law: An Extension of the Certiorari Game," *Stanford Law Review*, XIV (March 1962), 284; Walter F. Murphy, *Elements of Judicial Strategy* (Chicago 1964), esp. chap. 3; Richard E. Warton, *Legal Justice, Power Bargaining and Social Science Intervention: Mechanisms for Settling Disputes*, Purdue University Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences, Paper No. 194 (1968); David N. Atkinson and Dale E. Neuman, "Toward a Cost Theory of Judicial Alignments," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, XIII (May 1969), 271-84; and Theodore Becker, *Comparative Judicial Politics* (Chicago 1970), chap. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been thoroughly described, and economists and mathematicians using game and utility theories have developed some complex models of bargaining.[3] But negotiation as a political process, specifically explained in terms of power, is an underdeveloped area of theory.

In this review article I will examine a number of recent studies in mathematics, economics, psychology, and politics which have all had something significant to add to the study of the process, and then will focus (as few of them do) on their contribution to the political study of negotiation. In the meanwhile many of their contributions to other disciplines will be acknowledged only in passing. Although some of the work reviewed utilizes mathematical formulations, this review will remain on the verbal level. I should note at the outset that, were it not for the significant contributions which these books have already made to the understanding of negotiation as a process and of the exercise of power, it would be impossible even to raise the questions linking power and process.

I

Negotiation may be called the process of combining divergent viewpoints to reach a common agreement,[4] but none of the studies here reviewed spends much time in the essentialistic exercise of definition. Indeed, essential definitions are most useful for probing boundaries, and the problem of analyzing negotiation is not primarily one of distinguishing the phenomenon from its neighbors. Rather it is a matter of explaining or understanding particular outcomes of a process. Thus, the parameters of the explanation must be expressed through a set of assumptions, rather than through essential elements.

These assumptions refer to a condition which economists have often called "bilateral monopoly." The first assumption is that the process involves two parties (Coddington, 6); *N*-person situations, although frequently encountered in reality, are more complex extensions of the

[3] See F. Y. Edgeworth, *Mathematical Physics* (London 1881), esp. 20-30; Frederick Zeuthen, *Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare* (London 1930), esp. 104-50; G. L. S. Shackle, "The Nature of the Bargaining Process," in John Dunlop, ed., *The Theory of Wage Determination* (New York 1957), 292-314; Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960); Carl M. Stevens, *Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations* (New York 1963); John von Neuman and Oscar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (New York 1964); Martin Shubik, ed., *Game Theory and Related Approaches to Social Behavior* (New York 1964); Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations* (New York 1965); and Anatole Rapoport, *Two-Person Game Theory* (Ann Arbor, Mich. 1966).

[4] From Zartman, *The Politics of Trade Negotiations Between Africa and the European Economic Community* (Princeton 1971), 202.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

two-person case. The second assumption concerns the positive-sum nature of the encounter (Cross, 4, 19, 120; Coddington, 7).[5] An agreement by its very existence is a good or has value in and of itself; this good or value may be merely satisfaction over the end of conflict, but it is more likely to comprise additional payoffs or side-payments. Although it is agreed that fixed-sum outcomes are characteristic of a very different set of circumstances than that of most negotiations, and are thus subject to a different type of analysis, the nature of the negotiation curve (or frontier or set) is not at all clear. The general assumption that it is a single-function curve with a clear Pareto-optimal point is probably overly simplistic for theorizing and unrealistic for application. Coddington (pp. 33-34, 36) and others have raised this point without providing a full solution.[6]

If negotiation were merely the means of arriving at an acceptable reallocation of a set of goods or values between their owners, two simple utility scales would show a clear, determinate result.[7] Furthermore, the only decision involved would be on how far down the two lists to go in the exchange of equivalent goods. The image already begins to suggest the complexity of reality, for one of the aspects of negotiation (assuming that two known utility scales are available) is to induce the other party to go a bit further down his list than I want to go down mine, in order for me to get more for my money. But the other party has the same sort of motives, and as long as it is possible to entertain such hopes, it is in both our hoped-for interests to control each other's knowledge of our utility lists. Thus, a third assumption is that of imperfect information (i.e., neither perfect information nor total noncommunication), with the amount of information and its veracity under the control of each party (Cross, 5; Otomar Bartos in Swingle, 46).[8] Unlike models of other decision-making processes which can assume perfect information and then be tested against reality by relaxing the assumption, a model of negotiation must include imperfect information as one of its operative elements.

[5] See also Oran R. Young, *The Politics of Force: Bargaining During International Crises* (Princeton 1968), 28.

[6] See also Stefan Valavanis, "The Resolution of Conflict when Utilities Interact," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, II (June 1958), 156-69. On "negotiation set," see Rapoport (fn. 3), 101-2; on "utility frontiers" see Jack Sawyer and Harold Guetzkow, "Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations," in Herbert Kelman, ed., *International Behavior* (New York 1965), esp. 476-77. The Sawyer-Guetzkow chapter is still the single best work on the subject of negotiation.

[7] Steven Brams has reminded me that even this would not be true in a Prisoners' Dilemma or non-cooperative game without a saddlepoint.

[8] See also Young (fn. 5), 29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The sliding-scale example also brings out another assumption, however: that of mixed motives (Charles Gruder in Swingle, 111). Although the sum of goods or values brought into being by agreement on their reallocation is assumed to be larger than the amount of goods available beforehand, it is also assumed that the positive sum is not large enough to cover the wants of both parties. There is therefore a need for cooperation (to bring about the agreement, on the best terms mutually) but also an occasion of conflict.[9] Indeed, negotiation is often defined in terms of component conflicting and common interests: "Negotiation is a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of common interest where conflicting interests are present."[10] Bartos (in Swingle, 46, 64), defines negotiation as "a process whereby positions that are originally highly divergent become identical. Or, if you wish, it is a process whereby parties who disagree to start with reach an agreement. . . . To negotiate *means* to pursue twin (and usually contradictory) goals of maximizing one's own (individual) payoff and reaching an (group) agreement. . . . To put it somewhat differently, negotiation should be viewed as a process through which *the various individual interests* (maximization of own payoff) *are gradually transformed into one group interest* (the agreement)" [Emphasis in original]. According to Gruder (in Swingle, 111), "the goal of the participants in a mixed-motive or bargaining situation is to reach some agreement as to how to divide between themselves the total outcome available from their relationship." It is assumed that parties do not want merely to split the difference in their search for a just and lasting piece.

Mixed motives alone do not exhaust this complex of assumptions however, as Bartos' last definition suggests. Parties are not merely pursuing contradictory goals, any more than they are aggregating fixed preferences. To analyze negotiation, it must be assumed that values are alterable as well as partially unknown.[11] Agreement is brought about by the parties' changing the value of the goods in each other's

[9] Cross, 42, and Young (fn. 5), 26, appropriately posit pure cooperation and pure conflict (termed pure bluffing and pure intransigence) as the limits of negotiation. See also Nicolson's "shopkeepers" and "warriors": Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (Oxford 1964), 25f. What are process limits to Cross and normative styles to Nicolson become personality types to Harold Lasswell in *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago 1930), esp. 124f and 151f, on "agitators" and "administrators," respectively.

[10] Fred Charles Iklé, *How Nations Negotiate* (New York 1964), 3f. Iklé's most useful article, incorporating many of the above assumptions, is (with Nathan Leites), "Political Negotiations as a Process of Modifying Utilities," in Shubik (fn. 3), 243-59, originally appearing in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, VI (March 1962), 19-28.

[11] See also Young (fn. 5), 25-27, 29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eyes.[12] Recognition of this aspect of negotiation is the strength of the studies at hand, and they thereby unveil the challenge of explaining *how* values are changed.

Finally, it should be noted that these studies do not pay much attention to probabilities, and wisely so. While probabilities are not uninteresting as a subject of theory, they are not very useful for understanding the process of negotiation. Since matters under negotiation are generally important to one or more parties, and since a probability refers not to a percentage gain (as it might appear), but to a chance of something either happening or not happening at all, it is relevant to rational behavior only in its upper limits. The notion that bargainers balance payoff against chance of occurrence is an exceptional one, not a reference to a general characteristic. It would make a poor public defense for failure. (Indeed, Kennedy was criticized for it in the Cuban missile crisis, even when he succeeded—suggesting how unreal the analytic concept is.)[13] In addition, consideration of probabilities less than unity only makes sense when a large number of reruns can be made, and is therefore of only limited help or validity for understanding historic cases, each with its own characteristics. Probability is an indication of a partial explanation, with the rest of the cause unknown;[14] the studies under review seek a process model that is determinate in terms of its parameters.

II

The static aspects of the conditions discussed here, and the outcome which they determine theoretically, are best summarized in the significant model of Nash, which provides the base line for any theory of negotiation (as many of the books here reviewed explicitly recog-

[12] See Young, *ibid.*, chap. 16, on the proposition, "Conditions of crisis generate strong incentives for decision-makers to manipulate the perceptions of various parties concerning critical aspects of the clash," 394. Similar formulations are offered by Arthur Lall, *Modern International Negotiation* (New York 1966), 54 and 311. Indeed, many of Young's propositions ("hypotheses" is too precise a word for them) are similar to some of Lall's concluding principles; unfortunately, Young does not seem to have been aware of Lall's work. See also Iklé and Leites (fn. 10).

[13] See Richard J. Barnet's review of Ralph Lapp, *The Weapons Culture* (New York 1968) in *Science*, CLX (April 19, 1968), 293. It is true nevertheless that Kennedy did take chances in the Cuban negotiations, notably in regard to the first Khrushchev letter. "There was some debate among the experts in Hilsman's office as they tried to decide whether this extraordinary unofficial approach could be taken seriously. . . . The essence of the final approach to Moscow was to gamble that Khrushchev had not been overruled since sending off the secret letter. The President, in effect, accepted a set of terms Khrushchev had never formally offered." Elie Abel, *The Missile Crisis* (New York 1966), 157 and 176.

[14] For a similar use of the term, see Lawrence Mayer, *Comparative Political Inquiry* (Homewood, Ill. 1972), 23.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nize [Cross, 18-23; Coddington, 35-36; Anatole Rapoport in Swingle, 11-12]).[15] Nash has demonstrated that the outcome for a two-person non-zero-sum game that fulfills the conditions of Pareto optimality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, independence of linear transformations, and symmetry of utility scales is the point along a compact, convex negotiation set where the product of the parties' utilities is maximized.

> The major deficiency of the Nash model for our purposes, however, does not rest in the weakness of its assumptions but rather in its fundamental character as a piece of game theory. As a consequence of its concern only for the specification of an outcome, it can offer us no analysis of the dynamic process of disagreement-concession-agreement which constitutes the very essence of bargaining. We are given only a solution criterion with no insight into its *raison d'être*. The model does not even attempt to answer the question that often is most interesting to us: Under what conditions will the solution *deviate* from the idealized condition, and how will that variation take place? On the other hand, as an ideal solution, Nash's construction is extremely compelling, and its relevance may be extended to almost any kind of division problem, be it normative or descriptive. It is therefore desirable that when a theory or model does not satisfy the Nash criterion, the analysis be extended to show why the deviation has come about (Cross, 23).

Cross's approach seeks to explain the process of disagreement-concession-agreement in terms of the parties' concession rates. According to his model, each party revises its initial goals according to the other's expected concession rate, modified by experience over the course of the negotiations. Also influencing the concession rate are two time elements, the discount rate of future benefits and the fixed cost of bargaining. Using these variables in formal (differential) models, Cross arrives at a number of interesting implications, including some that parallel the inductive suggestions of the excellent empirical work of Siegel and Fouraker and others.

> Whenever a party increases his demand, he increases the payoff which he expects to receive at the time of settlement, but he also delays the date of that settlement by an amount of time determined by his opponent's rate of concession. . . . [S]udden large concessions from one player tend to encourage increased demands on the part of the other (pp. 47, 50).[16]

[15] John F. Nash, "The Bargaining Problem," *Econometrica*, XVIII (April 1950), 155-62. An important feature of all three works is the initial review and summary of previous work (Cross, chap. II; Coddington, chap. II; Rapoport in Swingle, chap. I). On the use of rationality models, baseline constructs, and the "zero method," see Karl Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (New York 1964), 141.

[16] For similar formulations, see Sidney Siegel and Lawrence E. Fouraker, *Bargaining and Group Decision-Making* (New York 1960), 81; Zartman (fn. 4), 221.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[W]henever both actual concession rates are less than the expected rates, both parties will converge toward an agreement (p. 51).

[We] observe a tendency for the two expected concession rates to approach each other (p. 53).

The better a learner he is [in perceiving changes in the other party's concession rate and adjusting to them], the more the outcome will go against a player (p. 60).[17]

The faster a player expects his opponent to concede, the greater will be his own demand (p. 73).

[O]verstating one's demands will not improve one's payoff at agreement at all! . . . In the last analysis, the best bluff is no bluff at all (pp. 170-71).[18]

[C]ost-imposing actions are potentially considerably greater in magnitude than are their consequences (p. 136).[19]

High . . . bargaining costs will have the effect of reducing the time required by the bargaining process (p. 61).

Cross's formulation is coherent, concise, elegant, and ingenious, and the fact that some of its implications have already been suggested by empirical studies only confirms the explanatory power of its general deductive principles. It also is an improvement over static economic theories which are satisfied merely with an equilibrium point or a contract zone (negotiations set), and which take little account of the dynamic process of exchange. But a theory that explains in terms of concession and time discount rates leaves some questions open. Is such an explanation any easier to operationalize than one couched in terms of utilities? And what is it, after all, that determines concession rates (as well as assigned utilities) and causes them to change? Might one not suspect that each party would not only manipulate its own concession rates but would also try to manipulate its opponent's?

Coddington picks up Cross's work and takes it into closed-loop systems analysis in which "each bargainer is making error-actuated decisions but each is attempting to steer in a contrary way . . . a pair of linked servomechanisms, the output of each one being the input of the other" (Coddington, 55). This realization leads to the refinement of some of Cross's assumptions and the use of the self-correction decision system to handle the fact that Cross's reactive tactics are theoretically (if realistically) error-based. (Coddington, ix-x, 59-64; Cross, 201 and 224.) "Whereas the strategic models (like those of game theory) give all the emphasis to the freedom of choice and the control that

[17] For similar formulations, see Siegel and Fouraker (fn. 16), 57f.

[18] For similar formulations, see *ibid.*, 93; Zartman (fn. 4), 216.

[19] For similar formulations, see David A. Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," *World Politics*, XXIV (October 1971), 19-38, esp. 28-29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

decision-makers may have over the process, the cataclysmic models (like Cross's model and the present framework) give emphasis to the built-in dynamics of the process before which the decision-maker is powerless" (p. 79). The penultimate conclusion is that "A theory of the bargaining relationship has yet to be developed" (p. 80); but the last chapter is a rather disappointing continuation of refinements that does not fully exploit the potentialities of the cybernetic approach.

Considering that the Swingle symposium starts with an excellent review of game-theoretic approaches to conflict resolution (by Rapoport) and that it is published in a social psychology series, it is surprising that it has so little to say about the Cross-Coddington theme of mutual adjustment of interpersonal behavior.[20] It is not surprising, however, that the contributions which its chapters do make are in the nature of inductive, empirical findings, and not new formulations or refinements of a model. Thus, they can offer hypotheses and support theories, but they cannot explain results.[21]

One of the best chapters, by Bartos, reports on group experiments concerning the relation between toughness (high opening bid and low concession rate) and final payoff. Results showed that toughness generated softness and vice versa, that negotiators tended to reciprocate concessions in frequency but in inverse magnitude, that toughness tended to be rewarded, that the time required to arrive at agreement varied inversely with the firmness of beliefs about the opponent's interests, and that the likelihood of toughness' preventing agreement varied directly with the accuracy of beliefs about the opponent's interests (pp. 57, 59-60, 65).[22] These findings all support Cross's formulations and fit within Siegel's and Fouraker's broader experiments and their equally supportive inductive summary: "the bargainer who opens negotiations with a high request, has a small rate of concession, has a high minimum level of expectation, and is very perceptive and quite unyielding, will fare better. . . ."[23]

The contradictions of a strategy based on the adjustment of expected concession rates, however, are well examined in a wider-ranging but

[20] None of the Swingle chapters refer to Cross's or Coddington's work, or even to Siegel and Fouraker. Two chapters in Swingle are not treated here; one, by Kenneth Terhune, because it focuses on psychology, personality, and behavior without touching power; the other, by I. L. Horowitz, because it is neither theoretical nor empirical.

[21] Cf. Cross, 37, 64, on explanation in regard to Siegel and Fouraker; and Young, "Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor," *World Politics*, XXI (April 1969), 486-511, on explanation in regard to induction.

[22] See also Swingle, in Swingle, 251. A full-length work by Otomar J. Bartos developing the subject further is entitled *The Process and Outcome of Negotiations* (New York, forthcoming).

[23] Siegel and Fouraker (fn. 16), 93.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

less rigorous chapter by the symposium's editor. "[C]oncession-making may not be interpreted as a cooperative gesture but rather as evidence of the opponent's weakness. . . . Players, therefore, are in a dilemma in which unyielding behavior can preclude the establishment of cooperation which in turn may have disastrous results, whereas making a cooperative gesture may encourage the opponent to press for further concessions and, in dangerous games of chicken, to press for final capitulation" (p. 262).

The situation is a sort of dynamic Prisoners' Dilemma of concession rates, and is a much more important twist on Cross's approach than those examined by Coddington in his book. In fact, the problem was the major issue in an exchange between the two in the *American Economic Review*, where the point of brinkmanlike concession rates was introduced by Coddington as *another* conceivable type of behavior, a point Cross never answered very well.[24] Rather than showing linear concession rates, two parties are likely to strut and spar a while, hardening terms to establish toughness, and, in true "chicken" style, jump to agreement with little bargaining at the very last minute;[25] in other words, there would be a shift between Cross's "unstable" and "stable" conditions, a difference which he does not examine and which his formulations (in their given form) cannot handle (Cross, 54-57).[26] Unfortunately, Swingle's discussion does not solve his own dilemma either, since it focusses largely on the effects on strategy of varying utilities in the matrix of a chicken game, with international examples and cases from the literature used rather anecdotally.

The reality of the Chicken Dilemma is attested to by a number of empirical studies,[27] most notably by the serious attempt of Oran Young to combine supportable propositions with comparative inquiry. Under "Hypothesis 8: Resolve and Prudence," Young suggests: "Conditions of crisis raise incentives both to demonstrate resolve clearly and to react in a prudent fashion to the dangers of destructive outcomes. The resultant cross-pressures tend to produce bargaining patterns among the principals which are unpredictable and subject to erratic oscillations."[28] Toward the end of the chapter, he also mentions in passing a more explicit theorem: "A party that can hold its position successfully un-

[24] Coddington, "A Theory of the Bargaining Process: Comment," and Cross, "Reply," *American Economic Review*, LVI (March 1966), 522-33.

[25] The point is briefly touched on by Swingle, in Swingle, 131f; see also Richard Witkin, "The Straphangers' Cliffhanger," *New York Times*, December 31, 1969.

[26] Cross discusses bluffing as a constant strategy, 166-79, esp. 170, and not as a prelude to agreement.

[27] See Lall (fn. 12), 297, 311; Zartman (fn. 4), 102f, 113f.

[28] Young (fn. 5), 177.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

less the opposing side is willing to assume the responsibility for initiating overt violence tends to have a significant advantage."[29] Finally, the erratic oscillations" are recognized as being "extraordinarily complex,"[30] but are in general a function of "the transition from one phase to another in an unfolding crisis, and changing patterns of perceptual asymmetries between participants with regard to matters of resolve and inhibitory fears."[31] For all the importance of rigorous, controlled inquiry and the use of concepts and propositions in empirical studies, this type of formulation seems to fall between two stools. Young's informed depictions of the crises in Berlin, 1948-49 and 1961, the Taiwan Straits, and Cuba are sound exercises in political history, and his introductory chapters are intelligent conceptual discussions. But the propositions (such as Hypotheses 8 and 16 above, or 15, below) that govern the organization of data in each chapter are not tied together by any theory; even when they are testable, they are not tested by citation of supportive case material. In fact, rather than providing political theory about bargaining, propositions such as "Resolve and Prudence" indicate the imperviousness of important characteristics of negotiation to theorizing.[32]

III

Jan Pen has suggested that, in regard to negotiation, it is not the outcome which is indeterminate but the theory.[33] That is a statement of hope rather than of analysis, a hope that Cross thus far comes closest to fulfilling despite the problems noted. Yet theories can only be determinate (i.e., completely explained) with regard to some specific variables.[34] In the rest of this review, I will suggest that the important variable of power has been systematically neglected in theorizing about negotiation, and that its inclusion would allow explanation of an aspect of negotiation not hitherto covered. Lest hopes spring prematurely, I should add that no power (political) theory of negotiation will

[29] *Ibid.*, 215. On the use of "soft" terms such as "success," see Zartman (fn. 4), 220.
[30] Young (fn. 5), 216.
[31] *Ibid.*, 178. If "oscillations," "phases," and "patterns" are in fact the same thing, then such relationships are tautological.
[32] Bartos tends to agree, in a useful article, "How Predictable are Negotiations?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XI (December 1967), 481-95.
[33] Jan Pen, "A General Theory of Bargaining," *American Economic Review*, XLII (March 1952), 24-42. Unfortunately, Pen's theory, which purports to provide explanation in terms of power and will, is no more determinate and even harder to operationalize than most, as both Cross, 17 and 28, and Coddington, 37-40, have noted.
[34] Cf. Richard Rudner, *Philosophy of Social Science* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1966), 91.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be presented here (for lack of space and a few critical components) but that only some pretheoretical considerations will be sketched.

For the most part, these studies have rejected the concept of power because of its tautological nature. Power determines the ability to win, but the ability to win determines who has (most) power.[35] As Cross points out clearly, "In part, the profusion of conflicting definitions is due to a failure to distinguish clearly enough between a bargaining outcome and the bargaining process. . . . A definition of power, however, cannot contribute anything to an analysis if it is simply taken to be synonymous with or descriptive of the outcome" (p. 17; see also pp. 144-45). The reaction to this realization is dual. Since they cannot handle it, some studies ignore power, leaving an empty space for it, whereas others try to find their explanations in other terms. (Many approaches do both.) Cross's and Coddington's explanations are a conscious attempt to pick up Karl Deutsch's suggestion that decision making could be looked at "somewhat less as a problem of power and somewhat more as a problem of steering."[36] Cross and Coddington introduce self-correcting concession rates as the answer: "each bargainer neglects the fact that changes in his own demand will affect the other bargainer's concession rate" (Coddington, 78); the theory is determinate precisely because there is no choice and "the decision-maker is powerless" (Coddington, 79) before the inexorable conjuncture of concession rates.

Yet even in this approach, there is a vacant chair for the concept of power. Coddington admits that the "theory of the adjustment of expectations will not be seriously pursued in this work" (p. 15), while attention is concentrated on expectations and decision making (adjustment being the linkage point between his two closed loops). Similarly, Nash's assumption of symmetry rules out differences in power and hence the use of power, and the Siegel and Fouraker and Bartos experiments show the effects of power without having any ways of analyzing it.[37] All such studies talk about convergence at a Pareto-optimal point. Yet none has tackled the next, obvious problem: What causes (or how do the parties bring about) such convergence?

[35] Gruder in Swingle, 112, trips on the tautology, as does Lall (fn. 12), 162. See also Coddington, xvi, on "skill" as a similar tautology.

[36] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nerves of Government* (Glencoe, Ill. 1963), ix, cited in Coddington, 542.

[37] Cf. Siegel and Fouraker (fn. 16), 42-70, 90, 93; Bartos, in Swingle, on abstract versus "spoken" experiments, 51, 54.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cross recognizes the problem. He suggests that a "proper definition" of power might be related to cost-imposing ability (akin to Harsanyi's "cost of power"),[38] but rejects it as necessarily too complicated (pp. 17-18, 145-47). Coddington does not even recognize the problem; his further refinements are designed to ensure consistency in the process of adjustment (reaction) rather than to assess influence (action) (pp. 86-91).

The response of the social psychologists in Swingle's symposium is quite the opposite. Power is recognized, typologized, summarized, and left hanging in midair in pieces—a great half-step forward to join several others going in the same direction, for there is little correlation with outcomes, or theorizing about the effects. It is a bit as if the analysts got caught up in the subject of the problem as formulated above and never got to the verb. It is difficult to summarize all the findings, since the chapters are themselves summaries of various experiments, but the component typologies can be noted. Raven and Kruglanski, Gruder, and Tedeschi all write about threats, promises, and persuasion (informational influence, lies and distortions, and warnings and predictions, according to their respective ways of treating persuasion)[39] (pp. 72-73, 76-77, 79-80, 92-94, 98-99, 131-36, 156-59, 161-64); Gruder (pp. 131-32) and Tedeschi (p. 156) both touch on commitment; and Raven and Kruglanski (pp. 74-76, 80-81, 94-99) also treat referent, legitimate, and expert influence. This last article also suggests some of the possible effects of the various sources of power. Yet none of these review chapters seek to pull the taxonomic ends together under a coherent theory to explain negotiation processes and outcomes.

Is there any place, then, to begin looking for a theory that explains how parties to negotiation cause convergence in terms of power? It has been too little noted, in the discussions of power, that the concept itself is (or purports to be) causal and explanatory. Power is the ability of one party to cause another to change its behavior in an intended direction.[40] An explanatory theory of convergence in terms of power is

[38] John C. Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games," in R. Bell, D. Edwards, and R. H. Wagner, eds., *Political Power* (Glencoe, Ill. 1969), 226-38, originally appearing in *Behavioral Science*, VII (January 1962), 67-80.

[39] James T. Tedeschi, in Swingle, 161n, uses the neologism "mendations" for communication of non-volitional future gratifications (the positive correlate of warnings), an unhappy word for a useful concept. I have termed the same thing "predictions," and used "promises" for communications of volitional future gratifications (the positive correlate of threats), in Zartman (fn. 4), 207f.

[40] Robert Dahl, "The Concept of Power," and Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thus merely a theory that explains the causes of convergence in terms of the causes of convergence—a tautology that is more serious and basic than the one noted by Cross. Power is not a thing, not even a thing-symbolizing-a-relationship, like money; it is an area for inquiry but not a concept of inquiry. The problem is therefore to conceptualize this capability (power) in such a way as to overcome the tautology of relational power, which does not separate process from outcome, without retreating into the taxonomic diversity of ingrediental power (the sources, bases, or elements of power).[41] To be fully explanatory, a theory must not merely correlate effects or assert a causative relation, but must tell, in its chosen terms, what it is in one element that causes another.

One way of meeting the problem would be to remain within the concept of utilities and allow power to be expressed as added value (the sources of power to represent additional utilities). Threat and warning then become (negative) values to add to a given position if a party proceeds on its chosen course, whereas promises and predictions become positive additions (inducements).[42] Power then is seen as the value of the deprivation or gratification required to dissuade or persuade a party to move from one position to another. Through this device, much of the reported psychological work on threats and other types of power could be related to outcomes and to game-theoretical analysis (through extended decision-trees or successive matrices), and to economic analysis (through utilities). If negotiation is treated as a self-stabilizing (i.e., outcome-reaching) process of output and feedback, then the abstract evaluation of communications between and within the two parties can be more accurately portrayed through the use of power as an added value. Similarly, the Nash solution could also be treated as an ideal type, achieved and hence explained without any use of power; picking up Cross's suggestion, deviation from this ideal could then be evaluated and understood through the concept of power as added value.

For all the conceptual attractiveness of this notion, the theoretical problems are not solved thereby. The chief remaining catch is that

---

"Decisions and Non-Decisions," in Bell, Edwards and Wagner (fn. 38), 79-93 and 100-109.

[41] See Dahl, *ibid.*, 81, on base; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York 1960), 110-49, on elements. On power as money, see Talcott Parsons "On the Concept of Political Power," in Bell, Edwards, and Wagner (fn. 38), 251-84.

[42] On the positive and negative pairs, see J. David Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (June 1963), 420-30; Baldwin (fn. 19), and "Inter-Nation Influence Revisited," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XV (December 1971), 471-86; Zartman (fn. 4), 206-11 and throughout.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

power, so conceived, is not a constant function. As presently formulated, the concept of power can explain breakdown and agreement only if some acceptance level for each party, or equilibrium point between the parties, is posited or discovered. Viewed as an added value, it can be used to make better (i.e., both more realistic and more abstract) formulations of adjustment and convergence, particularly in the analysis of past cases; but that is not the same thing as a theoretical —as opposed to an analytical—formulation. Admittedly, to understand a past outcome is not to explain a future one (or even postdict a past one), at least in the same step. Yet the processes are related. If political scientists are ever to do more than add to the large number of studies in political history on individual negotiations,[43] and both understand and explain what goes on beyond the unique event (past or present/future), both theory and analysis need to be further developed. Social psychologists and economists are pacing us, but political scientists had better begin to find their stride if they are even going to show.

In the meanwhile, can it be said that a comparative case analyst, such as Young, would be better off in his understanding or explanation if he made use of Cross, Coddington, or Swingle and his co-contributors? Young's study stands out as an important example of a new breed that examines its cases comparatively and on the basis of stated hypotheses. By that very nature, however, the work would be even more useful if it went a step further toward systematic analysis and theory through the use of the type of studies reviewed here. Young's hypotheses are in their preliminary state; they are cumbersome and unrelated to an overarching theoretical framework, and yet they are by no means unamenable to such restructuring. Admittedly, it is difficult to operationalize Cross and Coddington, although Cross does make an occasional effort to illustrate his formulations with references to historical events. It would not, however, be an artificial exercise to examine bargaining during international crises in terms of patterns of concessions or communication and response, as Young comes close to doing under his fifteenth hypothesis on the coercive use of asymmetries.[44] Indeed, such

[43] For some good recent examples, see Sven Allard, *Russia and the Austrian State Treaty* (University Park, Pa. 1970); R. J. Terchek, *The Making of the Test Ban Treaty* (Leiden 1970); Robert Randle, *Geneva 1954* (Princeton 1970); Nicholas Balabkins, *West German Reparations to Israel* (New Brunswick, N.J. 1971). For a collection of case studies in both the description and analysis of negotiations, see Zartman, ed. *The Analysis of Negotiation* (New York 1974).

[44] "As alternatives to actions that might precipitate violence during a crisis, efforts to structure the fundamental dimensions and specific issues of the clash in order to utilize or create advantageous asymmetries are apt to become highly influential coercive procedures" Young (fn. 5), 362. For another discussion of asymmetry in negotiation, see Zartman (fn. 4), 221.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a framework would provide the theoretical coherence and overcome the *ad hoc* or *a priori* nature of unrelated hypotheses, thus giving the analysis some claim to explanatory power. It is also possible to structure an analysis of international negotiations on the power typologies developed in the Swingle symposium, but such elements need to be related to outcomes or some other variables if explanation or even analysis is to be undertaken. Some of the experiments cited in Swingle suggest effects of the use of various types of power, and are thus more helpful for the refinement of choice (strategic) models of bargaining; such findings could usefully be tested against case studies alone or in combination with process (cataclysmic) models. There are some tremendous conceptual and operational problems to be overcome before such analysis can be carried through.[45] All the more reason to try soon.

[45] For an attempt to depict a simple monetary negotiation in rather tight, schematic terms, and the problems and lessons thereby brought to light, see *ibid.*, 67-74.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TRADITION AND POLITICS IN STUDIES OF CONTEMPORARY JAPAN

By JAMES W. WHITE*

Gerald Curtis, *Election Campaigning Japanese Style*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1971, 275 pp., $10.00.

Haruhiro Fukui, *Party in Power: The Japanese Liberal-Democrats and Policy-making*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970, 301 pp., $7.50.

Donald Hellmann, *Japanese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969, 202 pp., $5.00.

Ishida Takeshi, *Nihon no Seiji Bunka* [Japan's Political Culture]. Tokyo, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan-kai, 1970, 228 pp., ¥400.

Nathaniel B. Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969, 349 pp., $10.00.

I. Theoretical Questions

EACH of the books listed above is concerned in some way with problems of tradition and modernity. The extent to which tradition is still an influential force in Japan; the compatibility and/or incompatibility of tradition and modernity; the present functions of tradition in Japanese society, polity, and economy; and the future prospects for tradition in modern Japan—all these are matters of concern to the authors, and together they may inform present intellectual discussions of traditionalism, modernization, and modernity.

No one of these books makes a great theoretical contribution to political science; this characteristic unfortunately puts them in the mainstream of contemporary Japanese studies. The preoccupation with tradition which has characterized Japanese studies has obstructed contribution to theory building in the social sciences. Unique traits of all kinds, especially those rooted in the past, have drawn the attention of scholars to such an extent that only in an area where tradition is universally used as a major explanatory variable—modernization—has the Japanese case been of any great value.[1]

* I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of the members of the Comparative Politics Discussion Group of the University of North Carolina and of the Southeast Region Japan Studies Seminar, especially Professor Douglas Johnson.

[1] See, among others, Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (New York 1964); S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," in Jason Finkle and Richard Gable, eds., *Political Development and Social Change* (New York 1966), 573; Robert Holt and John Turner, *The Political Basis of Economic Development* (Princeton 1966); Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston 1966);

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tradition seems important to these authors in proportion to the distance from which they observe their subject matter—suggesting, hypothetically, that the importance imputed to tradition in explaining any political phenomenon will increase as the focus on the phenomenon proceeds from micro to macro.[2] As a corollary, the importance imputed to tradition in explaining political phenomena in any society will be great to the extent that micro-level studies of political phenomena in that society are lacking. The role of tradition is emphasized most by Ishida. After a marked gap in emphasis on tradition comes Hellmann, followed (more or less as a group) by Fukui, Thayer, and Curtis (who is himself little concerned with tradition, but whose protagonist is very, very concerned).

Concern with tradition is at least partially due to scholarly influences from Japan itself. The Japanese, with a fetish about their own uniqueness, have perpetuated the belief that whatever differentiates them from anyone else derives simply from their being Japanese, rather than from any differences in the timing or (replicable) process of their modernization, from contextual elements (such as insularity) which may be duplicated elsewhere, or from variations in modern universals dictated by the two previous factors. The reasons for the differences in emphasis on tradition and uniqueness among these authors are less clear; perhaps the more specific in focus a study becomes, the less the essentially residual, grab-bag categories such as tradition suffice as explanatory variables. That is, the role of tradition in any one aspect of the political system may be minor (although at the same time greater than may be the case in non-Japanese systems); but as case studies of single aspects are aggregated, one also tries to aggregate causal elements. While variables multiply, one basic set of variables—tradition—remains applicable throughout. Thus, its perceived role becomes relatively larger and larger until, on the macro level, one loses sight of particular, contextually important elements and sees Japan as practically a neotraditionalistic society. In other words, the perceived importance of tradition in explaining political phenomena in Japan is at least in part the result of (a) Japanese convictions of their own uniqueness and (b) the paucity, only now being remedied, of micro studies on Japanese politics.

To evaluate more accurately the role of tradition in Japanese politics

---

Thomas Smith, "Japan's Aristocratic Revolution," *Yale Review*, 1 (Spring 1961), 370; Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton 1964).

[2] "Macro" and "micro" refer, in this essay, to levels of generalization, not to levels of analysis.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and in politics in general, two initial areas of study may be suggested. First, cross-nationally competent observers are needed who can do for the principal assumptions about the uniqueness of Japanese tradition and modernization what Alfred Diamant did for the characteristics of Lucian Pye's "non-Western political process."[3] Such work is beginning to appear,[4] but it is still rare. Second, an effort must be made to get away from using tradition as an undifferentiated residual category or a series of unquantified generalizations. Ideally, what is to be sought is a set of operational measures of various forms of traditionalism which can be analyzed to show what proportion of political behavior is in fact explained by tradition as opposed to other factors. I suggest that, if such analysis were possible, the proportion of political behavior explained by traditional factors would be small in any single micro study but relatively great in macro-level studies.

But first, the definition of "tradition" poses problems. In many discussions it is the opposite of "modern"; traditional behavior is that which approaches the "non-modern" pole of the patterned variables of Parsons and Levy[5]—ascriptively and particularistically oriented, and so forth. On the other hand, tradition can also be defined simply as "norms, values, and patterns of behavior . . . that have remained unchanged for long historical periods."[6]

In this essay I will be, as are the authors of the works under review, more concerned with traditional behavior than with traditional institutions; moreover, I will use tradition—again, as they do—to denote long-standing behavior patterns which are not necessarily non-modern (in the sense of fitting the first, Parsonian definition of tradition offered above).[7] In the use of this focus and this definition of tradition, the problem arises as to the relationship between (analytical) non-modernity and chronological tradition. Can traditional behavior be modern, or is tradition necessarily non-modern? Outside the West, is that which is non-traditional and/or modern necessarily Western, or is there some

[3] Alfred Diamant, "Is There a Non-Western Political Process?" *Journal of Politics*, XXI (February 1959), 123; Lucian Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process," *Journal of Politics*, XX (August 1958), 468.

[4] See, for instance, Bernard Silberman, "Ringisei: Bureaucratization or Cultural Norms?" unpub. (Duke University 1972).

[5] Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory* (Glencoe, Ill. 1949); Marion J. Levy, Jr., *Modernization and the Structure of Societies* (Princeton 1966), 135-74.

[6] Silberman (fn. 4), 6.

[7] It has been suggested that, since I am using "traditional" in a purely chronological sense, I should discard the term and posit two behavioral dimensions, a chronological continuum (from "old" to "new") and an analytical one (from "non-modern" to "modern"). I do use the latter; for the former, however, I personally prefer the poles "traditional" and "non-traditional."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

core of universals in modernity such that a nation may modernize without going through any stage of Westernization? Finally, what differences might there be between the process of modernization and the state of modernity?

Early discussions of modernity tended to set up mutually exclusive before-and-after models of traditional and modern attributes, and to ascribe modernity to a society to the degree that it possessed the latter.[8] Moreover, these attributes were assumed to cluster, to constitute a modern syndrome such that, as parts of a system modernized, all other parts of that system would tend to modernize also; given the incompatibility of tradition and modernity, as the modern syndrome spread, traditional elements would of necessity fade from view.[9]

Of late, the above conception has come to appear increasingly unrealistic. Such "fallacies" as the dichotomy of tradition and modernity, the necessary displacement of the traditional and/or non-modern by the modern, and the mutual exclusiveness of (and therefore necessary conflict between) the traditional and the modern have been exposed by empirical research;[10] traditional-modern continua and mixtures have gained currency. It has become clear that traditional and/or non-modern behavioral elements can coexist, fuse, mutually adapt, and even mutually reinforce one another: as tradition can be utilized in the process of modernization, so can modernisms reinvigorate traditional elements.[11]

If in fact single societies can contain major modern and non-modern elements simultaneously without instability, then why has this reality been relatively neglected? I would suggest that much of the reason is to be found in the grounding of comparative political theory in the Western experience. First efforts to study modernization drew upon the example of Western Europe, where modernization was a relatively endogenous process. In all other societies, however, it is primarily an exogenous process: "following the breakthrough in England and France, every subsequent process of modernization has combined intrinsic changes with responses to extrinsic stimuli."[12] I would assert hypothetically that in countries which modernize in response to extrinsic stimuli, one can expect greater survival of the non-modern in the face of the modern than is the case in the endogenous modernizers.

[8] Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, IX (April 1967), 309.
[9] Samuel Huntington, "The Change to Change," *Comparative Politics*, III (April 1971), 288.
[10] Joseph Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity," in Finkle and Gable (fn. 1), 16.
[11] *Ibid.*, 16; Huntington (fn. 9), 295-96. [12] Bendix (fn. 8), 326.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Endogenous modernization is, *ipso facto*, intrinsic change. It tends to be the result of intrinsic changes in most, if not all, of the elements usually aggregated under the rubric of tradition. Exogenous modernization, on the other hand, involves to some extent (to begin with, at least) compartmentalized superimposition of new behavior patterns on traditional ones, or supplantation of traditional patterns by modern ones. Marion Levy's assertions about the "solvent" effects of modern patterns[13] notwithstanding, one can therefore expect more replacement or modification of the traditional by the modern in endogenous than in exogenous modernizers. Insofar as the earlier systemic assumption about modernization was correct, it seems fair to suggest that the assumption would hold true more often in societies which modernize endogenously than in other societies. Thus the common underestimation of the ability of traditional and non-modern elements to resist, survive alongside, and adapt to modernization is at least in part the result of the history of modernization and the study thereof: the first modernizers (who provided the examples for early theorizing) were the endogenous modernizers.

A similar handicap has characterized discussion of the relationship between modernization and Westernization. In many cases the assumption is made that, in the developing areas, that which is modern is also Western, and vice versa. All that is to be found in non-Western societies is supposedly either non-Western and non-modern, or Western and modern.[14] I would assert that in many respects Japan is non-Western and modern, and has been for some time. In the mid-nineteenth century most of what was modern in Japan *was* Western, although there was nothing intrinsically modern about some of the Westernisms imported, such as eating beef. Gradually, however, it dawned upon the Japanese that some of the West's offerings were not geographical localisms but universals of modernism—economic rationalism, principles of science and technology, and many criteria of interpersonal relationships which were in many instances not greatly unlike those of traditional Japan.[15]

The relationship between modernization and modernity is fruitfully studied in the Japanese case. Notwithstanding, again, the solvent effects imputed to modernization by Marion Levy, some attributes of modernization "have appeared, or have been adopted in isolation from

[13] Levy (fn. 5), 14, 128. [14] Huntington (fn. 9), 293-95.
[15] Hideo Kishimoto, "Modernization versus Westernization in the East," *Cahiers d'Histoire Mondiale*, VII (1963), 871-72. For one such instance, see Robert Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion* (Glencoe, Ill. 1957).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the other attributes of a modern society. Hence, modernization in some sphere of life may occur without resulting in 'modernity,' "[16] that is, in the modernization of the society as a whole. One may assume, as was the case with tradition and modernity, a gap between modernization and modernity; further, one may hypothesize that the probability that (societal) modernity will accompany (partial) modernization will vary inversely with the degree of exogenousness of the process of modernization.

Having indicated some of the areas of theoretical difficulty in the analysis of tradition, modernization, and modernity, I would categorize the authors under consideration here in terms of their views of the utility of these concepts in the explanation of contemporary Japanese behavior (see Figure 1). Curtis regards Japanese tradition as a non-modern phenomenon that plays a large part in contemporary Japan. Other authors also see tradition as important, but consider it to be, if not modern, at least highly contributory or otherwise adaptable to a predominantly modern context.[17] Ishida and Hellmann also see the "traditional" elements of Japanese politics as being peculiarly Japanese, but having both non-modern and modern functions.

Thayer, Fukui, and (to a lesser extent) Curtis deal with many of the same Japanese phenomena and see them as non-modern, but assert that they are often of relatively recent development and are not traditional elements. Such authors as Herman Kahn and Zbigniew Brzezinski go further, placing great emphasis on that which is Japanese in creation and design, but also unquestionably modern and not part of traditional Japan.[18] In this last—perhaps most difficult to envision—category, I would offer such examples as, in its day, the Meiji political system (a masterpiece of creative innovation, despite the foreign origins of many of its components), and the present-day shipbuilding industry, plus such relative trivia as the automatic electric rice-cooker and add-water-and-eat freeze-dried noodles.

The emptiness of most of the cells on the right-hand side of Figure 1

[16] Bendix (fn. 8), 329.

[17] Into this category would go all of the literature of "prerequisites of modernization" produced by those who see the roots of modern Japan in the Tokugawa period, such as the contributors to John Hall and Marius Jansen, *Studies in the Institutional History of Early Modern Japan* (Princeton 1968).

[18] Herman Kahn, *The Emerging Japanese Superstate* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1971); Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and Change in Japan* (New York 1972).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 1

ORIGINS OF CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE SOCIOPOLITICAL STRUCTURES AS SEEN BY VARIOUS OBSERVERS

JAPANESE (NON-WESTERN)				NON-JAPANESE (WESTERN)			
Traditional		Non-Traditional		Traditional		Non-Traditional	
Non-Modern	Modern	Non-Modern	Modern	Non-Modern	Modern	Non-Modern	Modern
Curtis (Halloran)	(Pre-requisite litera-ture)	Thayer Fukui Curtis	(Brzezin-ski) (Kahn)				(Halloran)
Ishida, Hellmann							

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

indicates the Japanese aversion to borrowing—or at least to keeping—elements already outdated elsewhere. The traditional and non-modern West has generally little appeal for the Japanese. Much of the modern West, however, has been imported. Such observers as Richard Halloran imply that everything truly modern in Japan is non-Japanese;[19] here the dichotomy between the non-modern, traditional Japanese elements and the modern, non-traditional Western elements is clear.

II. The Nature and Status of Japanese Tradition

A. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADITION

General. The perceived relevance of Japanese tradition, and the aspects of that tradition which concern them, differentiate the authors considered here. They also differ in their views of the status of tradition: is it still supreme, or is it being supplemented by new phenomena? Or, as early theorists of modernization assumed, is it being supplanted by the new? Assuming the presence of both traditional and non-traditional elements, is the relationship between the two compatible or conflictual? (In fairness, one must recognize that none of the authors take an all-or-nothing position; the emphases which I impute to them are only relative.)

Richard Halloran sees tradition as a blanket: that which is important in contemporary Japan is traditional, and vice versa. The Japanese, he says, "have taken *forms* from the West and molded them around the *substance* of Japan."[20] Ishida also interprets Japanese political culture in terms of tradition, but focuses on two aspects of that tradition—competition and conformity—in doing so.

On the case-study level, Hellmann emphasizes the role of tradition in decision making in general and intraparty factionalism in particular; Gerald Curtis sees tradition as operating, with almost equal importance, in voting behavior and electoral campaigning. Thayer and Fukui, dealing with what is supposedly the most traditional of Japan's parties, consider tradition as being of little help in analyzing that party, despite their attention to campaigning, factionalism, decision making, and other phenomena also dealt with by the other authors.

The particular aspects of Japanese society and culture that are perceived as both traditional and relevant to explanations of contemporary Japanese politics vary with each author. Halloran asserts overall importance; Kahn and Brzezinski are more specific, but so encyclopedic

[19] Richard Halloran, *Japan: Images and Realities* (New York 1969).
[20] *Ibid.*, xviii; emphasis in original.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as to make it unclear which elements are most worthy of attention. At the other extreme among the emphasizers of tradition one finds Ishida Takeshi, whose conceptualization is both systematic and parsimonious. The two most powerful politically explanatory elements in Japanese tradition, he asserts, are *conformity* and *competition*;[21] the relationship between them is to him the most useful organizing concept for a discussion of Japanese political culture. He sees the roots of this combination in the Japanese myths of creation (p. 51), and more immediately, in the sharp in-group/out-group distinctions that characterized traditional Japanese village life, where intense cooperation, collective action, conformity, and social pressure within the village combined with exclusivistic, at times hostile attitudes toward those from other communities (pp. 20, 67-69).

Today Ishida sees this combination throughout Japanese society. In small groups it leads to openness and familiarity with other "ins" and distance, guardedness, and circumlocution with outsiders (pp. 90-93). The two characteristics are linked, in that a sense of competition with or threat from other groups intensifies conformity within a group, and this conformist ideal in turn intensifies the competitive feelings of group members. The relationship is visible on all levels of society: the family, the workplace, and—most visible of all—the nation (p. 20). Nationalism in Japan during the last century has exemplified the mutual reinforcement of domestic conformity and international competitiveness and anxiety, culminating in the 1930's in a vortex of "competitive loyalism":[22] in-group conformism among the people led to a race to see who could conform most vehemently with group (that is, national) norms and actions, and to fierce attacks upon those who did not demonstrate a sufficient degree of nationalistic fervor (pp. 23-25).

Even though it has undergone marked change, tradition remains strong, according to Ishida. The form of competition and conformity has changed drastically in postwar Japan, but to Ishida they have remained their traditional selves. First, the loci of competition have changed (pp. 121-23); as the salience of national symbols receded, the systemic level of competition dropped and the scope of competition contracted horizontally until the primary loyalties came to be focused on one's family and work group. The basis of competition in Japan today is the drive to enter a "good" university and thus, later, to win

[21] *Docho* and *kyoso* in Japanese.

[22] *Chusei kyoso* in Japanese. Another equivalent is "more royalist than the king"; in its nationalistic manifestation the best rendering possible (if I may be permitted a neologism) is *chauv'-qui-peut.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

entry into a "good" company, the better to create a "good" situation for one's family.[23] When, however, external threats confront the family or firm as a whole, its parts draw together to meet the common enemy and intramural (literally, given the strength with which in- and out-group feelings are held) competition is subordinated except insofar as competitive loyalism to group values appears. Thus a threat to the textile industry as a whole, for example, submerges competition between its component firms; if the threat is to business as a whole, textile and other industries can be expected to band together; when a threat to the nation appears, practically all components of Japanese society are likely to draw together into a front united against the outsiders.

Second, conformism remains extreme. Carrying over from the "traditional conformity of the village," it is now tied in with the new pattern of competition (pp. 137-38). The only way up in Japanese society is through the educational system; the intense competition for success intensifies conformity to the norms which govern this mobility structure, and creates a "competitive loyalism" comparable to that of prewar Japan.

Third, the form of conformity has changed in that new norms have emerged (pp. 45-46, 95). Urbanization and physical mobility have reduced the degree of conformity to neighborhood and immediate social group norms and have increased dependence upon largely media-established consumerist norms. The mass media have heightened the awareness of Japanese homogeneity, thus encouraging the conformist impulse, and have presented to (if not foisted upon) the public the now-established consumer goal of the "three C's": car, air conditioner, and color TV.

The competition/conformity model of Japanese political culture is helpful in explaining the sources and reality of, and links between, the nationalism demonstrated before World War II and the Japanese business rat race today. In addition, it helps to clarify the noted proclivities of the Japanese for innovating and for borrowing new things. In that there is a strong tendency to conform to whatever is being done by "everybody" and a strong fear of being "out of date" in the sense of being out of step, there is in Japanese tradition an element of anti-traditionalism (pp. 4ff.). Finally, the model clears up the paradox of the intense dislike among Japanese of competition and their simultaneous vigorous indulgence therein.

[23] A "good" family is one which can provide the best possible education for its children and, for itself, a one-family house and all the "right" consumer goods.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In these instances the role of tradition is as an unconscious, objective force determining Japanese behavior; it also is quite often an explicit, subjective concern. Sato Bunsei, the chief character in Curtis's book, is affected by traditionalism in both ways. He is deeply concerned about "the glory of Japan's history and tradition, a history of Japanese uniqueness" (p. 172), which he considers to be in jeopardy. Moreover, although the degree to which traditionalistic variables explain major contemporary electoral trends is debatable,[24] Sato's campaign was predicated upon the assumption of a "highly integrative, cohesive, and hierarchical" village social structure (chap. 2). He had doubts that the old assumptions still held, but strategically he stuck to them. By winning, he vindicated his faith. One possible result of such events is self-fulfilling traditionalism in voting behavior. If politicians see all votes besides the "hard votes" which they themselves command as the hard votes of other politicians and thus not worth working for (Curtis, 60), few incentives exist to change either mass political orientations or elite political appeals; the traditionalism which candidates see in the voters will entrap the voters in traditionalistic electoral strategies.

Specific. Less concerned with general explanations of behavior, the other authors have focused primarily on aspects of Japanese tradition that are germane to their political concerns. I have selected four aspects which are dealt with by all or nearly all of them (and by Curtis and Ishida as well), and which may therefore be considered the most (though not the only) politically relevant aspects of Japanese tradition as seen by these authors. The four are familism, factionalism, hierarchy, and decisional style. They are interactive; each is part and parcel of the other: one can examine hierarchy, factionalism, and decisional style as elements of familism; or hierarchy in decision making, factions, and families; and so forth. Causation among these factors is unclear, but all four are seen today as being mutually reinforcing.

The patriarchal, affective, diffuse structure of the Japanese family has been re-created on all levels of Japanese society, as the common *oyabun-kobun* (parent-child) ritual kinship term denotes. Gerald Curtis finds *oyabun-kobun* relationships in several types of local political organizations (p. 46), and familistic concerns in candidate-voter relationships and in popular perceptions of motives for voting behavior (pp. 41-45, 104-05). Ishida finds similar characteristics in large organizations, which

[24] See, for instance, Scott Flanagan, "The Japanese Party System in Transition," *Comparative Politics*, III (January 1971), 231.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are seen not as creations of human will but as natural, organic entities, and—like the family and the village—as totally inclusive of all persons sharing certain characteristics of background or location (pp. 143ff., 198-202).

Such organizations have two important characteristics: within, they are characterized by "carte-blanche leadership"[25] in which the rank and file identify with and rely wholly on the diffuse good intentions and competence of a quasi-parental leader and pay little attention to intra-organizational decision making. When confronting the outside world, their inclination is to "drape father with the flag";[26] that is, to treat the leader as the embodiment of all the highest values in society. This requires that the leaders try to improve their competitive position vis-à-vis other organizations and facilitate the conformist drive of their followers by co-opting or pre-empting (and if possible monopolizing) the dominant authoritative values of society.[27]

The role of familism on the national level is debatable. Before the war an express effort was made to portray the nation as one big family of subjects under the paternal Emperor. Some observers assert that this is still the case;[28] I find this opinion to be an exaggeration of the prevalence of traditional values. Nevertheless, it is not an unusual view; in its extranational manifestation, familism among the Japanese does exist in the form of an acute awareness of ethnic identity. In addition, the imperviousness of Japan's physical insularity to modernization suggests that no degree of modernity will wholly eliminate this element of Japanese tradition.

Accustomed to tight social collectivities in terms of which goals are achieved and within which human needs are satisfied, Japanese people who were torn from the village during Japan's process of modernization and urbanization tried to create surrogates: "psuedo-villages" in the city[29] and factions within large, impersonal organizations (Ishida, 75). Ishida defines Japanese factions as "private, informal groups established within public, formal groups, possessing a closed conformist quality; they assist the exclusivistic pursuit by faction members of particularistic gain within the formal group. These groups are established with indi-

[25] *Hakushi inin-kei shido.* For a treatment in English, see Robert Ward, ed., *Political Development in Modern Japan* (Princeton 1968), 314 n. 11.

[26] A poor translation of *oyakata hi-no-maru.*

[27] That is, by mobilizing society's dominant biases. See E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York 1960), chap. 2.

[28] Halloran (fn. 19), chap. 4.

[29] For a discussion of this phenomenon see Kamishima Jiro, *Kindai Nihon no Seishin Kozo* [The Spiritual Structure of Modern Japan] (Tokyo 1961).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vidual relationships as their core and consist of the reciprocal relation between patriarchal protection and patronage by the leader and the dependence of the rank and file" (p. 76).

Donald Hellmann considers factions to be the basic units of Japanese politics, and sees their origin "in the traditional pattern of Japanese social relations" (pp. 14-15). He (and observers of Japanese politics in general) acknowledges the dominant role of the factions in the LDP, noting (pp. 18-19) how decision making within the party and in the political system as a whole is sometimes dominated by factional squabbles, how the structure of the LDP—a coalition of competing factions—limits and sometimes paralyzes the ability of any one person to exercise decisive leadership, and how the formal, bureaucratic organs of the LDP are manipulated by factional leaders and are unable to control the situation (pp. 66-67). The role of factions is beyond debate; what is questionable is the degree to which they do in fact represent traditional cultural forces.

The factions and the family, as well as Japanese political culture as a whole, share the characteristic element of hierarchy. Since this element has been sufficiently discussed elsewhere,[30] I will simply note its pervasiveness and its dual—domestic and international—manifestations. With regard to the solidification of Japan's new democratic political structure, hierarchical orientations in the elite subculture discourage both accommodation to opposition and attention to public opinion; leaders seem in fact to "react only to the most extreme expressions of public opinion" (Hellmann, 13). Externally, the international system is also viewed as being hierarchical; in some fashion—political, technological, economic, cultural, or military—the Japanese will seek to attain whatever they perceive to be their proper station therein.

Equally assured, in the opinion of some, is the persistence of the traditionally determined Japanese form of decision making, which can be summed up in a single word: consensus. In contrast to the American ideal of decision by confrontation-majority, the Japanese prefer extended palaver leading to unanimity.[31] This concern with consensus operates horizontally, as in the case of a meeting of equals or in the

[30] Among others, by Edwin Reischauer, *The United States and Japan* (New York 1962), chap. 8; Frank Langdon, *Politics in Japan* (Boston 1967), chap. 3; Nobutaka Ike, *Japanese Politics* (New York 1972), chap. 2; Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Tokyo 1954), *passim*, esp. chap. 3.

[31] Here, too, Japanese uniqueness may be questioned, since in the world as a whole consensual decision making is probably prevalent in more societies than is majoritarian.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

establishment of a national consensus. It also operates vertically, within the sectors, groups, and organizations which constitute Japanese society. In the latter form it does not contradict hierarchical principles: in the same fashion in which a good father listens to his children and a faction leader must be mindful of the needs of his followers and clients, all roles in the hierarchical Japanese tradition are reciprocal. Not symmetrical, not egalitarian, but reciprocal.

Consensual norms and conformist pressures create a decisional context in which not only confrontation but candor of any kind is assiduously avoided; the result is a nebulous "non-decisional"[32] situation, either wilderness or Wonderland to the outside observer.

Hellmann dwells at length upon such decisional structures, emphasizing the role of factions, of patron-client relations, of surviving Confucian values, of consensual authority, and of personality over institution (p. 69). He asserts, moreover, that the decisional process he examines is not new but rather a "modernized-traditional political phenomenon" with "direct links with the past" (p. 156).

In certain ways, then, it is clear that tradition, and even retraditionalization, is the concern of many Japanese. Some have a conscious concern; Curtis' subject, Sato Bunsei, is one. Even more important, perhaps, is what many observers see as a glacial, crescive trend toward "at least a partial return to prewar values" throughout society.[33] Such statements are well justified, but one must take care to distinguish retraditionalization from atavism, recidivism, or breakdowns of modernization. The Japanese people have long been acutely conscious nationally, and the dominant form this consciousness has taken for the last several centuries (i.e., the "traditional" form) has been one of pride and, politically, what one usually thinks of as nationalism. Since World War II, Japanese confidence, pride, and self-assertiveness have suffered; the fact that they are coming back to a more typical position represents an impulse toward cultural integrity, not a purposive return to tradition *per se* or a disenchantment with modernity.

B. SUPERSESSION AND IRRELEVANCE

None of the authors deny the supplementation of traditionalism in Japan by at least some modernisms; they differ only on the balance between, and the compatibility of the two, and present trends. Hell-

[32] For a discussion of this concept, see the extensive writings of Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz; e.g., "Decisions and Non-Decisions," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (September 1963), 632.

[33] Kahn (fn. 18), 9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mann (p. 70) and Ishida (p. 88) perceive factionalism as the working out of traditional impulses and see little prospect for its demise: if factions are simply the Japanese manifestation of the small-group phenomenon present in large organizations everywhere, and if such organizations are likely to persist in Japan, then what reason is there to predict the disappearance of factions?

In some cases supplementation takes the form of coexistence: traditional and non-traditional behavior may be compartmentalized. Sato's campaign demonstrates this phenomenon: in one city he had no electoral organization at all, but relied wholly upon a single supporter who was able to predict and deliver a precise number of votes through his manipulation of relationships (p. 67); in another village Sato benefitted from a revulsion against local bosses (pp. 78-79). The support of Sato by local notables throughout his district was completely independent of politics or of Sato himself: these men backed him as a favor to a friend. At the grassroots level, on the other hand, most of the actual campaigners appear to have been first-time activists to whom Sato seemed attractive as a candidate (p. 84).

In other instances fusion seems to be the case. Frank Langdon and Zbigniew Brzezinski view an integration either as a "peculiar combination of an essentially feudal structure with early industrial values" or as the "colonization" of Western institutions by traditionalistic behavior.[34] They differ on the consequences of the blend. Langdon sees tradition as stably dominant; Brzezinski wonders, "Is the fusion of the traditional and modern elements stable . . . or is it merely a transitional phase, leading eventually to more open tension between the two?"[35]

In contrast, some sections of the books under review emphasize the degree to which traditional Japanese behavior appears to be declining in political importance. Three areas in which this change may be taking place are factional and party politics, electoral politics, and labor-management relations.

Nathaniel Thayer tentatively foresees a transition within the LDP: he sees the party as "an amalgam of personal power lodged in the factions and institutional power lodged in the party organs" in which the balance of power is swinging toward the party—though in "halting and barely perceptible" fashion (p. 14). He considers the factions to be unable to generate popular political enthusiasm, instill confidence in the powerful business community, or provide political stability, and notes a number of structural changes in the party which cut away at

[34] Brzezinski (fn. 18), 3; Langdon (fn. 30), 97.
[35] Brzezinski (fn. 18), 5.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the fiscal autonomy of the factions and their power in regard to the processes of candidate selection and intraparty and intragovernment mobility (pp. 306-09, 311-14).

Fukui similarly sees non-traditional (in this case modern) changes: "the facade of unity and harmony afforded by the emotional and irrational elements of factionalism will be replaced by much more harsh and direct, though no doubt rational, confrontation of ideological principles and political commitments" (pp. 141-42). The problem here is that the Japanese have developed rather effective mechanisms for the reduction of conflict in a factional context, which rely on the "emotional and irrational" aspects of conflict.

A transition is apparent also in the electoral field. In Japan one can at present see campaign structures and strategies typical of premodern villages and of postindustrial cities, but to Gerald Curtis (pp. 128-37) and Nathaniel Thayer (pp. 309-10) this coexistence seems to be a transitional stage between the former and the latter. Before World War II, cohesion and hierarchy in the villages made electoral mobilization possible through local notables whose influence over family units was such as to render direct contact of a candidate with the electorate unnecessary. Postwar land reforms, the legal disestablishment of the family, and rapid urbanization have broken down this condition; the response has been the *koenkai*, a candidate's personal support group, "a mass-membership organization with the function of organizing large numbers of the general electorate on behalf of [the] candidate" (Curtis, 128). Their function resembles that of the old American urban political machine (p. 145) far more than anything in the Japanese tradition. Local leaders are incorporated into the *koenkai*, but they no longer stand between the candidate and the voters (pp. 130-31). And even the *koenkai*, like the American machine, seem to be giving way to newer voter mobilization techniques in the urban centers: the utilization of mass media, personal appearances, and computerized public relations are nothing rare in Tokyo today (p. 137).

Curtis's candidate, Sato Bunsei, relied to a great degree on traditionalistic methods, but was not irrevocably locked into them; where pre-existing voluntary associations could be found, he was willing to exploit them (pp. 180-81). He saw the attenuation of local and communal ties and the growth of instrumental ones which operated through occupational associations, for instance, but it was not yet the dominant trend in his largely rural district. As a national pattern, however (pp. 137, 145, 251-52) Curtis offers the model of a historical (and, at any given time, rural-urban) continuum running from complete reliance

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on local community notables, through the emergence of *koenkai* and the enlistment of voluntary organizations, to the maximization of direct contact with the people both personally and through the media. As personalistic relationships become impersonal, affective relationships become instrumental, and primordial and communal relationships become associational, Curtis sees Japanese campaign strategies as converging with those of the West—becoming more modern, though not necessarily more Western.

A final area in which tradition may be of diminishing importance is that of economic behavior, specifically labor-management relations. I will deal later with recent events which have hypothetical political parallels.

The phenomenon in question is what I call "hothouse traditionalism." In Japan, labor unions are organized on a company basis and federated into national organizations; labor relations on the union level are often characterized by familistic collusion between leadership and management (for the purpose of overall company benefit), and on the national level by a concern for ideological, political issues to which the bread-and-butter concerns of employees are often subordinated. Under conditions of rapid economic growth, when wages can be raised sharply each year without diminishing a company's fortunes, the inherent conflict between labor and management can be submerged in a traditionalistic blend of company paternalism, non-conflictual bargaining, and consensual decision making on wages and working conditions.

Under recession conditions, however, such as characterized the Japanese economy in the early 1970's, the interests of company and labor have diverged; workers' demands for raises in a context of falling profits have met resistance, and measures by management—rationalization of organization, low bonuses, and increased rents in company housing—have encountered equal resistance. Workers' demands have become less rhetorical, and meaningful strikes and slowdowns (as opposed to the usually ritual, short prebargaining stoppages) have occurred; in the words of one newspaper, "the long 'honeymoon' . . . looks as if it's over."[36] In such a situation, union leaders who continue to collaborate with management face unprecedented threats to their incumbence.

The implication of these events is that the reputed eufunctionalism of tradition for the Japanese economy may depend upon low-stress

[36] *Asahi Shimbun* [Asahi News] (March 18, 1972).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

environmental conditions. As long as the economy is growing rapidly and society is stable, traditional elements can survive and even, by contributing continuity in a situation of rapid change, be eufunctional for further growth. But when exogenous factors increase tension, or when the economic bubble bursts, the potential dysfunctionalism of tradition for social stability is realized; the conditions under which the new smoothly supplements tradition give way to conflict between the two.

The emergence of such conflict may depend upon endogenous factors: social modernization before World War II eventually came to contradict a largely traditionalistic political ethic, creating strains that were solved by a reactionary elite response. It may also depend on exogenous factors: witness the role of the Great Depression in influencing prewar Japanese economy and society, and the role of the United States' freeze and subsequent devaluation of the dollar in prolonging the recent Japanese recession.

But threat or benefice aside, the overall role of tradition may well be subject to gradual change in relation to the newness of Japan's present sociopolitical framework. Donald Hellmann attributes the tradition-dominated, "unregulated pattern of decision-making" in foreign policy largely to the low level of institutionalization of postwar political roles and the continuing gap between the postwar constitution and Japanese cultural reality (p. 155). Sidney Verba has hypothesized that personality and other non-rational factors play a role in organizational and decisional behavior to the extent that conditions are unstructured.[37] I would suggest that lack of structure (that is, non-congruence) in political institutions and political culture similarly allows extraordinary room for the exercise of traditional factors.[38] In unstructured or internally contradictory situations one finds norms where one can; personality and precedent (especially deeply rooted cultural precedent) seem likely sources. In the absence of conflict, time will bring the institutionalization and at least accommodation, if not congruence, of political structure and political culture. Hypothetically, then, the political influence of traditional factors will, *ceteris paribus*, vary inversely with (a) the level of institutionalization of a political system and (b) with the degree of congruence between the political structure and political culture of a political system, where modernity is more a feature of the structure than of the culture.

[37] Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., *The International System* (Princeton 1961), 93.

[38] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston 1965), chap. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We may thus expect that in the future the role of tradition in determining Japanese political behavior will decline or, if there is cultural resistance to such a decline, that the relationship between traditional and non-traditional elements will become more conflictual than it is at present. The books under review show differences in perception of this future relationship. The macro-level studies tend to see tradition as supreme or supplemented, while the micro-level studies tend to emphasize supplementation or supplantation; micro-level observation tends to bring out more conflict between the two than does macro-level. Once more, it is possible that the scholarly macro-to-micro sequence in studies of non-Western societies has influenced our understanding of those societies.

C. NEITHER TRADITIONAL NOR JAPANESE?

To other observers, tradition is a non-essential variable, either because the behavior under analysis is in fact new, or because it is not uniquely Japanese. Haruhiro Fukui analyzes the ruling LDP with hardly any reliance at all upon such concepts as "tradition." His analytical foci are party membership, party organization, intraparty groups, and connections with extraparty groups (p. 9); he offers an exhaustive treatment of the LDP with little more than passing notice of traditional factors.

One of these foci, intraparty groups, is none other than our supposed paragon of tradition, the factions. Other writers hint at the less-than-unique nature of Japanese factionalism; Ishida suggests (p. 88) that factions be seen "not as an anachronistic legacy of the past," but rather as "a Japanese manifestation of the informal groups one finds in formal groups" everywhere. Fukui (pp. 128-33) and Thayer (pp. 10, 17, 20, 21-42) are also doubtful; they find the primary causes of today's party factions in the postwar electoral system, the party system of presidential election, the need for political funds, the competition for party and government posts, and psychological reasons (not all of which are traditional).

Intraparty factions did exist before the war, but they were "an *addendum* to the political process . . . . 'they were not too important. Nobody felt obliged to belong to them.' " Today, however, they "are *integral* to the political process" (Thayer, 20). In between came defeat and occupation: "disagreement over leadership, many new politicians, an expanded electorate, no established source of political funds, no organization in the countryside—these were not the conditions conducive to the growth of party institutions" (Thayer, 10). The result: cliques

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which clustered about those leaders who did have access to funds, political experience, and ambition, and which "evolved essentially as devices by means of which a member of the party in the Diet hoped to acquire either a government post, a party post, political funds, or all of these. In other words, a Diet member's desire for office and money was responsible" (Fukui, 128).

Traditional precedents did exist, and traditional mental sets played a role as well. But our previous conception of factions as the sole product of culture and history undoubtedly needs revision. Moreover, "Japanese tradition" must be scrutinized in order to determine if all of it is in fact uniquely Japanese. In some instances, what appears to be part of the cultural tradition may derive from physical circumstances; in others, it may derive from the nature of the Japanese modernization process; in still others, tradition may indeed be at work, but not in uniquely Japanese fashion. For example, Ishida offers a picture of a tradition so flexible, pervasive, and voracious that it not only survives modernity and newness but even feeds upon them, so much so that one may ask if this is tradition at all. In the case of the present scope and level of competition, traditional factors as earlier discussed by Ishida do indeed seem to be crucial. However, with regard to the new consumerist conformity, is it not possible that a conformist, "tradition-directed" society has been replaced by an "other-directed" society which, because it is equally conformist, has deceived people into thinking that *both* are really traditional?[39]

Similarly, may it not be that population pressure has contributed mightily to maintaining scholastic competition and the resultant conformism to norms in education and mobility? Much of Japanese behavior may have developed as a coping mechanism in a context of dense overcrowding. The assiduous avoidance of open conflict—or openness of most kinds—and the amazing Japanese quality of psychological self-isolation in crowded places may be the result of the traditionalistic interaction of conformity and competition of which Ishida speaks, but they may also be the only alternatives to civil war or madness in an environment as closely packed as Japan's. But are these elements of Japanese culture in fact something to which the Japanese alone can lay claim? The ability of urban Americans to survive and to thrive in conditions equally inhuman (but for other reasons) suggests that they are not.

Japanese modernization, like the Japanese environment, may have a causal significance that is often masked by sweeping traditionalist

[39] David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven 1961).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

arguments. Recent work by Bernard Silberman[40] deals with the assumption that the survival of traditional forms signifies the survival of traditional functions, or the survival of anachronistic structures. Two examples of his argument concern the persistence of *han* (feudal domain) identity well into the Meiji era, and the contemporary prevalence of an institutionalized form of consensual decision making, the *ringi-sei*.[41]

Silberman attributes the persistence of *han* identity not to localism and parochialism (i.e., tradition), but to the uncertainty surrounding bureaucratic and governmental roles—especially the criteria for recruitment and promotion—in the early Meiji period. Some criteria were needed, and (a) an individual's role in the Meiji restoration itself, (b) the possession of a background of Western education, and (c) *han* origin were the best the leadership could find. With time, more (bureaucratically) rational criteria were developed and *han* identity, without support from culture or tradition, disappeared. One might recall Thayer's discussion of the ambiguities of the early postwar situation and their relation to the development of factions within the parties.

Silberman sees the *ringi* system less as a mechanism for engineering consensus than, again, as a structural response to a given problem at a given stage of modernization. He finds no such system in pre-Meiji Japan or thereafter, until the appearance of large, complex organizations. Such organizations evolved before bureaucratization took place, and the *ringi* system was devised as a substitute for rules for the operationalization of policy. Unlike *han* identity, the *ringi-sei* survives today. Silberman attributes this survival (not completely convincingly) not to the superior staying power of some supportive tradition, but to the fact that this particular non-traditional device is in fact a very efficient means for authorizing decisions. It ensures that all competent personnel have passed upon proposed policies, and it is thus compatible with modern, bureaucratized behavior.

Silberman also debates the degree to which the *ringi-sei* is peculiarly Japanese. Similarly, Gerald Curtis argues with one of the most durable explanations of Japanese voting behavior, that based on obligation. Specifically, Curtis is concerned with the phenomenon known as the "hard vote," that portion of the vote which goes "consistently and re-

[40] Oral presentation, Washington, D.C. (October 1972).

[41] Kiyoaki Tsuji, "Decision-Making in the Japanese Government," in Ward (fn. 25), 457. The *ringi-sei* is basically a system wherein each member of an organization within whose jurisdiction or expertise a proposal falls has an opportunity to check and formally approve the proposal.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

peatedly to a particular person as a consequence of personal ties" with no political causation involved.

> Implicit in much of the discussion of the "hard vote" is the idea that such behavior is uniquely Japanese. On the whole Japanese are very self-conscious about the influence a supposedly "feudalistic" sense of obligation has on voting behavior. . . . While the particular form obligation takes in Japan may originate in traditional Japanese values, the phenomenon itself is universal. . . . The norm of reciprocity . . . is universal. What is unique about Japan is not the existence of the norm but the extent to which it has been encouraged by traditional patterns of social organization and institutionalized and articulated in terms of specific modes of social behavior (Curtis, 38-39).

Again, no dismissal of either the concept of tradition, or of Japanese uniqueness, is advocated; instead, what is recommended is greater attention to differences of degree, not kind, and to the existence of universals in Japanese politics to which the ethnocentrism of the Japanese and our own seduction by this ethnocentrism have blinded us.[42]

III. The Role of Tradition

A. TRADITION AS A EUSTRUCTURE

The most positive evaluation of the functions performed by tradition in Japan is made by Herman Kahn, who sees tradition as contributing to Japan's modernization, compatible with modernity, and a valuable asset which will help Japan meet and overcome future problems. Many other observers would probably agree with him. In one regard, however, there is less than unanimity, and that concerns the rise of militarism and the eclipse of party politics in the 1930's. Without being a strict determinist one can see in the work of Barrington Moore[43] and Peter Duus[44] the way in which traditional factors influenced the development of political arrangements so as to constrain the political arena seriously and to facilitate, if not directly contribute to, the demise of the first Japanese attempt at democracy.

In contemporary Japan, both macro and micro perspectives reveal instances of the eufunctionalism (or at least functional neutrality) of tradition for economic growth and political stability. Kahn offers whole inventories of national characteristics that benefit economy and society. More specifically, a variety of aspects of Japanese tradition have

[42] It must be admitted, however, that if the Japanese are eager seducers, we—with our visions of Oriental exoticism and inscrutability—are certainly unprotesting partners.

[43] Moore (fn. 1), chaps. 5, 8.

[44] Peter Duus, *Party Rivalry and Political Change in Taisho Japan* (Cambridge, Mass. 1968).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in recent years undergone a revisionist interpretation and have emerged in a new, beneficent light. First came Japanese managerial practices: the archaic paternalism and apparent irrationality of strict seniority, lifetime employment, immobility of labor, and non-competitive methods have come to be regarded as in fact quite efficient in their Japanese context. The intraparty factions have been subjected to similar treatment: both Fukui and Thayer see them as performing important functions in the areas of resource (i.e., campaign fund) distribution, personnel selection and promotion, and intraparty democratization. Finally, the interminable and anonymous Japanese style of decision making has begun to be seen as another reasonably efficient way of getting things done.[45]

One final area for which Japanese tradition may prove eufunctional concerns human adjustment to industrial or postindustrial society. "Modernization destroys the more intimate communities in which alone man can realize his full personality; it sacrifices human, personal, and spiritual values to achieve mass production and mass society."[46] Today people are beginning to understand this dehumanizing aspect and a new personalism in human relations—call it Consciousness III[47] or whatever—is receiving new attention. Japan has become (in terms of GNP) the third-greatest power in the world without going as far along the patterned-variable continua toward sterile, dehumanized "modern" poles as have other, equally industrialized nations. That fact suggests that in Japan traditional values not only assisted modernization by contributing to mass political quiescence, frugality, and hard work; they also humanized the process of modernization, and may eventually enable Japan to create a modern economy without suffering from complete social modernization. Since rapid modernization does not allow as much time for traditional values to attenuate as does slow modernization, I would hypothesize that the dehumanizing effects of industrialization are small to the degree that industrialization is rapid; as a corollary, countries which industrialize rapidly will attain economic modernity with a less alienated, anomic, and fragmented society than do those which modernize more slowly.[48] Both hypotheses, naturally, hold only in cases where economic modernity is in fact achieved.

[45] Silberman (fn. 4). [46] Huntington (fn. 9), 298.

[47] Charles Reich, *The Greening of America* (New York 1970).

[48] I use the term dehumanizing both impressionistically, to denote a characteristic of any society situated at the "modern" poles of all of the Parsonian patterned variables, and empirically, building on studies of comparative industrialization. See, for instance, R. P. Dore, *City Life in Japan* (Berkeley 1967), 258; Ezra Vogel, *Japan's New Middle Class* (Berkeley 1966), 255.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I would also hypothesize that Japan will enjoy greater social stability and community because, by modernizing rapidly, it skipped over one historico-cultural stage experienced by the West, the stage of *laissez-faire*, inner-directedness,[49] or possessive individualism.[50] Japan passed directly from traditional collectivism to a modernity in which (a) interdependence requires restrictions on freewheeling individualism, and (b) mechanization, rationalization, and standardization create a need for new types of human community. In adjusting to the interdependence of a postindustrial society and keeping alive the human element therein, Japan may be, thanks to its traditions, better prepared than are societies with a powerful individualistic tradition. She could therefore serve as an example of what the future might be.

B. TRADITION AS A DYSSTRUCTURE

Concurrent with analyses of Japanese tradition which present it as a eustructure in the Japanese political system, there are equally strong assertions of its dysfunctionalism therein. Several aspects of the political system have been specified as problem areas; among them are decision making, factionalism, and foreign policy. Despite assertions to the contrary, the dominant interpretation of Japanese decision making is still that it is politically dysfunctional. Ishida emphasizes the organic Japanese world view, with its tendency to regard not only organizations but also events as natural occurrences with autonomous volition; the political result is acceptance of a course of events or policy decisions as an independent force beyond human manipulation (pp. 61-63, 152-53).

This characteristic has two political consequences. First, since no human will is involved in a spontaneous, inevitable course of events, no one is responsible for them. In today's hyperproductive Japanese hothouse where failures (and thus problems of accountability) are rare, such irresponsible decision making may suffice; under conditions of stress it may not. Second, the characteristic of acceptance increases to an unhealthy degree the decisional autonomy of elites. Unpleasant conditions are often perceived as natural; therefore endurance, not political remonstration, is considered the proper reaction. Thus the Japanese endure appalling environmental deterioration without forcing politicians to make some difficult decisions regarding national priorities.

Due partly to the traditionalistic way in which they are made, hard decisions are particularly difficult for the Japanese. The LDP as ruling

[49] Riesman (fn. 39).

[50] C. B. MacPherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (London 1962).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

party is responsible for policy making, but it is factionally fragmented and operating under strict consensual norms. As a result, any issue that inspires strongly held preferences is likely to lead to immobility in the government (Hellmann, 48). In some such cases the deadlock can be broken (that is, unanimity can be achieved) only if the Prime Minister promises to step down after resolution of the matter—a substantial payoff to his coalition partners, many of whom will become eager candidates for the position. Instances of such inoperability have recurred in the polity. Hard decisions are less characteristic of the economy, which has grown by 10 to 15 per cent per year for most of the last two decades. Generalizations about the political eufunctionalism of tradition based on studies of the Japanese economy may therefore be unjustified.

As is clear from the above, intraparty factionalism intertwines with consensual norms to create the fragile decisional machinery of the LDP. The factions "make for effective teamwork when things go well and perhaps for irreconcilable conflict when they do not."[51] Even in non-crisis situations, considerations of coalition maintenance and personal power-maximization often take precedence over those of governmental performance or issue preference (Hellmann, 19). One can only hope that, as Brzezinski says, things continue to "go well."

Another area of anxiety is foreign policy, and here tradition plays a dual role. First, the Japanese are acutely nationally conscious; combined with their hierarchical world view and lack of economic self-sufficiency (a long-standing but hardly traditional factor), that impels them toward a positive international role and an inevitable effort to achieve the international status they believe is their due. On the other hand, the Japanese are perhaps the most insular (in all senses) of the world's major nations; this is as true of elites as it is of the masses. Thus, as one aspect of tradition impels Japan outward, another makes a constructive international role exceedingly difficult.

Japan's sensitivity to status distinctions and the concept of "proper station" make her international role an especially sensitive one. In a context of rising nationalism and continuing insecurity, any move seen by the Japanese as likely to obstruct their assumption of their proper station or to threaten their sources of raw materials is liable to be regarded with consternation and perhaps even paranoia. The fact that they have little control over their international position lends a hothouse air to all that occurs domestically. I would assert that, given such conditions, one can describe the commonly acknowledged eufunctionalism of tradition in Japanese society—to the extent that what is

[51] Brzezinski (fn. 18), 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

commonly labeled "traditional" is in fact so—as a phenomenon which creates a kind of "unstable stability."[52] It will bear close watching in the foreseeable future.

The continuing eufunctionalism of tradition for political stability, economic growth, and democracy in Japan is largely due to hothouse conditions: rapid economic growth, affluence for many, absence of external threats, and security of foreign sources and markets. Such phenomena as national assertiveness and hierarchicalism, consensual decision making, factionalism, and competitiveness could, under stress, create chauvinism, aggressiveness, decisional paralysis, and internecine warfare (both figuratively and, as shown by the brutal inter- and intrafactional bloodlettings of the radical students, literally). Economic stagnation or external rebuff could create a zero-sum situation wherein traditional and non-traditional elements can no longer coexist; tradition may thus act not as a brake on economic growth or as an antidemocratic force, but as a potential catalyst and accelerator, an epidemiogenic agent which, upon stagnation or rebuff, will magnify the effects of such an event and cause repercussions throughout society.

The fragility of tradition as a political and social eustructure is compounded by two additional manifestations of tradition[53] which directly contribute to the "instability" of contemporary Japanese stability. First is the consumerist, family-centered conformity of postwar Japanese society, which has created electoral apathy and a generally declining interest in politics (Ishida, 141-42). This apoliticism has a political effect by creating an acquiescent, submissive mass orientation, that is, passive support for the present conservative government. The LDP's electoral support has declined in each of the last several general elections, as has the overall voting rate. By shrewdly cutting back on candidacies the LDP has managed to keep a dominant majority in parliament; this stability is being (less noticeably) gradually eroded away at the polls, however. At the same time, the apparent permanence of LDP rule has driven those on both fringes of the political system to ever more extreme methods; the combination of apathy and extremism is at best unhealthy and at worst disastrous.

Second is the characteristic organizational behavior of the Japanese (Ishida, 143-47, 198-216). Where leaders have complete decisional autonomy and can (so long as they satisfy rank-and-file demands which are more expressive than instrumental) ignore substantive policy recom-

[52] The term is Watanuki Joji's. *Nihon no Seiji Shakai* [Political Society in Japan] (Tokyo 1967), chap. 3.

[53] As defined by those who present the arguments. Note that the degree to which these factors are traditional is debatable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mendations, feedback channels to the elite never fully develop. In such a context, complexity and bureaucratization create problems of communication closure, non-responsiveness, and depersonalization (the last of which is particularly galling to Japanese). The degree to which members depend upon the organization for expressive and instrumental gratification determines the degree to which bureaucratization leads to problems; such problems are, typically, frustration, dissatisfaction, and alienation, leading in turn (somewhat parallel to political trends) to apathy, withdrawal, or radical action.

There are signs—particularly the disenchantment of farmers with the LDP, and workers with both the Socialist Party and their union leadership—that traditional styles of leadership are no longer functioning effectively. In large organizations, mechanisms of communication are needed which can continue to gratify affective needs. Without such mechanisms, all of the economic achievements of the Japanese may become dust in their mouths, or nuts and bolts in their spirits.

IV. Conclusion

Japan is heavily (though not so heavily as commonly thought) influenced by a tradition which is neither so traditional nor so non-modern as it is often thought to be. This tradition is quite strong in some areas but fading in others, compatible with the new in some respects and incompatible in others. Where it survives, it is in some instances kept artificially robust by the general rapid growth and stability of the Japanese society, polity, and economy. Similarly, tradition makes some contributions to the stability, maintenance, and flourishing of Japan's economy, society, and polity, but is dysfunctional thereto in other ways. Where eufunctional, it is often so only because of its generally buoyant, low-stress context, which is liable to become less buoyant in the future, with possible intensification of problems by traditional forces in a stagnant, declining, or otherwise stressful situation. The emergence of such a situation may in fact be partially caused by traditional factors in a context of rapid change and modernization.

Assertions such as these put one somewhat in the position of the proponents of the "non-decision-making" approach to politics, who are often forced to try to develop an interpretation of a situation in the absence of overt behavior, at worst being forced to rely upon their own values and hunches and little more. The existence of "unstable stability" and the hothouse quality of Japanese traditionalism can perhaps be demonstrated only through hindsight; if economic growth continues

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

indefinitely, if other nations are cooperative (and, when necessary, tolerant), and if Japan's present political structures become more congruent with her political culture, we may never know if such conditions ever existed at all. At present, therefore, these conclusions remain in the realm of almost pure speculation, albeit speculation which may serve some purpose as a corrective to the generally euphoric evaluations of contemporary Japan.[54]

[54] However, events since the original writing of this essay may rescue it from the realm of speculation. The instability of domestic economic conditions has been demonstrated by the Arab oil embargo—which could, if extended, almost totally destroy the Japanese economy—and by gnawing inflation (over 15% in 1973) which *preceded* the oil crisis and which Prime Minister Tanaka has stubbornly refused to acknowledge, much less come to grips with. In the international arena, the problems facing expanding Japanese trade and ambition have been violently demonstrated by the bloody anti-Japanese riots which followed the Prime Minister's path during his January 1974 trip to Southeast Asia. The domestic political repercussions of these phenomena are yet to be seen, but may well provide a test of the hypotheses posed above.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

STATESMANSHIP AND SCHOLARSHIP

By TANG TSOU

Richard Moorsteen and Morton Abramowitz, *Remaking China Policy*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971, 135 pp., $5.95.

A. Doak Barnett, *A New United States Policy Toward China*. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1971, 132 pp., $5.95.

Jerome Alan Cohen, Edward Friedman, Harold C. Hinton, and Allen S. Whiting, *Taiwan and American Policy*. New York, Praeger, 1971, 191 pp., $2.50.

O. Edmund Clubb, *China and Russia: The Great Game*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1971, 578 pp., $12.95.

Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*. New York, Pantheon, 1970, 475 pp., $10.00.

Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970, 266 pp., $6.50.

Daniel D. Lovelace, *China and 'People's War' in Thailand, 1964–1969*. Berkeley, Center for China Studies, University of California, 1971, 95 pp., $3.50.

Bruce D. Larkin, *China and Africa, 1949–1970*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971, 268 pp., $8.50.

John G. Stoessinger, *Nations in Darkness: China, Russia, and America*. New York, Random House, 1971, 197 pp., $6.95.

"[POLICY] is like a play in many acts which unfolds inevitably once the curtain is raised. To declare then that the performance will not take place is an absurdity. The play will go on, either by means of the actors . . . or by means of the spectators who mount the stage. . . . Intelligent people never consider this the essence of the problem, however. For them it lies in the decision whether the curtain is to be raised at all, whether the spectators are to be assembled, and in the intrinsic quality of the play. . . ." With these words of Metternich, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger begins the chapter on the definition of the political equilibrium in his book on problems of peace in Europe between 1812–1822.[1]

A decision to raise the curtain on a new policy toward China was made by President Nixon soon after he had come into office. The prelude consisted of a series of signals in the form of seemingly trivial moves which were accompanied by secret American overtures leading to Kissinger's historic trip to China in July 1971. The curtain was raised by simultaneous announcements in Washington and Peking of Nixon's acceptance of Peking's invitation to visit China. The scenes of the first

[1] Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored* (Boston 1957), 41.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

act moved from the United Nations to Peking and then to Shanghai. The whole act was full of breath-taking suspense, and punctuated by solemn rituals, heart-warming human gestures, and moments of dead silence, while hard bargaining took place behind an almost impenetrable screen. With the briefing on the meaning of the Shanghai communiqué, the first act was over. The long march toward the destination of Sino-American rapprochement had begun.

In this first act of statesmanship, both sides succeeded in finding a series of formulae to move Sino-American relations from dead center, thus breaking the impasse of the past twenty-two years and holding out at least the possibility of ending a seemingly permanent state of mutual hostility. On the American side, the general ideas underlying this first act were developed by specialists on China and Sino-American relations, both inside and outside the government. A new consensus concerning China's capabilities and present objectives had been building over a period of ten years, while different scenarios on concrete moves and countermoves were being offered. The receptivity of the public to a change in policy was prepared by a series of books, monographs, policy papers, and conference records written from diverse perspectives. But the change did not take place until the tragedy of the Vietnam War had driven home the imperative of recognizing the limits of American power, until the necessity of seeking a settlement of that war had clinched the case for opening a dialogue with Peking, and until the rapid increase of Soviet military power and political influence—particularly in the Middle East and South Asia—had underscored the folly of overestimating "the Chinese threat." A link between the worlds of scholarship and high policy was established at the highest level in the person of Henry Kissinger. The historic mission of re-establishing a dialogue with the Chinese Communists fell, ironically, on Richard Nixon, who had played a not insignificant part in shaping the policy of ostracizing Peking from the world community. As Premier Chou En-lai said in a different context, "it is for the doer do undo the knot."[2]

The first act has given us a new perspective from which we can evaluate American policy and works on this subject. This article will begin with an examination of a number of recently published policy analyses and recommendations which appear to be relevant to the President's trip to Peking. I will then discuss the ideas, concepts, and assumptions underlying the policy change in terms of more scholarly and theoretical concerns.

[2] *New York Times*, August 10, 1971.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I

It is unusual in the annals of diplomatic history that, almost simultaneously with a major move in the foreign policy of a great power, the reading public is offered a piece of writing which in retrospect clarifies for it some of the ideas underlying that dramatic change, and which contains policy recommendations closely parallel to the actual policies subsequently implemented. *Remaking China Policy*, by Richard Moorsteen and Morton Abramowitz is one of these unusual works. In his foreword, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, the former Under Secretary of State under whom both authors once served, compares it to George Kennan's famous "X" article in *Foreign Affairs*. But the contrasts between the two pieces of work are very striking, reflecting the changes in intellectual style in the past twenty-five years and the vastly different problems and circumstances to which they address themselves. Moorsteen's and Abramowitz's policy memorandum does not contain the grandiose analyses, confident forecasts, stirring calls to action, or elegant literary style which characterized Kennan's article. Their style is austere, their reasoning rigorous, their language plain, and their conclusion restrained. The keynote of their policy study is uncertainty. Not only do they frankly express their uncertainty about China's responses; uncertainty of the final outcome is an integral part of their policy proposal. They permit themselves the luxury of stating the modest but important conclusion that, "On balance, we came to feel it probable that past United States policies were based on excessive fear of the aggressiveness of the Chinese Communists." But immediately, they add: "Even this is uncertain because of the self-fulfilling nature of such policy premises" (p. xxii). Their recommendations are admittedly based on "assumptions about how Peking views its objectives and their relative priority." This admission is followed almost at once by the question: "But are they [these assumptions] any good"? (p. 83). Despite their professed uncertainties, Moorsteen and Abramowitz recommended a slight but significant change in policy—a change which subsequently helped to break the long-standing deadlock. Their policy recommendation of "one China but not now" was the one adopted by President Nixon.

The significance and audacity of Moorsteen's and Abramowitz's recommendation must be understood in terms of the evolution of debate among officials and scholars. In the four or five years prior to 1970–1971, the policy of containment and isolation had gradually eroded. The alternative which was most frequently suggested and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which received the most widespread and strongest support was the policy of "two Chinas," formulated by A. Doak Barnett as early as 1960, in *Communist China and Asia*. It envisaged the international recognition and acceptance of the People's Republic of China on the mainland and the Republic of China on Taiwan. On the one hand, the United States would make it clear that she no longer recognized the Nationalists' claim to be the government of the mainland of China. On the other hand, she would "specifically reject Peking's claim over Taiwan."[3] In the United Nations, a formula of "dual representation" was advanced, under which the seating of Peking would be linked with the simultaneous admission of Nationalist China as a new member.

At the time, Barnett's recommendation represented a radical departure from the current policy of "pressure and diplomatic isolation" and a valiant and forward-looking attempt to seek partial accommodation with Peking. It was strongly opposed by the Nationalists and denounced by right-wing writers in the United States, earning Barnett an honored place in the mythical group called the "Red China Lobby."[4] But Barnett's proposal was never adopted by the successive Democratic administrations. Ironically, the implementation of this policy in the early sixties, even without Peking's agreement, would probably have preserved the Nationalists' seat in the United Nations and made Taiwan's international status secure well into the 1970's and perhaps beyond. However, it might not have turned Peking-Washington relations in the direction intended by Barnett, because, from the point of view of Peking, the most serious defect of this proposal was that it would have entailed the permanent separation of Taiwan, and Peking's acquiescence to a situation created by American military intervention in the civil war.

By 1970 and 1971, when the United States seriously sought to break the impasse, Barnett found it necessary to make some important changes in his formulation of the two-China policy. In his influential book, *A New Policy Toward China*, he sweetens his original proposal by a number of suggestions: an end to the active patrolling by the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, the removal of all American forces from Taiwan, the abandonment of the building of any special China-directed anti-ballistic missile defense, steps to alleviate Peking's fear of American-Soviet collusion, eased trade restrictions, and an exchange of visits. Barnett's most significant concession to Peking is the modification of the two-China policy with a verbal affirmation that "the

[3] A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia* (New York 1960), 472-75.
[4] Robert Hunter and Forest Davis, *The Red China Lobby* (New York 1963), 172-78.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States is completely open-ended regarding the ultimate status of Taiwan and that we will neither actively oppose nor actively promote either reunification with the mainland or independent status, but will be prepared to accept any long-term outcome (including possible intermediate solutions such as, for example, a Taiwan linked to China but with autonomous status) if it develops by peaceful means and is acceptable to the people on Taiwan" (p. 80). So far as the long-term future of Taiwan is concerned, he recommends that the United States hold to the position that the legal status of Taiwan is still undetermined. With regard to the question of membership in the United Nations, Barnett reaffirms his recommendation of "dual representation." But he attempts to devise a new formula which would dissociate dual representation from any commitment to "the idea of a permanent 'two Chinas' situation." The proposal would be so worded that it could easily be interpreted as providing "two seats for one nation," modeled on Byelorussia and the Ukraine. "It should be explicitly understood that the formula involves no challenge to, or endorsement of, the territorial claims of either Peking or Taipei" (p. 92). In short, the policy proposed by Barnett can be described as dual representation in the United Nations, combined with an undetermined status and open-ended future for Taiwan. But the combination of the idea of dual representation with the U.S. position after June 1950 (that the status of Taiwan is undetermined) implies a rejection of Peking's preferred position of "one China." His policy proposal can be interpreted or misinterpreted as "two Chinas now but with an open-ended future," or simply as a more subtle form of the two-China policy.

Against the policy of two Chinas, as well as the superficially highly appealing policy of "one China, one Taiwan," Moorsteen and Abramowitz correctly raise two serious objections. First, Peking's overall strategy is "focused on minimizing the future likelihood of permanent alienation of Taiwan from the mainland," and "commitment to either policy would seriously aggravate relations with Peking rather than improve them" (p. 5). Second, either of these policies "would commit the United States or Japan indefinitely to providing a military shield for Taiwan," and "such flexibility as we have now would be dissipated" (p. 5). Moorsteen and Abramowitz note that the basic argument for the alternatives of "two Chinas" and "one China, one Taiwan" is that "Peking (but not we) will just have to adjust to reality"—current reality in case of the former alternative, and "emerging reality" in the case of the latter.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In contrast to these policy alternatives, the policy of "one China but not now" envisages "nominal recognition of the territorial integrity of China including Taiwan." The position adopted after June 27, 1950—that the future status of Taiwan awaits determination—carries the implication of settlement through international negotiation. Moorsteen and Abramowitz recommend a change to the position that Taiwan's status is "a matter to be decided between them [Peking and Taipei]," and that "no international negotiations are required" (p. 19). But, much like the current policy and the two other alternatives, their recommendation precludes the reversion of Taiwan to the People's Republic of China at the present time. The American commitment to defend Taiwan will be maintained; but "if our other allies in Asia see their security improving, if Peking really tries to create suitable conditions for the people on Taiwan, and if the latter gradually realize that they too must accommodate, our military commitment to the GRC [the Government of the Republic of China] might no longer be necessary" (p. 9).

Moorsteen and Abramowitz recognize that their proposal moves the United States "ever so slightly toward Peking's preferred 'one China'" (p. xxix). But they are confident that the United States is in a position to control the course of future development. Some American policies "can increase the probability of future reunification, others (such as formal United States commitment to a 'two Chinas' position) can greatly reduce it" (p. 7). As they see it, the evolution of American policy would depend on Peking's "future conduct—both with respect to our other interests and in making reunification more acceptable to *the people on Taiwan*" (p. 7; emphasis in original). With regard to the immediate problem of China's representation in the United Nations, Moorsteen and Abramowitz envisage the acceptance of the possibility of being out-voted in the United Nations and counsel against making too great an effort to keep a seat for Taipei.

Many months before the policy memorandum was published as a book, it must have been widely discussed among officials and scholars. An informal debate took place between Moorsteen and Abramowitz on the one side and Barnett on the other. In his book, Barnett advances two arguments against Moorsteen's and Abramowitz's policy alternative. First, "it would have adverse and demoralizing effects on Taiwan—in particular, on the local Taiwanese population" (p. 98). Moorsteen's and Abramowitz's answer is: the Nationalist Government "will gradually perceive that nothing concrete has changed," that "daily life on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Taiwan goes on as before," and that "the future appears more uncertain, but the present remains preferable to any available alternatives" (p. 9). They admit that the adoption of their policy proposal would reduce the likelihood of Taiwanese independence, for it would reduce the Taiwanese hope of "inheriting the U.S. commitment from the GRC through an independence movement," and would make "continued GRC rule all the more indispensable" (pp. 10-11). Still, Moorsteen and Abramowitz do not believe that their alternative would foreclose the possibility of Taiwanese independence (p. 56).

Barnett's second objection, for him the "most compelling argument" against the policy of "one China but not now," is "the fact that if actual political forces in the years immediately ahead worked toward separate states rather than reunification, as is not only possible but in the judgment of many observers, probable, then the United States would again find itself saddled with a policy that was in conflict with political reality" (p. 98). Moorsteen and Abramowitz do not deny this possibility. Their laconic comment is: "In the end, so it may be" (p. 5).

Thus, the policy of "one China but not now" is as open-ended regarding the long-run future of Taiwan as Barnett wants it to be. But there is a crucial difference between Barnett's proposal and that of Moorsteen and Abramowitz. Obviously, Peking would see a better chance to achieve her objective if the point of departure of the supposedly open-ended process was "one China but not now" rather than "dual representation in the United Nations combined with an undetermined status and open-ended future for Taiwan." It is quite possible that President Nixon would have preferred a two-China policy if Peking had shown the faintest sign of being amenable to such a formula. But, as the President's visit to China and the Shanghai communiqué showed, it was the "ever so slight" movement toward Peking's position as contained in Moorsteen's and Abramowitz's formula which spelled the difference between success and failure in breaking the impasse of the past twenty-two years.

That the specialists on China were moving away from the two-China policy toward the policy of "one China but not now" is shown in *Taiwan and American Policy*, which reports the proceedings of a conference sponsored by the League of Women Voters Education Fund and the National Committee on United States-China relations. At this conference the positions adopted by some of the leading scholars are fairly close to Moorsteen's and Abramowitz's. In his paper, "Morality, Taiwan, and United States Policy," Allen S. Whiting advocates "a policy whereby Taiwan's future is explicitly and wholly left to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mutual deliberations and interactions of the people involved on both sides of the Taiwan Strait" (p. 103). Specifically, he calls for the elimination from United States policy options of "a 'two-Chinas' formula as well as promotion of Taiwan independence." Jerome Cohen points out that the probable outcome of the successful implementation of the proposal for dual representation is to exclude Peking and to keep Taiwan in the United Nations. He proposes U.S. abstention from the vote on the Albanian resolution which, "by assuring Peking's presence in the United Nations, would produce [a] clear long-term benefit to both the world community and ourselves" (p. 163). On the question of Taiwan's future, he advocates "negotiation that will discuss withdrawal of recognition from Taipei and its conferral upon Peking," while the status of Taiwan might or might not be settled at the time of the agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations (p. 164). This emphasis on the question of recognition as one of the first steps to be taken is different from Moorsteen's and Abramowitz's scenario in which nominal recognition of the territorial integrity of China including Taiwan comes first, while establishment of diplomatic relations is left to the future. Harold Hinton proposes an alternative which is very similar to that of Moorsteen and Abramowitz. He suggests that in the United Nations, the United States should continue to introduce the important-question resolution, but "should not work as hard for its adoption and for the defeat of the Albanian resolution as it has in the past" (p. 125). Hinton sees his proposal as leading toward a multilateral balance of power in East Asia, whereas Moorsteen wishes to achieve a configuration of power more favorable to the United States than multilateral balance, and in particular to prevent the rise of a nuclear Japan which, in his view, is implied by Hinton's notion of multilateral balance (p. 132-36).[5] Edward Friedman makes an impassioned plea for an end to the provocative military and subversive actions by Americans and Nationalist Chinese against China. But he underestimates Peking's preoccupation with the future status of Taiwan and thus fails to see the importance of an American concession on this issue in evoking a response from Peking. Instead, he observes that "China seems open to accepting the actual fact of an independent polity in Taiwan if America will accept the established fact of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia as a natural consequence of power and propinquity" (p. 52).*

[5] Hinton later makes it clear that he also wants the United States to discourage the Japanese from becoming a nuclear power (p. 148).

* This suggested settlement might become one of the many possible outcomes in the future but had no relevance for policy at that time.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Concerning the question of United Nations representation, the momentum toward the "one-China" position suddenly gathered unexpected strength in the United States. One hundred and ten China scholars signed a statement published in the *New York Times* on June 14, 1971, which opposed "any effort by the United States to impose a formula for dual representation without the prior agreement of both claimants to China's seat," and declared that "Peking should be granted its legitimate place in the United Nations." Two days later, Senator Edward Kennedy introduced a resolution in the Senate, using almost the exact words of the statement. It was subsequently reported that preliminary plans for President Nixon's trip to China were being made during intensive negotiations that took place between the United States and China, starting in April, 1971.[6]

Why did these scholars believe that concessions to Peking's view should be made? Most of them desired to end the state of hostility which could have become permanent, to reduce American involvement with Taiwan, and to decrease the risk of war with China. But beyond these generalities, there were very specific reasons. Moorsteen and Abramowitz express the belief that "better" relations with China, to be induced by the policy of "one China but not now," would enable the United States to deal more successfully with her problems in Southeast Asia and her relations with Japan and Soviet Union. They propose to make a series of minor concessions to Peking (over the issue of Taiwan), conditional on improved Chinese behavior in Southeast Asia.[7] Indeed, the basic rationale of the policy of "one China but not now" is to use the future prospect of recovering Taiwan to induce Peking to establish stable, peaceful relations elsewhere in Asia. There would be a long process of mutual interaction and bargaining in which the United States would go slow in making further concessions after the fast start of making a nominal affirmation of the territorial, international integrity of China, including Taiwan (pp. 7-8, 56). In the years since Kissinger's first secret trip to Peking, there have been frequent speculations to the effect that one of the most important reasons for President Nixon's new China policy was to enlist China's help to end the Vietnam War on terms acceptable to the United States. On this

[6] *New York Times*, July 17, 1971.

[7] This is what is commonly known as the concept of 'linkage.' With regard to Southeast Asia, Whiting expresses his belief that there are no independent viable societies and governments in the near future. He asserts: "If we say we want all these situations [of political instability] to exist without any Chinese interference, then let us forget it. Obviously, the Chinese are going to influence and interfere as the Russians influence and interfere in the Middle East . . . and as Americans do in Latin America" (*Taiwan and American Policy*, 140).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

specific question, Moorsteen and Abramowitz offer little enlightenment. Beside the general statements mentioned above, they merely suggest that Peking could influence the further development of the war in Southeast Asia, and that "if we could find grounds for a *mutual* interest in better United States-Chinese relations, we might find Peking easier to deal with at an international peace conference" (p. 65-66; emphasis in original).

Moorsteen and Abramowitz consider friendship and alliance with Japan as "the main element of our posture in the Pacific" and the maintenance of the present friendly relations between United States and Japan as "our principal concern in Asia" (p. 26). But they see a nuclear Japan as a destabilizing factor in Asia and world politics, "with very serious consequences indeed." They hope to prevent this very real possibility by making good use of Japan's present aversion to nuclear weapons and by creating an Asian environment that would make it unnecessary for Japan to become a nuclear power. A détente between the United States and China would reassure Japan by minimizing the risks that Japan would incur in retaining America's nuclear umbrella. Implicitly, Moorsteen and Abramowitz urge Peking to recognize "a mutual interest between China and the United States in non-proliferation, including non-acquisition by Japan" (p. xxviii), and a common interest among the three powers in reducing tension in Asia.

Among the specialists, Moorsteen and Abramowitz make the most succinct and clear-cut statements regarding Soviet intentions toward the United States in the context of Sino-American relations. In their view, Soviet motivations are "short-term anti-Chinese, long-term anti-United States" (p. 48). They bluntly tell the reader: "At present, the Soviets may look to the United States as the main—temporary but necessary—counterbalance to increasing Chinese influence in the Far East. . . . [A]n active Russian role in Southeast Asia is likely to be mainly a source of mischief for us" (pp. 48-49). As for the convergence of American and Chinese interests, they write equally pithily: "Peking . . . sees . . . a possibility for somehow using the United States against Russia. We have a similar, if equally ill-defined, interest in using relations with China to limit troublesome Soviet tendencies" (p. xxix). Moorsteen and Abramowitz conclude that "in the end, our shared apprehensions and rivalry toward the Soviet Union may turn out to be the most important elements in United States-Chinese relations," because "the potential Soviet threat to each of us is great" (p. 45). They propose to balance "the variegated dealings with the Soviets" by "a more rounded United States-China relationship" so that both Peking and Moscow

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would have "greater awareness of our position and potential in the triangle" (p. 47), and so that "the Sino-Soviet controversy [will] continue to limit the challenges either Russia or China poses to United States security interests" (p. 44). They are not as confident as are the overwhelming majority of specialists that a Sino-Soviet rapprochement is impossible. At the time of writing, they were not sure when and if China would be willing to play her hole card in the rivalry with the Soviet Union—improved relations with the United States. As events in 1971–1972 soon showed, Peking did play this card. It is quite probable that Washington's adoption of the "one China but not now" policy was the most important move which helped Peking to make up her mind.

Moorsteen and Abramowitz seem to have sensed that not only was the time ripe for the adoption of a new policy, but also that the situation required urgent action. This sense of urgency seems to have stemmed from the assumption that the United States might soon lose her freedom of action in seeking an accommodation with Peking on the Taiwan issue: "Undertaking almost any process of adjustment . . . will grow more difficult as Japanese interests in Taiwan increase, as Japan becomes economically and militarily stronger, and as Japanese attitudes and political leaders change" (p. 12). Taking full account of Peking's fear of a Taiwan under Japanese protection, they correctly surmise that "Peking might respond to partial solutions 'in principle' that fell well short of actual reversion of Taiwan to the mainland at any early date—or even any fixed day at all" (pp. 4-5). This is the solution they offer in their policy of "one China but not now." Another important reason for quick action, in their judgment, is that Mao's position would be better than his successors' "to make a major change in policy toward the United States and to accept a partial solution on Taiwan even on a temporary basis" (pp. 62-63).

The dramatic events which took place soon after the various specialists made their views public give us an unusual opportunity to see in what way American policy has conformed to or departed from their recommendations, and to what extent the development of Sino-American relations has validated or confounded their judgments of China's response. None of the specialists, in any of their published works, suggested a Presidential trip and a summit meeting. But such a move was consistent with their sense of urgency, their view that fundamental problems rather than peripheral issues must be tackled, their belief that the outcome must have the sanction of Mao, and in the case of Moorsteen and Abramowitz, their view that within the American bu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reaucracy at the policy-making level, "some other country or consideration rather than China is almost always of central concern" (p. 72). The "Nixon shock" to Japan did not form a part of their scenarios. Indeed, Moorsteen and Abramowitz specifically warned that "the Japanese government could be extremely embarrassed . . . if we jumped far ahead of Japan in coming to terms with Peking, or if it became known that we were merely discussing important questions with China without keeping Japan informed" (p. 28). Most probably, it was Peking who insisted on absolute secrecy as a precondition of discussing the possibility of a Nixon visit. Without such secrecy, opposition to this dramatic move by domestic critics and America's allies might well have jeopardized the whole enterprise. America's assent to absolute secrecy was quite possibly a necessary measure to dispel Peking's distrust and to establish a basis of mutual confidence for subsequent negotiations. If these speculations are correct, the suggestion for prior consultation with Japan ran afoul of the real demands of the situation, and the policy-makers had to make a choice.

The Administration was faced with the problem of making and announcing a final decision on policy for China's representation in the United Nations almost immediately after Kissinger's secret trip. After considerable delay, the Nixon Administration in late summer of 1971 adopted almost in its entirety the proposal of "dual representation" suggested by Barnett, and fought hard for its acceptance by the General Assembly. When the votes in the General Assembly were finally counted, the proposal had gone down to defeat by 59 to 55, with 15 abstentions. This vote marked the demise of the idea of "dual representation," long a part of the two-China policy. In effect, the United Nations removed an important obstacle to partial American accommodation with China. The results of tough bargaining in Peking during Nixon's visit in February 1972 conformed to the general outline of Moorsteen's and Abramowitz's proposal of "one China but not now." Their book represents the most detailed public record of the Nixon-Kissinger approach to one of the most difficult problems of foreign policy in our time. It shows how a formula to accommodate the minimum demands of both sides can be found to serve as a necessary basis for the initiation and maintenance of a process of negotiation. In this process of negotiation, the various conflicting and parallel interests are linked together so as to facilitate the search for a compromise package. Along with the search for mutual accommodation on specific questions, an attempt is also being made to work out a mutually acceptable international structure of power in the light of evolving political, military,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and economic realities. By making the process open-ended, and by frankly acknowledging the uncertainty of the final outcome, the new approach has given American policy the necessary flexibility and a strong bargaining position to deal with a fluid and rapidly changing situation.

II

One of the basic and indispensable ingredients of the dramatic change in American policy was a generally accepted re-evaluation of China's intentions and capabilities. An examination of this change in perception must start with the scholars' reappraisal of Chinese intentions in the Korean War, because "the post-1950 American image of a hostile, menacing China dates from the Korean War" (p. 45), as John Stoessinger notes in his interpretative study, *Nations in Darkness*. This process of reappraisal began with Whiting's pioneering *China Crosses the Yalu*, still one of the best works in the field of Sino-American relations after 1949. On the respective responsibilities of the Soviet Union and China in initiating the Korean War, Whiting demonstrated that "the North Korean attack was planned and directed by the Soviet Union" and concluded that "there is no direct evidence of Chinese participation in the planning and preparation of the Korean War."[8] On China's subsequent entry into the Korean War, he stressed Peking's considerations of defense.

Whiting's analysis of the respective roles of the Soviet Union and China in starting the Korean War was by no means generally accepted. One of the most clear-cut challenges was posed by Harold Hinton. Hinton advanced the thesis that Mao probably urged Stalin to give the North Koreans the permission and logistical support necessary for a formal invasion of South Korea.[9] To this suggestion "Stalin gave a highly nervous assent," and "he would commit nothing more than logistical support." In his next major work, published four years later, Hinton courageously reversed himself. He now gave Stalin the credit of planning and organizing the invasion of South Korea as a response to the American move toward a peace treaty with Japan, and to compensate for the Soviet Union's recent setbacks in the West such as the failure of the Berlin blockade and the formation of NATO. Peking "acquiesced in Stalin's grand design for Korea" in the interest of over-

[8] Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu* (New York 1960), 45. For an excellent reappraisal of Chinese intentions and the American policy of containment, see David P. Mozingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsidered," *World Politics*, XIX (April 1967), 361-77.

[9] Harold Hinton, *Communist China in World Affairs* (Boston 1966), 207.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

all relations with the Soviet Union.[10] Hinton's complete reversal of his position reflects the direction in which American thinking evolved. This change in analysis was probably related to his advocacy, a year later, of the policy of "one-China-later."

The theory which attributes the main responsibility of starting the Korean war to China is not yet dead, however. In his recent book, *China and Russia: The Great Game*, O. Edmund Clubb, a former foreign-service officer with extensive experience in China, one-time Consul General at Vladivostok, and now a respected scholar, writes: "it can be tentatively deduced that the Communist strategy for Korea was in good part formulated and probably even proposed by Mao Tse-tung, and accepted with suitable qualifications by Stalin" (p. 388). Clubb supports his deduction by invoking "the inquiring principle of *'cui bono?'*," by pointing to the assumption by China of the responsibility of rescuing North Korea at the critical strategic juncture, and by noting the failure of Peking to blame Moscow for starting the war. The impossibility of arriving at a definitive judgment on matters of high policy without access to the most secret archives is underscored once more by Clubb's argument. But political leaders must act, policy-makers must choose, and scholars must suggest an explanation on the basis of available evidence. Perhaps the key to the question may be sought in the timing of the attack—the fact that it was launched before Peking could complete the elimination of Chiang's regime on Taiwan. From Peking's point of view, the unification of China undoubtedly had priority over an attack on South Korea. Moreover, Truman's statement of January 5, 1950, emphatically declared that the United States had no intention of using its armed forces to defend Taiwan and would not even provide military aid or advice to Nationalist forces there. It was a more clear-cut statement than Acheson's omission of South Korea in his delineation of America's defense perimeter. Therefore, an attack on Taiwan would involve no risk of American military intervention, or at least a lesser risk than an invasion of South Korea. Yet the invasion of South Korea by the North Korean forces, over which the Soviet Union had firm control, occurred before Peking's projected move against Taiwan. The timing of the attack is thus *prima facie* evidence of Peking's minor role in the outbreak of the Korean War. Even if we conclude that the North Koreans advanced the timetable of the invasion to the complete surprise of both the Soviets and the Chinese, the failure of the Soviets to exercise the necessary precautions must have

[10] Harold Hinton, *China's Turbulent Quest* (New York 1970), 41-43.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been considered by the Chinese as a most serious matter which did great damage to China's interests.

Clubb's speculation on the origin of the Korean War may not be unrelated to his general approach of interpreting modern China's foreign policies by extrapolation from the foreign policies of Imperial China. This approach is partly shown in his long-held view on China's expansive tendencies and the Chinese government's position on the lost territories. Commenting on the outlook of the Chinese Communist leaders in mid-century, Clubb writes, "the CCP chieftains . . . wanted to have China's frontiers include all territory won by the conquering *Manchus*, not simply that ruled by the regressive Ming Chinese. No Chinese leader in modern times has been prepared to accept as legal and final any past transfer of territory that has been to China's *detriment*; the reverse operation is entirely acceptable" (p. 378; emphasis in original). He does not seem to have given much thought to the implications which Peking's recognition of Outer Mongolia in October, 1949, and the subsequent conclusion of boundary treaties with Outer Mongolia, Burma, and Pakistan have for his specific judgment and his general approach. His obsession with the policies and outlook of Imperial China and with the dynamics of empire building has confounded his analysis of Peking's actual policies. It has led him to such wild speculation as the following statement: "It can be deduced that for Chinese of the 'revolutionary' Maoist stamp the paramount strategic objectives would be Siberia to the North with its natural wealth, Russian Turkestan to the West, Africa in the distant southwest, and Australia far to the Southeast, all three areas offering rich prizes for the resource-poor and power-hungry Chinese nation" (p. 514).

China's entry into the Korean War gave rise to the general image of China as a bellicose, revolutionary, and expansionist power; the Sino-Indian border war created the image of China as a chauvinist, ungrateful nation who could not maintain amicable relations with a peace-loving and friendly India and even launched a surprise, treacherous attack on an unprepared neighbor. Among scholars on China, however, the popular interpretation of the Sino-Indian War was not widely shared. But it remained for a former British correspondent of the *Times* (London) to write the most exhaustively researched and interesting book on the subject, *China's India War*. Neville Maxwell was in India during almost the whole period from the Lonju incident of August 25, 1959, to China's unilateral declaration of a cease-fire on November 20, 1962, and beyond. His book is the product of his "subsequent reappraisal" of the events which he reported at the time. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

study of relations between China and a state such as India poses a research problem of a different sort from that of Sino-Soviet relations. In the case of the latter, there is a rough symmetry of the kinds of sources and information available, except that Soviet officials and experts had, until recently, better personal contacts with American scholars and were in a better position than the Chinese to try to influence their views by means of face-to-face arguments and by supplying them with selected information. In the case of Sino-Indian relations, there is an asymmetry of access to sources. Maxwell had access to materials from the files and unpublished reports of the Indian Government and Army, and was able to interview politicians, officials, and military officers in his capacity as a reporter in an open society. In tracing Chinese policy formulation, he had to rely exclusively on the public record. He frankly notes this "unavoidable imbalance" which makes Nehru "particularly vulnerable to the count of inconsistency, and transparent in his deliberate ambiguities" while it makes China's policy look far more monolithic, perhaps even more pragmatic than it actually was (p. 14).

With this warning, Maxwell proceeds to give a convincing account which clarifies many puzzling questions. He traces the origin of the border war to a decision made as early as November 1950 by Nehru that the McMahon Line was the boundary and "India would refuse to open the question to negotiation when or if the Chinese did raise it" (p. 24).[11] In July 1954, this approach to the question of border was extended to cover other sectors of the boundary with China.[12] In the western sector, where there had been three basic alignments favored by the British, the Indian Government chose as its unilaterally defined boundary (east of the Karakoram Pass) the most forward alignment of the three proposals, which looped up to the Kuen Lun Mountains, and thus included in India the disputed region of Aksai Chin.

From the time when the conflict of claims over Aksai Chin came into the open in October 1958 to the border war of 1962, Nehru took a rigid position which Maxwell describes as follows: India's boundaries "were where the Indian government said they were—therefore there could be no negotiations," and "*the status quo ante* (always called by India 'the *status quo*') must be restored, that is, where the Chinese were on territory claimed by India, they must withdraw" (p. 102).

[11] In his historical introduction, Maxwell reaffirms the generally known fact that no Chinese Government has ever accepted the McMahon Line, and that the sector between Afghanistan and Nepal remained undetermined.

[12] In a memorandum dictated by Nehru and circulated to the ministries concerned, Nehru wrote that this whole frontier "should be considered a firm and definite one which is not open to discussion with anyone" (Maxwell, 80).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In contrast, "the Chinese government expected negotiations on the entire length of boundary with India, and no doubt considered their intimated acceptance of the McMahon alignment as one of their 'gives' in the process of give and take" (p. 99). In essence, Peking proposed negotiations and a final settlement on the basis of the status quo, that is, Peking's acceptance of the McMahon Line and India's acceptance of the Chinese claim over Aksai Chin (p. 94). After the failure of the Chou-Nehru summit conference in April, 1960, the Indian Government adopted "the forward policy," which "looked ultimately to changing the military balance in Aksai Chin to the point at which India could use force to eject the Chinese" (p. 176).[13]

The crushing victory achieved by the Chinese offensive from October 20 to November 20, 1962, the unilateral declaration of cease-fire, and the voluntary withdrawal to a position twenty kilometers behind the line of actual control enabled Peking to put into effect what she had proposed all along. All these events and results are described in vivid detail by Maxwell. For our purposes, the really important point, of which Maxwell's book gives us a glimpse, is the severe handicap which Peking's confrontation with the United States and the widely shared image of an aggressive China placed on Chinese diplomacy. Nehru may have intended to trade off his policy of friendship with China for Peking's acceptance of India's territorial claims. He may have thought that China would acquiesce in his claims because she had to rely on India to counter America's policy of isolating China. He may have believed that China would at least not react militarily against India's forward policy because such forcible action would confirm the image of an aggressive China and contribute to her increased isolation. Maxwell's account leaves one wondering whether Nehru would have been so intransigent and would have pursued the forward policy to its bitter end if the international context of Sino-Indian relations had been different. Given this international context and India's policy, China's success in defending her security interests, upholding her long-standing border policy, and minimizing the adverse international repercussions of her action came only as a result of her reasonable and clearly defined

[13] Maxwell is not totally uncritical of some aspects of China's diplomacy. In retrospect, he feels that if in his meeting with Nehru in 1956, Chou En-lai had brought up the Chinese claim to Aksai Chin in the context of his concession on the McMahon Line, "it was highly probable that this dispute would have been avoided" (pp. 94, 95). He notes that Chou's letter of September 6, 1959, to Nehru misled the Indian Government into considering it as a repudiation of the McMahon Line and "a barely veiled claim for the whole of NEFA [the North-East Frontier Agency] north of Brahmaputra . . ." (pp. 124, 125). He also criticizes the statement issued by China's Defense Ministry on October 20, 1962 (which accused the Indian troops of launching large-scale attacks) as "sacrificing truth for propaganda advantage" (pp. 371, 372).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

objectives, her patience, and her skill in subjecting her military actions to the strict control of her political policy. China's political-military policies during the border war furnish us with the best example of the application to international conflicts of Mao's three principles that "we will not attack unless we are attacked," that "we will not fight unless we are sure of victory," and that "after repulsing one die-hard attack we should know when to stop and bring that particular fight to a close. . . ."[14]

The Sino-Indian border war and the Korean War both involved the direct use of Chinese military power to defend China's security interests. A deeper and more pervasive source of the widespread fear, distrust, and suspicion toward China than her military power was Peking's reputation as a revolutionary power, her ideological commitment to the promotion of revolutions abroad, and her avowed policy of support for wars of national liberation. Thus, before American policy could be changed and a new policy of accommodation could be given an adequate foundation, two intellectual tasks had to be performed. One was to examine the actual behavior of Peking in order to see to what extent the desire to promote revolution governed China's actions and policies in practice. The other and more difficult task was to ask the following questions: Even if one took for granted that the ultimate goal of Peking was revolution, and that in fact Peking's actions and policies did contribute to revolutionary activities at different times and places, what actual danger did China create for the United States and the rest of the world? Was it not conceivable that a new structure of power relationships between Peking and the other nations could be built so that Peking would find it both necessary and desirable to rely less frequently and openly on revolutionary methods to promote change outside her own borders and to disrupt the total international configuration, if not to forego them as a matter of principle? Could the United States formulate a new policy which would facilitate this process of change in Chinese thinking and which would be less counter-productive and more conducive to American interests than containment and isolation?

Peter Van Ness's book, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation*, focuses on the actual practice of Peking and contrasts it with her ideological pronouncements. He seeks to answer the question: "What factors were most influential in determining Peking's decision whether to support ongoing

[14] Mao Tse-tung, "Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front," March 11, 1940, *Selected Works* (Peking 1965), II, 426-27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

revolutionary armed struggles in the independent countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America?" (p. 169). In doing so he uses, for the first time in a study of Chinese foreign policy, a very simple form of the method of defining concepts operationally, finding indices for variables, and constructing a scale of measurement—a method which has been widely used in other fields. He defines Chinese support for foreign revolution "minimally as public endorsement in the official Chinese press of the armed struggle of any group or organization that is publicly committed to and actively pursuing the overthrow by force of the established government of any foreign country or territory" (p. 82). He selects the crucial year of 1965 for his statistical study—a year immediately before the Cultural Revolution, in which Lin Piao made his famous speech, "Long Live the Victory of People's War." Simply by contrasting the twenty-three countries, colonies, and foreign-controlled territories endorsed as targets of revolution by Peking with those not so endorsed, Van Ness shows conclusively that, contrary to Marxist theory, the existence of a feudal structure, colonialism, and the status of being recipients of Western foreign aid were not determining factors for inclusion or exclusion as targets. He then constructs two quantitative "measures": "official friendliness toward Peking" and "official hostility toward Peking." The measure of "official friendliness toward Peking" combines three factors: diplomatic relations with Peking, a vote in favor of admission of the PRC to the UN in 1965, and trade with Communist China in either 1964 or 1965. The other measure, "official hostility toward Peking," also includes three factors: diplomatic relations with Taiwan, a vote cast against admission of Peking to the UN in 1965, and the status of a signatory to a defense treaty with the West. Each of these factors is counted as one point in a rating scale of zero to three points. Of the eighteen independent countries endorsed as targets of revolution, fifteen have a zero rating on the scale of "official friendliness," while the remaining three show a rating of only one out of a possible three points. With regard to the measure of "official hostility," fourteen out of these eighteen nations have a score of three, and two others a score of two, while only two nations score less than two. Of the four independent countries that were sites of an armed struggle in 1965 but were not endorsed by Peking as targets of revolution, all had a "friendliness rating" of two and a "hostility rating" of zero. Van Ness's simple conclusion is that "the primary factor in Peking's decision [to endorse publicly an armed struggle in another nation] is the nature of the policy pursued by the government of a particular country with respect to the People's Re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

public of China" (p. 169). Peking in effect uses support for "armed struggle" against an established government as a threat and sanction against a foreign government which adopts a hostile policy (p. 193).

Van Ness's generalization does not cover all aspects of Peking's support for wars of national liberation. Peking's failure to give public endorsement to armed struggles in a particular country does not rule out clandestine support of various types. In a way, Van Ness's conclusion flows automatically from his definition of the problem and his choice of public endorsement as the indicator of Peking's support. Given the lack of reliable information on other kinds of support by Peking, his choice is not an unreasonable one. But obviously, Peking could not openly support armed struggles in a nation with which she maintained diplomatic relations and other effective ties without damage to these ties. Be that as it may, Van Ness's study does show that the system of nation-states and a recognized status within it did impose a restraint on the PRC's policy of supporting revolutions abroad, at least to the extent of discouraging Peking from publicly endorsing armed struggles in a nation which maintained a working relationship with her on the government-to-government level.

In order to gain a full view of Peking's foreign policy, problem-oriented studies as exemplified by Van Ness's work must be supplemented by and checked against intensive studies of a single case or a few cases. Daniel Lovelace's *China and "People's War" in Thailand, 1964–1969* is one such recent work. It deals with a country which the United States is committed to defend unilaterally (by the Rusk-Thant joint statement of March 1962) if SEATO should fail to respond to Thailand's appeal for assistance. According to Lovelace, "the Chinese seem to have provided the propaganda and front support [to the local insurgents] while the North Vietnamese have contributed aid in the form of training and supplies" (p. 66). But his study, along with many others, stresses the contrast between Peking's strong verbal commitment to the support for national liberation movements and the actual level of support given to them. He also finds that Peking's support to the insurgents "began only *after* the Tonkin Gulf Incident and the initiation of U.S. clandestine bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail" (p. 78; emphasis in original). Thailand was chosen as a target "primarily because of its activities as an ally of the United States in Vietnam, rather than because of its traditional anti-Communist or anti-Chinese attitudes" (p. 80).

The now familiar conclusion that Peking poses no serious threat to other nations is stated once more by Bruce D. Larkin, in his thor-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

oughly researched *China and Africa, 1949–1970*. He writes: "China's aims in Africa include revolutionary aims which are not important for the short term and are unlikely, in any case, to be achieved. There is no convincing evidence that Peking's revolutionists are a major threat to indigenous African political life" (pp. 5-6). With regard to the crisis in the Congo (Léopoldville) from 1961 to 1964, where China took a series of actions most alarming to the West, he shows that even before Lumumba's assassination, the sober tone, the moderate expectations entertained for the Lumumba-Gizenga group, and the concern for objective conditions in her secret analysis stood in sharp contrast to her optimistic public statements. Throughout the three-year crisis, the Chinese risked little and proceeded cautiously.

Chou En-lai's remarks, during his tour of Africa from December 1963 to February 1964, that "an excellent revolutionary situation exists in Africa" and that the African peoples were "pushing the revolution forward" cannot be correctly interpreted as an assault on men presently in power (p. 70). This judgment challenges an interpretation championed by the Western press and advanced by some African leaders at that time. Between 1965 and 1967, China suffered serious setbacks in Africa as Burundi, the Central African Republic, Dahomey, Ghana, and Tunisia broke or suspended diplomatic relations with China one after the other, and the relationship with Kenya was seriously strained. But Larkin finds that in many of these cases China was "the victim of bad luck, of military coups and even of the uncontrollable aggressiveness of indigenous radicals" (p. 141). His view is that "African governments which choose to create relations with China may generate useful opportunities for themselves and lessen, rather than enhance, the likelihood that they will be disrupted by China's pursuit of world revolution" (p. 14). On American policy toward China, Larkin observes that "opportunities to undo false perceptions are lost if China is excluded from normal relations" (p. 196), and that "China is more likely to urge revolutionary action in Africa if she believes that the Soviet Union and United States systematically frustrate Chinese efforts to win a fitting place in the world" (p. 13).

Larkin's analysis and his explicit and implicit suggestions for policy gain added weight precisely because he takes more seriously than Van Ness China's long-term goal of world revolution, her model of gaining power, her policy of promoting national revolution as a step toward social revolution in Africa (as some of the Chinese leaders would want radicals and revolutionaries abroad to believe). He also notes that the short-term pragmatic, evolutionary, and non-disruptive policies are

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consistent with the long-term ideological, revolutionary, and disruptive policies—in conception if not in actuality—because the short-term policies can be considered preparatory steps for achieving the long-term goal.

The shift from the now abandoned American policy to the new approach has stemmed not only from a change in the evaluation of Peking's capabilities for good or evil and of her aggressiveness in foreign relations—an obvious point and the lowest common denominator among many scholars and officials. Beyond this change, one can also detect in the writing of some China specialists an underlying hope and assumption, expressed in various degrees of explicitness or implicitness, that China will play a constructive rather than a disruptive role in international politics, and that she will try to promote change within the existing system of nation-states largely through evolutionary methods. This underlying assumption implies a rethinking of the theoretical framework with which China's international behavior has been analyzed in the United States. Such rethinking would construe Peking's foreign policies and actions as a case of the confrontation between a revolutionary regime with a Messianic message and the international system, leading to a process of adjustment between the two.

Daniel Tretiak is one of the first China specialists to pose the problem explicitly in these terms.[15] This definition of the problem also underlies the works of Van Ness and Larkin. In comparison with the two most significant cases in modern history, revolutionary France and Russia, China's capabilities to change the international status quo in the foreseeable future are weak. This weakness makes China's challenge less formidable. Unlike the French and Russian leadership, however, the Chinese leadership had, in its rise to power, accumulated long experience in successfully waging political-military-revolutionary warfare against heavy odds. That experience bolsters China's revolutionary confidence and may induce the Chinese to cling to their revolutionary vision and to persist in a protracted struggle by using pragmatic, evolutionary, and moderate policies as expedient means for a certain period of time, to be followed at a suitable moment by revolutionary policies in order to achieve their ultimate goals. The Chinese tendency to believe that their revolutionary experience can be applied to the international arena complicates the task of evaluating the long-term meaning of China's short-term policies.

[15] Daniel Tretiak, "China's Relations with Latin America: Revolutionary Theory in a Distant Milieu" in Jerome Cohen, ed., *The Dynamics of China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, Mass. 1970), 88-105.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From an even broader theoretical perspective, the challenge of a revolutionary state and its subsequent adjustment to the international system can be considered a case of a radical political movement's confrontation with the status quo and its subsequent de-radicalization.[16] Following Tucker's lead and modifying some of his formulations, one can suggest that a radical movement or a revolutionary state will come to terms with the existing political system if two conditions are fulfilled.[17] The first relates to the strength of the existing order, both objectively and as perceived by the radicals or former radicals. If the existing order is objectively so strong (and is so perceived by the radicals) that they cannot survive and flourish by the use of revolutionary methods, then the process of de-radicalization will set in. The second condition is that the radical movement has acquired a fair stake and a proper place in a well-defined, stable, and above all a just political system, commensurate with its strength, its appeal, and its potential contribution to stability and progress. These two conditions must exist concurrently. The presence of the first without the second—a situation which American policy toward China from 1951 to 1969 sought to create—would merely strengthen the long-term determination of the radical movement or revolutionary state to challenge the existing system, and provoke it to take disruptive actions whenever opportunities present themselves. Peking's shift from the policies of "peaceful coexistence" of the Bandung period to the militant policies symbolized by the slogan of "the East wind prevails over the West wind" can be seen in this light. This analysis parallels one of Larkin's hypotheses: "The CCP leadership is more likely to question or discard evolutionary strategies if using such strategies does not improve China's freedom of choice" (pp. 13-14).

The presence of the second condition without the first entails a similar danger. To give a radical movement or a revolutionary state a fair stake in the status quo and a proper place in the system necessarily entails an increase in its capabilities and prestige. Instead of weakening the urge to change the system, such an increase may give the radical movement or the revolutionary state a better chance to challenge the system successfully. Worldly success can lead to two diametrically opposite results: de-radicalization or re-radicalization. The outcome

[16] Robert C. Tucker, "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (June 1967), 343-58.

[17] Tang Tsou, "Comments on Tucker's 'The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements,'" paper read at the Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association, September 1966; subsequently published as "Communication to the Editors," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (December 1967), 1101-03.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hinges on whether both conditions are present simultaneously, or whether one condition exists without the other. When both conditions obtain simultaneously, the risks incurred by the radical movement or the revolutionary state in adopting revolutionary methods will be greater and weigh more heavily, in the minds of the leaders, than the chances of successfully challenging the system; the political forces in the radical movement and the revolutionary state that value their stake in the political system and perceive its strength will be stronger than their opponents. On paper, it is easy to give a broad and tentative answer to the question of bringing about an adjustment between a radical movement or a revolutionary state and the international political system. In practice, statesmanship of the highest order is required to solve the problem. By beginning a process through which Peking may acquire a proper place and a fair stake in an evolving structure of power relationships, President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger have corrected a one-sided and incorrect policy of dealing with China. It remains to be seen where this process will lead.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EDWARD S. CORWIN'S
The Constitution and What It Means Today

1973 Edition
Revised and Edited by HAROLD W. CHASE and CRAIG R. DUCAT

In this new edition of Edward S. Corwin's classic book on U.S. Constitutional Law, Harold W. Chase and Craig R. Ducat have sought to retain the incisive flavor and commentary of earlier editions. New material covers the passage of the 23rd through the 26th Amendments, and includes decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts. This edition also contains a supplement on the 1972-73 Supreme Court session. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $3.95

THE CIVIL-MILITARY FABRIC OF WEIMAR FOREIGN POLICY

GAINES POST, JR.

In the historiographic debate over Germany's responsibility for the outbreak of the two world wars, little attention has been paid to German politico-military activity in the Weimar Republic. The author examines the relationship between foreign policy and military planning, and charts its directions and changes to develop a model of German civil-military relations which illuminates the general problem of modern civil-military relations. $16.00

ELITES AGAINST DEMOCRACY
Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890-1933

WALTER STRUVE

The author relates biography to intellectual, political, social, and economic history in this study of the development of the German concept of an open yet authoritarian elite, and analyzes the political ideas and activities of nine elitists, among them Max Weber, Walther Rathenau, and Oswald Spengler. "An extremely significant contribution, an effective addition to the method of intellectual history, and a consequential thesis that is new and very instructive."
—William S. Allen Cloth, $20.00; Limited paperback, $9.75

now in paperback . . .

THE CAPTIVE PRESS IN THE THIRD REICH

ORON J. HALE

"How Hilter did it, how he reduced to mindless uniformity the most varied and decentralized press in the world, is explained in Oron J. Hale's book—a model of detailed but clear scholarship which will certainly be the standard work on the subject."—H. R. Trevor-Roper, *The New York Times Book Review*
Cloth, $12.50; paper, $3.45

now in paperback . . .

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN MODERN JAPAN

Edited by ROBERT E. WARD

"When American scholarship can be made to intersect, even partially, with Japanese scholarship, as in this volume, the results are impressive, as much for what they suggest for the future as for what they tell us now."—R. A. Miller, *The Yale Review*

Studies in the Modernization of Japan Cloth, $16.00; paper, $3.95

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

now in paperback . . .

HOW THE CONSERVATIVES RULE JAPAN

NATHANIEL B. THAYER

"The first major work focusing directly on the intricate mechanisms of conservative rule. . . . For the first time the organization and behavior of the Liberal Democratic party are subjected to a seasoned political scientist's systematic and critical observation and analysis."—Haruhiro Fukui, *American Political Science Review* Cloth, $12.50; paper, $3.45

TEACHERS AND POLITICS IN JAPAN

DONALD R. THURSTON

This descriptive and analytic study of the Japan Teachers' Union, an important and controversial interest group in Japanese politics, reveals a great deal about Japan's educational and political systems. The author's purpose is to discover how much influence the JTU has had on its own members and on the formulation and implementation of educational policies. *Studies of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University* $14.50

BLACK POWER/WHITE CONTROL
The Struggle of The Woodlawn Organization in Chicago

JOHN HALL FISH

Founded in Chicago in 1961 by a group of clergymen, with tactical advice from Saul Alinsky, TWO became one of the most exciting, controversial, and significant experiments in community control. John Hall Fish, an active participant in TWO, traces the organization's history and the problems that threatened the black inner-city community in the Woodlawn area. "John Hall Fish's thoughtful analysis of The Woodlawn Organization's internal and external struggles is relevant to participants in and students of community control in every American city."
—Herbert J. Gans $12.50

DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS

Edited by ORLEY ASHENFELTER and ALBERT REES

Five experts from business, government, labor, civil rights organizations, and economics discuss important aspects of discrimination in the labor market: Kenneth Arrow lays the theoretical foundations of the economic analysis of discrimination; Finis Welch views the relationship between schooling and labor market discrimination; Orley Ashenfelter presents a method for estimating the effect of trade unionism on the wages of black workers relative to whites; Ronald Oaxaca discusses discrimination against women; and Phyllis Wallace examines public policy on discrimination. Discussions of these papers are provided by Melvin W. Reder, Richard Freeman, Herbert Hill, Barbara R. Bergmann, and Dale L. Hiestand. $9.00

THEORY OF UNION BARGAINING GOALS

WALLACE N. ATHERTON

Wallace Atherton discusses a single but very important facet of the behavior of labor unions—the ways in which their bargaining objectives are determined. The analysis starts with a theory whose form and substance are close to existing theories, and then is altered by adding unfamiliar elements. "One of the few attempts to incorporate the internal political aspects of trade union behavior into a formal model with implications for economic variables."—Orley Ashenfelter $9.50

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Latin America and the United States

The Changing Political Realities

JULIO COTLER AND RICHARD R. FAGEN, EDITORS. It is clear today that the realities of Latin America are changing more rapidly than knowledge about those realities, that Latin America can no longer be understood as merely the shadow cast by the Colossus of the North. In an effort to explore the nature of these relations, a group of distinguished social scientists present twenty-two papers covering such topics as the politics of the multinational corporation, military elites and military thinking, and the sources of U.S. foreign policy. Paper, $4.95[x]; cloth, $18.75

Stanford University Press

The Political Science Department and the Center for the Study of the Causes of War and Conditions of Peace at Utah State University sponsored a Merrill Visiting Scholar Lecture Series, with each lecturer contributing a distinctive paper toward a collected work entitled:

THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE IN THE 1970s: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND STRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES, *ed. Wolfram Hanrieder, Winthrop Publishing Co., April, 1974.*

Wolfram Hanrieder, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara and Merrill Professor at U.S.U., Spring, 1973, directed the lecture series and compiled the writing of the twelve visiting scholars: Hans J. Morgenthau, David Walker, Edward Morse, Arnulf Baring, Paul Y. Hammond, Robert Hunter, David Calleo, Stanley Hoffmann, William Diebold, Kenneth Waltz, John Yochelson, Robert C. Livingston

THE MILTON R. MERRILL CHAIR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE is an annually rotating professorship directed toward bringing distinguished political scientists to U.S.U. The mission of the CENTER is to explore important issues and problems that will effect international stability in the coming years.

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Journal of
PALESTINE STUDIES

WINTER 1974 VOL. III, NO. 2

A Special Issue on the October War and its Aftermath

The first comprehensive analysis of the recent war to appear in English.

The Egyptian and Syrian Campaigns ★ Arab and Israeli Reactions ★ Oil as a Political Weapon ★ The US Role ★ Western Europe and the Conflict ★

Kissinger meets Haikal ★ Shazli on how Egypt crossed the Canal ★ Faisal and the Shah discuss Oil ★ Senator Fulbright on the Great Powers and the Conflict ★

The Journal of Palestine Studies is the only English-language quarterly in the world dealing exclusively with the Palestine problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

REVIEWS OF RECENT BOOKS FROM THE HEBREW PRESS, PERIODICALS IN REVIEW, VIEWS FROM ABROAD, DOCUMENTS & SOURCE MATERIAL, ARAB REPORTS & ANALYSES

Annual subscription rates: US $12.00, £4.90.
Student rate: US $7.00, £2.80. Single copy: $3.00, £1.20

Obtainable from

The Institute for Palestine Studies

P.O. Box 7164, Beirut, Lebanon Box 329A, R.D. No. 1, Oxford, Pa. 19363, U.S.A.

FROM THE

Center of International Studies

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

KENYA

The Politics of Participation and Control

By Henry Bienen

Henry Bienen's case study of political participation in Kenya discusses administration, party politics, ethnicity, and class. He suggests that, in a system dominated by elites, individuals and groups exert influence primarily through patron-client networks and local administrative and party organs. Local politics is the most important arena for most people. As long as the regime adopts policies which maximize economic growth and take account of peasant middle and small holders, and as long as individual representatives can be replaced even though no change of regime occurs, limited political participation leads to political stability. $10.00

Order from your bookstore, or
Princeton University Press
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

social
science
INFORMATION
sur les
sciences
sociales

An international journal in English and French published six times yearly by the International Social Science Council.

Volume XII **Numbers 3 & 4** **June & August 1973**

FROM THE CONTENTS

Articles by:

Luc BOLTANSKI	Erwin Goffman et le temps du soupçon: A propos de la publication en français de **La représentation de soi dans la vie quotidienne.**
François BRESSON	Some aspects of mathematization in psychology.
John H. CROOK	Darwinism and the sexual politics of primates.
David EASTON	Reflections on criticisms.
Roger D. MASTERS	Functional approaches to analogical comparison between species.
Roberto MIGUELEZ	Applications de la théorie sémantique à la théorie de l'histoire.
Mark A. TESSLER	Problems of measurement in comparative research: Perspectives from an African survey.

and other contributions to the sections: Animal and human ethology, Comparative research, Family sociology, Inventories and bibliographies, Review articles, Theory and methods, Trends and developments.

Subscription price: Institutions, 125 F; Individuals, 98 F yearly, payable to the publisher: Mouton & Co., Periodicals Department, P.D. Box 482, The Hague, Netherlands.

Editorial address: International Social Science Council, Unesco, 1 rue Miollis, 75015 Paris, France.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Fall 1973 **Volume 27, No. 2**

POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF MULTI-STATE NATIONS

PARTITION AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT
Ray E. Johnston

TWO GERMANIES—AND THEN?
Joachim Remak

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION IN DIVIDED GERMANY
Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr.

KOREA: THE PREPOSTEROUS DIVISION
Gregory Henderson

THE CHANGING PATTERN OF ASIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: PROSPECTS FOR THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA
Soon Sung Cho

ONE PEOPLE OR TWO? THE ORIGINS OF PARTITION AND THE PROSPECTS FOR UNIFICATION IN IRELAND
Thomas E. Hachey

CIVIL WAR IN IRELAND: A TRAGEDY IN ENDLESS ACTS?
Richard Ned Lebow

BOOK REVIEWS

Golam Choudhury, Yung-Hwan Jo, Richard Merritt, Robert St-Cyr, Stephen Walker

Subscriptions: Single current issue $2.25; single back issue $2.50; one year $4.50; two years $8.50; three years $12.50. Plus 50 cents per issue for foreign postage and handling.

School of International Affairs, Columbia University

Offices: 420 West 118th Street, New York, New York 10027

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

An international journal for the study of China

JANUARY-MARCH 1974 **ISSUE NO. 57**

Communications Within the Bureaucracy — Michel Oksenberg
Some Observations on Current Fertility Control in China — Carl Djerassi
The 1972 Shipping Regulations — Anthony Dicks
The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement: A Relationship of Ambivalence — Gene Hsiao

Research Note
Political Profiles: Wang Hung-wen and Li Teh-sheng — Parris Chang

Report from China:
"Revolution in Education" Committees — Robert McCormick

COMMENT **BOOK REVIEWS**
QUARTERLY CHRONICLE AND DOCUMENTATION

Editorial Office:
School of Oriental and African Studies
Malet Street, London WC1E 7HP

Subscriptions:
Research Publications Ltd., Victoria Hall, East Greenwich, London SE10 ORF

Subscription Rates: £4 or U.S. $10.00 a year
For full-time students: £2 or U.S. $5.00 a year
Individual copies: £1.00 or U.S. $2.50

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Comparative Politics

The quarterly journal of the Political Science Program, The City University of New York.

Volume 6, Number 3, April 1974:

"Political Participation and the Life Cycle," by Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and Jae-on Kim.

"The Political Mainsprings of Economic Planning in the New Nations: The Modernization Imperative versus Social Mobilization," by Baldev Raj Nayar

"A Typology of Latin American Political Systems," by Eldon Lanning

"Political Party Leadership in Colombia: A Spatial Analysis," by Gary Hoskins and Gerald Swanson

"Bureaucrats as Modernizing Brokers? Clientelism in Colombia," by Sterfen W. Schmidt

"Attitudes of French Lycéens toward Nation and Government," Research Note by Robert C. Frasure and David J. Falcone

"The Study of Elite Circulation: Who's on First and What's He Doing There?" Review Article by I. William Zartman

---

Subscription Fulfillment, Comparative Politics, 49 Sheridan Ave., Albany, New York, 12210

Enclosed is my check or money order for a subscription to **Comparative Politics** for _____ year(s) at $_____. (Individuals, 1 year $10.00; 2 years $19.50; 3 years, $29.00. Institutions, $15.00 per year. Students, $7.00 per year. Add $.50 postage for Canada and PUAS and $1.00 foreign postage annually.)

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ABSTRACTS

A Bimonthly Journal

The *International Political Science Abstracts* published in 1973 abstracts of 4,555 articles from 560 journals (including 128 published in the United States) of which 54 are covered in full. Articles published in English are abstracted in English. Articles in other languages (approximately 30%) are abstracted in French. Each issue contains a subject index; each annual volume carries a cumulative subject and author index.

Board of Editors

Jean Laponce, University of British Columbia, President of the International Political Science Association
Stein Rokkan, University of Bergen
David Easton, University of Chicago
H.R.G. Greaves, London School of Economics and Political Science
Richard I. Hofferbert, University of Michigan
Jean Meyriat, International Committee for Social Sciences Documentation
André Philippart, Secretary General of I.P.S.A.

Editor

Serge Hurtig, Secretary General, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris

Annual Subscription

Institutions F.F. 225 ..... approx. $53.00 (post devaluation rate)
Individual subscribers F.F. 100 ..... approx. $23.50 (post devaluation rate)

All subscriptions should be addressed to
IPSA-Abstracts, 27, rue Saint-Guillaume, 75 PARIS 7e, France

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE ROUND TABLE

The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs

Editor—Robert Jackson, All Souls College, Oxford

THE ROUND TABLE offers a combination of scholarship and controversy on current international, political and economic affairs with special reference to the Commonwealth.

ISSUE NO. 252 OCTOBER 1973

Editorial—After Ottawa

Peter Shore—Labour's Foreign Policy

Saul Rose—"Westminster" in South Asia

Michael Howard—The Future of N.A.T.O.

Richard Hodder-Williams—Malawi under Dr. Banda

A.J.R. Groom—British Defence Policy since 1970

Ian Clark—Soviet Policy in Asia

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION: £4

(four issues: January, April, July and October)
from the Journal's Manager, Oxford University Press, Neasden, London NW10 ODD
and from all booksellers
(rates for Overseas Subscriptions on application)

THE ROUND TABLE
18 Northumberland Avenue, London WC2N 5AP, England

RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SCIENZA POLITICA

Quadrimestrale di
scienza politica

Anno III—No. 2—Agosto 1973

SOMMARIO

Saggi

L. Morlino, *Stabilità, legittimità e efficacia decisionale nei sistemi democratici*

L. Pellicani, *Mobilitazione sociale e crisi rivoluzionaria*

Ricerche

S. H. Barnes & B. Farah, *Rappresentanti e circoscrizioni in Italia e in Germania*

G. Pasquino, *Mutamenti socio-economici, élites e decadenza politica: il caso argentino*

Note

A. Podgorecki, *Un paradigma per l'ingegneria sociale*

F. Rizzi, *Dall'unificazione alla scissione socialista* (1966-69)

Recensioni—Summaries

Pubblicata tre volte all'anno dalla Società editrice il Mulino—Via Santo Stefano 6—40125 Bologna. Abbonamento annuo: Lit. 5000 per l'Italia e 6000 per l'estero.

Published three times a year by Società editrice il Mulino—Via Santo Stefano 6—40125 Bologna, Italy—Subscriptions: Lit. 5000 for Italy; Lit. 6000 abroad

Publié trois fois par an par Società editrice il Mulino—Via Santo Stefano 6—40125 Bologna, Italie. Abonnements: Lit. 5000 pour l'Italie, Lit. 6000 pour l'étranger.

Direttore: Giovanni Sartori—Redattore—capo: Gianfranco Pasquino

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FORO INTERNACIONAL

Revista Trimestral Publicada Por el Colegio de México

Fundador: DANIEL COSIO VILLEGAS
Director: RAFAEL SEGOVIA
Director Adjunto: BLANCA TORRES RAMIREZ

VOL. XIV OCTUBRE-DICIEMBRE, 1973 NUM. 2

INDICE

ARTICULOS

RUBÉN KAZTMAN, Movimiento sindical y decisiones nacionales

FRANCISCO ALCALÁ QUINTERO, México y su relación con el mercado común centroamericano

CELSO LAFER, Comercio internacional: fórmulas jurídicas y realidades político-económicas

ROGER E. KANET, Esferas de influencia de la política exterior soviética

NOTA DE INVESTIGACION

RESEÑAS DE LIBROS

LIBROS RECIBIDOS

Precio del ejemplar: 18.00 pesos, U.S. Dls. 1.60
Suscripción anual (4 números): 60.00 pesos, U.S. Dls. 6.00

EL COLEGIO DE MEXICO
Departamento de Publicaciones
Guanajuato 125
México 7, D.F.

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

An International Interdisciplinary Journal

Some recent and forthcoming articles of interest:

Comparative Communism Versus Comparative Politics by JOHN H. KAUTSKY

Change in Communist Systems and the Comparative Analysis of Modern Societies by S. N. EISENSTADT

Communist Systems and Modernization: Sources of Political Crises by PAUL H. B. GODWIN

Non-ruling Communist Parties and Political Adaptation by THOMAS H. GREENE

The Soviet Union, China, and the Revolutionary Movement in Laos by PAUL F. LANGER

A Comparison of the Current Chinese and Soviet Central Committees by DEREK J. WALLER and ROBERT H. DONALDSON

The editors plan special issues devoted to urban and national minorities problems, political succession, civil-military relations, and personality and politics in Communist systems. Inquiries and manuscripts on these subjects, as well as on comparative analyses of divided countries and across political systems, are invited.

Graduate Student Essays: Advanced graduate students in the social sciences are encouraged to submit manuscipts of article and research-note length.

Published quarterly by the School of International Relations, University of Southern California, VKC 330, University Park, Los Angeles, Calif. 90007.

Subscriptions: Individuals $10 a year, institutions $16 a year (postage included).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRINCETON · UNIVERSITY · PRESS

AFGHANISTAN

LOUIS DUPREE

The ancient land and the modern nation of Afghanistan are the subject of Louis Dupree's sweeping narrative. His purpose is to identify the major patterns of Afghan history, society, and culture as they have developed from the Stone Age to the present. Mr. Dupree's encyclopedic account is divided, for convenience, into four parts: the land, the people, the past, and the present (the beginning of modern Afghanistan, its social and political development from the nineteenth century to the 1970's). The book includes an epilogue on the possible effects on Afghanistan's future of the *coup d'etat* of July 1973. $22.50

UDI

The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion

ROBERT C. GOOD

Robert C. Good provides an immensely readable account of the complex sequence of events which led to the "unilateral declaration of independence" of Rhodesia in November 1965 and to the settlement of November 1971. The emphasis is on the international repercussions, which put great political and financial strains on Great Britain, placed Zambia in mortal danger, and promoted an unprecedented involvement of the United Nations in programs of dubious effectiveness. "The best study of the Rhodesian problem written, and the first to put it in its geo-political context." —W. Scott Thompson $12.50

THE SOVIET VOLUNTEERS

Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organization

WILLIAM E. ODOM

Founded in 1927, the Society of Friends of Defense and Aviation-Chemical Construction, or "Osoaviakhim," became the largest mass voluntary association in the Soviet Union before World War II. Using the language and concepts of Western social science, William Odom recounts the development of Osoaviakhim in its first decade. "The Odom volume represents one of the few successful Western attempts to explain an organization/interest group in a Communist system through the application of Western social science methods and approaches."—Roman Kolkowicz $14.50

URBAN NETWORKS IN CH'ING CHINA AND TOKUGAWA JAPAN

GILBERT ROZMAN

Gilbert Rozman draws on both sociology and history to develop original methods of illuminating the historical urbanization of China and Japan and to provide a way of relating urban patterns to other characteristics of social structure in premodern societies. "The place of Chinese and Japanese urbanization in the premodern world perspective, as presented here, is an exciting breakthrough on a vital subject. In this light, this is a totally new work in the body of literature on Chinese and Japanese societies."—C. K. Yang $16.50

THE BRAZILIAN-AMERICAN ALLIANCE, 1937-1945

FRANK D. McCANN, JR.

Frank D. McCann uses previously inaccessible Brazilian archival material to discuss the events which brought about a close alliance between the United States and Brazil during the regime of Getúlio Dornelles Vargas. The author's analysis of Brazil's decision to join the Allies affords a view of the diplomatic uses of economic and military aid and provides insights into the military's influence on foreign policy, and into the functioning of Vargas' *Estado Nôvo*. $18.50

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS Princeton, N. J. 08540

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED